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Abstract
This thesis investigates the long-run development of credit markets around the world
and the legal frameworks governing them. Chapter 1 begins by discussing open ques-
tions about financial sector development and financial crises, in particular the role of
financial regulation and bankruptcy frameworks. One striking pattern that emerges
is the relative paucity of comparable cross-country data on the structure of debt mar-
kets. Chapter 2 thus introduces a new resource for macro-finance research: a long-run
database on the outstanding amount and sectoral allocation of credit in 120 countries
all over the globe from 1910. I discuss in detail how I constructed comparable data on
the sectoral level from over 600 archival sources and present a range of new stylized
facts. Perhaps most strikingly, corporate credit (relative to GDP) stopped expanding
all over the world around 1980, while household credit has skyrocketed. Importantly,
the rise of household credit is not only driven by mortgages but also consumer credit –
particularly in emerging economies. I then test empirically which theories can explain
these trends in credit allocation.
A potential policy implication some may want to draw from the stylized facts in
Chapter 2 is that regulators should target particular sectors to influence the alloca-
tion of credit. To this end, many central banks around the world regularly use macro-
prudential tools, which are supposed to prevent a build-up of systemic risk. In chapter
3, I show that such targeted policies historically exhibit a large, robust electoral cycle
around the world. More precisely, prudential tools are considerably less likely to be
tightened, and more likely to be loosened, in pre-election quarters – particularly when
upcoming elections are expected to be close. Central bank independence, which is
thought to ease political economy constraints, does not appear to be an important
moderating factor for the election cycle in prudential regulation; it does, however,
eliminate electoral cycles in monetary policy. Taken at face value, these findings sug-
gest that the more immediate effect of prudential policies on the median voter might
make them more difficult to implement than previously imagined.
In Chapter 4, I turn to another legal determinant of credit market outcomes: the
efficiency of bankruptcy courts. While it is well known that legal frameworks matter
for the development of debt markets, much less is known about the implementation
of law into practice, i.e. debt enforcement. I study this question using quasi-random
exposure of firm borrowers to the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Pro-
tection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) in the United States. BAPCPA fundamentally reformed
consumer bankruptcies, which resulted in the largest drop of bankruptcy filings re-
corded in US history, particularly in districts with a historically higher share of con-
sumer cases. Because BAPCPA left bankruptcy rules for firms largely unchanged, I
can identify the causal effect of reduced court congestion on financing terms. I find
that the drop in caseload per judge was associated with an improvement in interest
rate spreads and loan maturities. A back-of-the-envelope calculation implies that the
social costs of busy courts are large.
Chapter 5 provides implications of my thesis for policy makers and future research.
I also discuss some preliminary results from ongoing research into how credit is alloc-
ated during credit booms and their association with subsequent banking crises.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Great Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 has led to a reevaluation of the role of credit for
macroeconomic dynamics. Long thought of as a mere “veil”, there is now an emerging
consensus that debt contracts are important for understanding economic development
in the long-run but also business cycle fluctuations. Despite a wealth of new insights, it
has proven extraordinarily difficult for policy makers to derive regulatory frameworks
in the post-crisis era, because relatively recent research appears to partially contradict
long-held beliefs about the welfare effects of growing financial sectors. In this thesis, I
provide new empirical evidence that I hope will contribute to this important debate.
The role of banking and finance has a long tradition in economics, dating back at
least to the classic work of Bagehot (1873). One of the early contributors was Schum-
peter (1912), who argued that credit creation by banks enables entrepreneurs to en-
gage in innovative projects, and thus drives economic growth. Both Von Mises (1912)
and Hayek (1929) saw credit as an important driver of the business cycle. Goldsmith
(1969) first documented a positive correlation between the size of the financial sec-
tor and economic development. A large body of literature, starting with the seminal
work of King and Levine (1993), found empirical evidence for a link between financial
development and economic growth on the macro-level, and argue that this partially
reflects causality going from finance to growth.1.
The perhaps most convincing evidence, however, comes from studies using sec-
toral or firm-level data. Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that manufacturing industries
with a higher dependence on external financing grow faster in countries with higher
financial development (see also Guiso et al., 2004a). These industries also experience
deeper downturns during recessions, particularly when they have fewer tangible as-
sets (Braun and Larrain, 2005). In countries with more developed financial systems,
risky borrowers can also pledge less and more firm-specific collateral, which eases
financing constraints (Liberti and Mian, 2010). Fisman and Love (2007) and Bekaert
et al. (2007) find that financial development and liberalization, respectively, are asso-
1Major contributions include Arestis and Demetriades (1997), Rousseau and Wachtel (1998), Beck
et al. (2000), Levine et al. (2000), Wurgler (2000), and Guiso et al. (2004b). See Levine (1997), Levine
(2005), Beck (2008), and Popov (2017) for excellent surveys. The literature on financial liberalizations
has also found growth effects of plausibly more exogenous reforms (e.g. Henry, 2000b,a; Bekaert et al.,
2001, 2005; Levchenko et al., 2009). These findings are also related to the literature on the bank lending
channel of monetary policy, e.g. Jiménez et al. (2012) and the references therein.
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ciated with higher growth in industries with higher growth opportunities. Banerjee
and Duflo (2014), Brown and Earle (2017), and Lelarge et al. (2010) use exogenous,
policy-induced changes to firms’ access to debt financing and show that these have
large effects on firm outcomes. A large separate literature on banking deregulation in
the United States has shown largely positive effects on borrowers (see Kroszner and
Strahan, 2014, for a survey); Bertrand et al. (2004) provide similar evidence for France.
This is intuitive, given that such deregulations have been found to be accompanied by
large changes to credit markets (see e.g. Keil and Müller, 2018).
There is also evidence on a tight link between finance and innovation, but the res-
ults are considerably less clear-cut. Hsu et al. (2014), for example, find that more de-
veloped equity markets foster innovation in a sample of 32 countries, but larger debt
markets have a detrimental effect. A related paper by Brown et al. (2013) finds that
credit markets have an effect on fixed investment, but only equity markets matter for
R&D. Also looking across countries, Acharya and Subramanian (2009) find that more
creditor-friendly bankruptcy codes that foster financial development (Djankov et al.,
2007) are associated with less innovation. These findings are consistent with the ex-
istence of pervasive information asymmetries in debt markets (e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss,
1981). Drawing on the US experience, Chava et al. (2013), Cornaggia et al. (2015), Kerr
and Nanda (2009b) find that the effect of deregulation on innovation differs across
private and public firms, and – depending on the type of regulatory change – may
be positive or negative; Amore et al. (2013). Benfratello et al. (2008) find that local
banking development boosts process innovation in Italy. Another separate, largely
survey-based literature on the financing constraints of small and medium sized en-
terprises and entrepreneurship has found that such constraints correlate with inferior
firm performance (e.g. Beck et al., 2005; Kerr and Nanda, 2009a; Fraser et al., 2015);
also see Hall and Lerner (2010) on the financing of R&D and innovation.
However, the latest financial crisis has cast considerable doubt on the unfettered
validity of positive effects of debt market development. Recent data efforts by Schu-
larick and Taylor (2012) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a) have shown that financial
crises across countries and time have been preceded by credit booms (see also Gourin-
chas and Obstfeld, 2012); a finding that has since been replicated by many other stud-
ies. This result is also a consistent finding in the search for early warning indicat-
ors of banking crises (e.g. Reinhart and Kaminsky, 1999; Drehmann et al., 2010, 2011;
Drehmann and Juselius, 2014). Eichengreen and Mitchener (2003) document the effect
of the 1920s credit boom in the context of the Great Depression. Predictively, Lowe
and Borio (2002) describe how financial imbalances can build up in an environment of
low inflation if credit pushes up asset prices. These findings are consistent with earlier
8
work by Loayza and Ranciere (2006), who find a negative short-run but positive long-
run effect of financial development on economic growth.
Additional evidence on what drives short-lived credit booms comes from credit
spreads. Mian et al. (2017b) and Krishnamurthy and Muir (2017) show that spreads
are relatively low prior to recessions and financial crises accompanied by credit booms,
suggesting that credit supply rather than demand is the source of these expansions.
While these empirical findings may be new, the insight that financial sector disrup-
tions may be an important source of business cycle fluctuations are not: Minsky (1986)
and Kindleberger (1978), much cited references in the post-2007 period, argue that
the financial system may be inherently unstable and prone to trigger macroeconomic
crises endogenously.2 Indeed, Danielsson et al. (2016) find that unusually low volatil-
ity is predictive of financial crises.
But why do financial sectors at times lead to growth in output, and at others to ex-
tremely costly crises (Claessens et al., 2009)? How can these apparently contradictory
findings be reconciled?
Theory and existing empirical work suggest that the sectoral allocation of credit
might be key. In early work, Hume and Sentance (2009) argue that a disproportion-
ate amount of credit extended for the acquisition of existing assets was central to the
"growth puzzle" of the 2000s. Beck et al. (2012) find that corporate credit is associated
with the well-documented benefits of economic growth and reductions in income in-
equality, while household credit is not. Similarly, Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) and
Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2015) argue that credit may crowd out growth if it is alloc-
ated to the “wrong” sectors. Chakraborty et al. (2018) find that house price booms lead
to a reallocation of credit from firms to households. Mian et al. (2017a) and Di Maggio
and Kermani (2017) show that changes to banking regulation can create booms but
also subsequent busts, and tend to reallocate resources from the (relatively more pro-
ductive) tradable to the (relatively more unproductive) nontradable sector (see also
Mian and Sufi, 2014a).
The crowding out argument builds on a series of influential papers arguing that
credit growth (or financial development) has a non-linear effect (e.g. Arcand et al.,
2015; Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012, 2015; Gambacorta et al., 2014). In this view, the
financial sector does exert a positive influence, but only up to a point, after which it
may become detrimanetal to growth. This also meshes with the earlier work of East-
erly et al. (2001), who find that higher financial development decreases the volatility
of economic growth, but only up to a point.
2The phenomenon of excessive lending was already stressed by Wicksell (1898), Von Mises (1912),
Hayek (1929), and Fisher (1933).
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Credit allocation has also been identified as a factor in the run-up to financial
crises. Büyükkarabacak and Valev (2010) differentiate between household and cor-
porate credit, and find that the former plays a larger role for crises. Jordà et al. (2014)
and Jordà et al. (2015) use 140 years of data to document that mortgage credit is a sig-
nificantly better predictor of financial crises than non-mortgage credit. More broadly,
Mian et al. (2017b) find that household credit growth predicts recessions in a broad
panel of countries and Bahadir and Gumus (2016) show that household credit matters
more than firm credit for business cycles in emerging markets.
It seems clear that many of the open questions about macro-financial linkages are
hard to address due to a lack of comparable data across countries. While recent ef-
forts by the Bank for International Settlements (Dembiermont et al., 2013), Jordà et al.
(2016), and the IMF Global Debt Database (Mbaye et al., 2018) have laid important
groundwork, we still lack an understanding of what lies beneath the often-used meas-
ure of private credit to GDP. To remedy this limitation, chapter 2 introduces a novel
long-run database on sectoral credit for 120 countries, starting in 1910. By substantially
extending previous data efforts using more than 600 primary and secondary sources, I
am able to document new stylized facts on the evolution of credit in modern banking
systems all over the globe. New long-run time series on household lending (includ-
ing separate series for residential mortgages), and corporate lending by sector, paint a
striking picture: household credit has become the dominating business model of credit
institutions, while corporate lending has essentially stalled since around 1980 in most
of the world.
After addressing what might explain the composition of credit across and within
countries over time, chapter 3 turns to a study of the political economy of financial
regulation. One potential take-away from the new stylized facts I provide is that reg-
ulators should interfere with credit allocation using (macro)prudential tools – an in-
creasingly common practice among central banks (Cerutti et al., 2017a). I show that
the use of targeted sectoral tools is subject to a powerful electoral cycle, drawing on
the near-universe of democratic elections from 2000 to 2014. Policies that likely dir-
ectly affect households are less likely to tighten in the quarters preceding elections,
particularly when the electoral outcomes are expected to be close.
In chapter 4, I turn to an alternative set of legal parameters: the efficiency of bank-
ruptcy courts. A long literature, starting with the seminal work of La Porta et al. (1997,
1998) has shown that legal frameworks matter for access to finance. While changes to
bankruptcy codes and creditor rights are well-studied, surprisingly little is known
about the actual implementation of such laws into practice. I thus build on Djankov
et al. (2008) who show that measures of debt enforcement are positively correlated
10
with the size of debt markets across countries.
More precisely, I study the effect of court efficiency on financial contracts. Identi-
fying causal effects in this setting is clearly fraught with challenges. First, it is rarely
clear what efficiency is and how to measure it. Second, differences in court efficiency
across countries is likely correlated with a myriad of other factors, most obviously the
design of legal codes themselves. As a result, previous work by Ponticelli and Alencar
(2016) and Rodano et al. (2016) find that financial reforms interact with the pre-existing
functioning of courts. Third, even within a given country, poorer or more remote areas
likely have fewer resources for courts, which makes any outcome inherently endogen-
ous to local conditions.
I attempt to overcome these concerns by using a unique quasi-experiment in the
United States: pre-determined geographical exposure to the Bankruptcy Abuse Pre-
vention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). BAPCPA fundamentally re-
formed US bankruptcy procedures for consumer cases, which resulted in the largest
drop in bankruptcy filings ever recorded. Business bankruptcies, however, were largely
unaffected, which allows me to identify the causal effect of court efficiency on the
terms of corporate loan contracts. The US setting also allows me to measure court effi-
ciency in line with what the Judicial Conference of the United States uses: the number
of cases per judge, weighted by the typical time different types of cases take to be
processed.
The exogenous variation in the drop in caseload per judge following BAPCPA al-
lows me to construct estimates of the aggregate costs of inefficient legal enforcement
based on the implied impact on corporate debt service burdens. I find that these costs
are larger and much higher than those of hiring additional judges, even in the most
conservative approximations. My methodology also helps to uncover the US districts
with the highest projected returns to hiring new judges.
Finally, chapter 5 discusses implications of the work laid out in this thesis for fu-
ture research and policy. I start by discussing preliminary results of work on a detailed
assessment of credit booms in the run-up to financial crises and flesh out future dir-
ections. Turning to policy, I then discuss the potential costs and benefits of interfering
with credit allocation in light of political limitations.
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Chapter 2
Credit Markets in the Long-Run,
1910-2014
2.1 Introduction
“Anyone who supposes that financing business is
the primary function of banking is mistaken.”
– John Kay, Other People’s Money (2015)
The Great Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 has brought banking and credit back to the
forefront of macroeconomic enquiry. By now, a flourishing body of research has pro-
duced many new insights into how credit markets work, often drawing on detailed
microeconomic data. Yet despite this interest, there is a surprising paucity of long-run
historical data on credit markets across countries. In particular, very little is known
about how private credit is distributed across industries and households, and whether
and how this allocation has changed over time. This makes it difficult to address ques-
tions such as: What triggers sudden increases in credit availability? Why do some
credit booms end badly, while others do not? Has mortgage lending become the dom-
inant business model of financial institutions?
In this paper, I attempt to close this gap by presenting a large dataset on sectoral
credit for 120 countries. I combine data from more than 600 primary and secondary
sources – many of which were digitalized for the first time – to offer an in-depth look
beyond what constitutes total credit to the private sector. Using previously untapped
sources, I construct series on total lending back to 1910, and novel data on credit by
sector starting in 1940. The harmonized time series offer a much more detailed, disag-
gregated view of the business model of modern credit institutions, and lets me trace
its trajectory over time.
I make three contributions. First, I provide researchers with new harmonized time
series on sectoral credit that are consistent with existing aggregate data on private
credit. The dataset is the result of an extensive data collection effort, drawing on a
wealth of mostly untapped historical publications of statistical agencies, central banks,
regulatory authorities, and banking associations around the world. Large parts of the
12
raw data were digitalized from paper or PDF versions, often through library visits. To
make them comparable across countries and time, I harmonized the raw series with
the generous help of more than 150 individuals working for over 135 national and
international organizations, without whom this project would not have been possible.
All data sources and adjustments have been documented and cross-validated in detail
in an extensive data appendix and spreadsheet collection.
Second, I provide a historical account of changes in the size and composition of
credit markets around the world. A simplified standard textbook view of financial
intermediaries is that they channel savings from households to firms. Yet, a number of
popular accounts have questioned whether this still makes for an accurate description
today (Turner, 2015; Foroohar, 2016; Kay, 2015), supported by studies of the United
States (Greenwood and Scharfstein, 2013) and a small group of advanced economies
(Jordà et al., 2016). But what holds true for the rest of the world?
As a motivating example, consider the loan portfolio of Deutsche Bank – Ger-
many’s largest banking entity with around EUR 1.6 trillion in total assets in 2016,
amounting to 55% of German GDP. In 1957, around 58% of the company’s outstand-
ing loans were extended to industrial companies, a further 27% to retail and wholesale
trade, and only 15% to other sectors including households, real estate, and the finan-
cial sector. By 2016, these ratios had reversed: only 9% of Deutsche Bank’s loans today
are to manufacturing and related industries, retail and wholesale trade are a marginal
component with 4%, and most of the remaining 87% are exposures to households, real
estate firms, and other financial intermediaries. Does this merely reflect changes in a
single institution’s business model or have banking systems around the world shifted
their credit allocation in a similar manner?
The data lends strong support for the latter. Household credit has surged almost
uniformly around the world, despite differences in the growth of the financial sector.
While it is well known that the ratio of credit to GDP has strongly increased since
the 1980s in advanced economies (Schularick and Taylor, 2012), I show that it has
remained essentially flat in emerging economies. The share of household credit, how-
ever, has increased everywhere: in non-OECD advanced and emerging countries, the
average share increased from around 10% in 1960 to around 40% today.
What is perhaps even more striking is the evolution of corporate credit relative to
GDP. With the exception of a recent increase in the wake of the 2008-2009 financial
crisis, firm lending has stayed essentially flat in advanced economies over the past
35 years. In emerging economies, corporate credit has in fact decreased relative to GDP
between 1980 and the mid-2000s by some measures. In other words, firms today do not
borrow more from domestic institutions than in 1980. This, of course, is not a necessity
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from the boom in household lending: credit to firms and households appeared to grow
more or less in tandem until a strong decoupling in the early 1980s.
Importantly, there are substantial differences in what accounts for this growth in
household debt. In advanced economies, residential mortgages account for a relat-
ively stable share of around 60-70% in total household credit, which has seen a slight
increase in the run-up and aftermath of the financial crisis. This is consistent with the
findings of Jordà et al. (2015), who show that mortgages make up an ever-increasing
share of total lending in 17 advanced economies. It also meshes with the finding of
Greenwood and Scharfstein (2013) who show that mortgage debt has grown dramatic-
ally in the United States from 1980 to 2007. I show that the picture differs for emerging
economies: consumer credit, credit cards, and car loans make up a larger and increas-
ing fraction of household lending, weighing in at around 55% today. Taken together,
the data suggest that a simple textbook narrative based on banks taking deposits from
households and lending to firms may be an incomplete characterization of the busi-
ness of modern financial institutions.
Heterogeneity also matters for corporate lending. While the total amount of firm
lending appears to have changed little over the past three decades, its composition cer-
tainly has. All over the globe, agriculture and manufacturing make up an ever smal-
ler share of corporate financing, with emerging economies experiencing the largest
declines. Apart from the tertiary sector, it appears that construction and real estate
has become an increasingly dominant force: even in the reconstruction period fol-
lowing World War II, lending to real estate developers and construction companies
only accounted for around 6% of corporate lending in advanced economies. Today, it
accounts for more than 20%. But even in developing countries, there has been a no-
ticeable increase in the portfolio share of construction loans, particularly compared to
the period 1950-1970.
This range of new stylized facts prompts the question what might explain them.
My third contribution is to study the factors shaping the perhaps most profound shift
in global private debt portfolios: the rise of household credit. Identifying what causes
changes in credit allocation, particularly over long stretches of time, is a daunting chal-
lenge and beyond the scope of this paper. However, I can test a number of candidate
theories using simple correlations, which – while far from conclusive – will hopefully
guide more rigorous future work.
I begin by establishing that much of the variation in the household share in total
lending, around 60%, can be accounted for by time-invariant country factors. The
addition of global factors affecting all countries simultaneously increases the R2 by
another 20% or so; time-varying regional factors do not appear to provide information
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over and above global factors. This means that, to understand the allocation of credit,
we have to understand country-specific aspects and trends spanning the globe.
Next, I consider whether the development of alternative financing sources for firms
can explain their decreasing role in domestic lending. I find that they cannot. Cross-
border lending, for example, has in fact decreased in emerging markets relative to
domestic credit. It also makes up only a tiny fraction of total debt all over the globe,
except in tax havens and for non-bank financial institutions in advanced economies.
Corporate bonds market have increased in importance, but only since the mid-1990s.
And even after adjusting the ratio of corporate credit to GDP for cross-border lend-
ing, bonds, and trade credit, it is still similar today compared to the early 1980s. As
it turns out, these and other measures of alternative financing sources – such as the
ratio of trade, leasing, or foreign direct investment to GDP – are uncorrelated with the
household credit share both across and within countries.
Building on the large literature in law and finance following La Porta et al. (1997,
1998), I consider whether legal frameworks play a role in credit composition across
countries. Indeed, it appears that (at least across countries), legal origins, insolv-
ency frameworks, and debt enforcement have some explanatory power for the use
of household debt. Measures of income, savings, and demographic factors, however,
show much stronger correlations. While it is intuitive that richer countries use more
household credit (Cerutti et al., 2017b; Badev et al., 2014), I also find a role for the dis-
tribution of income. The link between inequality and debt is ex-ante unclear: Beck
et al. (2007), for example, find that financial development disproportionally benefits
the poor across countries; and related evidence exists for the staggered lifting of US
branching restrictions (Beck et al., 2010). An alternative hypothesis is that increases in
inequality may be one of the drivers of household debt booms prior to crises (Kumhof
et al., 2015; Rajan, 2010; Mian and Sufi, 2011). In the data, I find that higher inequality
is associated with a lower household credit share across countries. Conditioning on a
country’s GDP per capita, however, reverses the correlation; given that the intuition of
inequality-fueled credit booms is based on advanced economy experiences, this may
not be entirely surprising. Demographic factors have even higher explanatory power.
The share of the population living in urban areas and that aged between 30 and 49
– likely the main group taking out mortgages – is associated with household credit
within and across countries.
The variables with the highest explanatory power, however, are related to finan-
cial deregulation and information sharing institutions. Popular accounts such as Kay
(2015), Foroohar (2016), and Turner (2015) have made the argument that changes to
banking regulation have led to a “crowding out” of corporate by household credit.
15
This is also related to empirical work by Mian et al. (2017a) and Di Maggio and Ker-
mani (2017), who show the reallocative effects of boom-bust cycles following deregula-
tion. Chakraborty et al. (2018) also provide some evidence consistent with a crowding
out of corporate lending during housing booms. In the data, I find that deregulation
has consistently high explanatory power for the household credit share both across
and within countries. I also find that household debt is more widely used in countries
with higher usage of information sharing institutions, especially private credit bur-
eaus. That is, better information sharing among lenders is not only associated with a
higher ratio of credit to GDP (Djankov et al., 2007), but also a shift away from firm to
household lending.
My work extends previous efforts by Schularick and Taylor (2012), Jordà et al.
(2015), and Jordà et al. (2016) who introduce long-run credit data for 17 advanced
economies starting in 1870. It also builds on institutional efforts at the Bank for In-
ternational Settlements (Dembiermont et al., 2013), World Bank (Cihák et al., 2013),
and the International Monetary Fund in providing such data. The database I present
differs from their work and other sources by providing considerably more granular
estimates of who received credit around the world. To illustrate, the data allow us
to compare the composition of manufacturing lending in Austria and Pakistan in the
1960s or trace the trajectory of household credit growth in Switzerland and Peru from
the 1940s. Put differently, while existing work was able to shed some light on the size
of credit markets (e.g. Djankov et al., 2007), my contribution is to study the allocation
of credit, which was previously impossible due to the lack of cross-country data.
I expect the data to find wide applications for studying the effects of macroeco-
nomic policies on the financial sector, which has largely relied on measures such as
value added and sectoral characteristics to proxy for changes in credit allocation (e.g.
Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Wurgler, 2000). They might also be helpful in testing mod-
els with financial sectors in which sectoral heterogeneity matters (e.g. Schneider and
Tornell, 2004; Matsuyama, 2007, 2013; Rancière and Tornell, 2016; Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe, 2016; Bahadir and Gumus, 2016). At the outset, it is worth stressing that com-
piling time series from at times more than a dozen individual sources per country
introduces a margin of error. To be as transparent as possible, the data appendix ac-
companying this paper lists all sources and adjustment in great detail and compares
my data with existing sources. Still, the data have the potential to be improved and
expanded as new sources become available.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2.2 I introduce the new dataset on sectoral
credit in detail and discuss some aspects of its construction and coverage. In section
2.3 I document a range of new stylized facts about credit markets around the world.
16
Section 2.4 explores determinants of the share of household credit across and within
countries over time. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 A New Global Dataset on Sectoral Credit
I assemble a novel dataset on credit markets for 120 countries from over 600 individual
country sources. The main contribution compared to existing work is that I construct
long-run disaggregated data by households, non-bank financial intermediaries, and
non-financial corporations, which in turn are broken down by up to 115 individual
industries. In addition, I collect data on household credit by purpose, where I can
differentiate in many countries between residential mortgages, consumer credit, credit
cards, and car loans. I also add data on commercial (i.e. non-residential) mortgages.
To be included, I require countries to have credit data for at least two corporate
sub-sectors (e.g. Agriculture and Manufacturing) since 2005. I make four exceptions
for countries that do not fulfill this criterion: China, the Netherlands, Luxembourg,
Sweden, and the United States.1 To guarantee that the detailed data are comparable
across countries and with existing data sources, I also collect new data on total private
credit from national sources. In some cases, these are complemented with existing data
from the Bank for International Settlements, the IMF’s International Financial Statist-
ics (including old paper versions), the United Nations Statistical Yearbook, statistical
publications of the League of Nations, and the advanced economy time series of Jordà
et al. (2016).
Given its disaggregated nature, I document the collection and harmonization of the
credit data in detail in an extensive data appendix and spreadsheet collection. These
data will be made publicly available to researchers for free. The data appendix also
acknowledges the diligent and tireless support I received from statisticians and bank
supervisors in most of the countries in the sample, without whom this project would
not have been possible. The appendix can be downloaded here.
2.2.1 Data Sources and Concepts
Sectoral credit data have been collected and published in most countries for multiple
decades, but not on a harmonized basis. As a result, I draw on hundreds of scattered
primary and secondary sources to construct these time series.
1The Netherlands publish detailed corporate lending data, but I have not been able to construct
reliable long-run time series.
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To begin, I retrieved data from statistical publications and data appendices pub-
lished by national central banks and statistical offices. In many cases, I use publica-
tions from different organizations even for the same country; much of these are not
available online. Large shares of the data were digitalized for the first time and copied
by hand, either from PDF or paper documents. Many of the national authorities also
shared previously unpublished, non-public data with me via email or mail. In the data
appendix, I show a few examples of what the underlying data look like.
A major challenge in working with sectoral credit data is to make them compar-
able across countries and time to account for changes in the classification of sectors,
lending institutions, and debt instruments. For harmonization purposes, I consul-
ted historical meta data in institutional publications and liased closely with all of the
national authorities publishing information on sectoral credit via email. The raw data
were adjusted for inconsistencies hampering cross-country comparisons and breaks in
the time series arising from changes in classifications that are unrelated to fundament-
als (such as large scale debt write-offs). The data appendix reports all harmonization
procedures and adjustments in the Excel part of the data appendix on the individual
time series level.
All data are end-of-period outstanding amounts in national currency. The coverage
comprises the broadest set of lending institutions for which data are available; where
possible, I include non-bank financial institutions. “Credit” is defined to include all
debt contracts (loans or debt securities) denominated in local or foreign currency. In
practice, the statistical coverage usually follows the structure of the financial system;
countries with high market shares of non-bank lenders usually also report statistics on
these, and the same also holds for debt securities.2 Because a typical country reports
time series on loans extended by all monetary financial institutions (MFIs), this makes
my data closer to existing sources reporting bank credit (such as the World Bank Global
Financial Development Database) rather than total debt (such as the IMF Global Debt
Database). I discuss comparison with other sources below and in the data appendix.
Household credit comprises all lending to households and non-profit organisations
serving households, as in Dembiermont et al. (2013). In most countries, sole propri-
etorships are not singled out in household credit statistics, so they are not counted as
corporate credit to ensure the data remain comparable.3 I include as non-bank finan-
2Note that the issue of lender and debt instrument coverage is typical for data on financial institu-
tions and not a particular feature of the sectoral credit aggregates assembled here. In the few countries
where more comprehensive data was available but not included, e.g. Denmark, the rationale is outlined
in detail in the data appendix.
3This creates some differences with existing data by Jordà et al. (2016), who at times appear to
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cial corporations all financial institutions who do not fund themselves with deposits
(i.e. non-MFIs); many countries further single out statistics on insurance companies
and pension funds.
I also construct time series on “total corporate credit” which equals the sum of
non-bank financial and non-financial corporations. This creates a slight difference to
the data published by the Bank for International Settlements, for example, who treat
total credit as the sum of household and non-financial corporate loans; however, lend-
ing to financial institutions makes up a non-negligible part in some countries, which
is why I single it out. I exclude credit to national or local governments.4 Since the
overwhelming majority of sources does not differentiate business lending by public or
private ownership of the borrower, data on corporate credit in most cases also includes
state-owned enterprises; similarly, lending by both private and government banks is
included, which includes development banks in some cases.
2.2.2 Coverage and Comparison with Existing Sources
Table 2.1 compares existing datasets with my contribution. I extend previous aca-
demic and institutional efforts by the Bank for BIS, World Bank, the IMF, and the
Jordà-Schularick-Taylor Macrohistory Database (Jordà et al., 2016). The newly com-
piled data are an extension along four dimensions: sectors, countries, time, and fre-
quency. First, I collect novel disaggregated data on corporate credit, following the
United Nations International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC Rev. 4). Depend-
ing on their availability, the raw data include between 3 and 115 sub-sectors, with an
average (median) of 20 (16) sectors per country. 52 countries report data on manufac-
turing sub-industries at some point. To maximize data availability, I restrict these to
four broad sectors in this paper: agriculture, industry (manufacturing and mining),
construction and real estate, and others.
The data lend a new level of detail to the analysis of debt markets, as the aggregate
credit to non-financial corporations (NFC) includes industries that may differ strongly
count sole proprietorships as corporate credit. Different disaggregation regimes by legal organisation
or economic activity further mean that in some countries sectors such as agriculture are largely counted
as households. In these cases, I adjusted corporate and household data in consultation with the national
authorities to ensure comparability across countries. See the data appendix for more details.
4A considerable number of countries reports time series on lending to “public administration and
defence; including compulsory social security” (ISIC Rev. 4 section O) as part of disaggregated credit
to non-financial corporations. Where it was available, I created additional sub-totals to exclude it ex-
plicitly, but in practice the category only makes up for a tiny fraction of the credit market in all sample
countries.
19
in their characteristics. For example, data on NFC credit from existing sources include
lending to construction and real estate companies. In many cases, the data reported as
“non-financial corporations” also appears to include lending to non-bank financial in-
termediaries. To my knowledge, I am the first to collect and document systematically
data on the latter.
Table 2.1: Comparison with Existing Data Sources on Private Credit
Dataset Freq. Countries Start Level of disaggregation
WB GFDD Y 203 1960 –
BIS Q 40 1940 NFC, Households
IMF FAS Y 152 2004 Households, SMEs (limited)
IMF GDD Y 190 1950 NFC, Households
Schularick and Taylor (2012) Y 14 1870 –
Jordà et al. (2016) Y 17 1870 Corporate, Households, Mort-
gages
Müller (2018) M/Q/Y 120 1910/ NFC by industry
1940 Households:
Mortgages
Consumer credit
Credit cards
Car loans
Total mortgage credit
Non-bank financial institutions
Notes: The data on total credit in Müller (2018) starts in 1910 and the sectoral data in 1940. WB GFDD
stands for the World Bank’s Global Financial Development Database (Cihák et al., 2013). BIS refers to
the credit to the non-financial sector statistics described in Dembiermont et al. (2013). The IMF FAS and
GDD refer to the International Monetary Fund’s Financial Access Survey and Global Debt Database.
NFC refers to non-financial corporations.
Second, the full database spans across 120 countries. While the country coverage
for countries with sectoral data is lower than the near-comprehensive World Bank
and IMF GDD data, it considerably expands the coverage of credit to households and
non-financial corporates in Dembiermont et al. (2013), which comprises 44 countries
in their dataset. One major contribution is thus the collection of long-run series on
household debt for many countries. The coverage spans across all major world eco-
nomies but also includes many small open economies; even at its lowest point in 1940,
I have sectoral data for around 50% of world GDP, and almost 90% today.
Third, many countries report data starting in the 1960s, a significant fraction even
from after World War II. The time dimension usually goes significantly beyond what
has been available before despite the much higher level of detail (see the appendix
for more detail). I report sectoral credit data from 1940 to have a meaningful sample
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size. I also construct new long-run total credit time series for a substantial number of
countries going back to 1910.
Fourth, I collect data in higher frequency than previous efforts, in many cases
monthly. This increases the size of the full dataset, which contains more than 1.5
million observations. I restrict the data to year-end values for the largely descriptive
analysis in this paper.
Figure 2.1: COMPARISON OF PRIVATE CREDIT/GDP WITH EXISTING DATA
SOURCES
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Note: This graph plots the ratio of total credit to the private sector from the new database against the
ratios from the World Bank, IMF Financial Access Survey, and the BIS for overlapping samples. See the
online appendix for more details and validation exercises.
My data are consistent with existing sources. Figure 2.1a and 2.1b compares the
newly compiled total credit measures with data from the World Bank’s Global Fin-
ancial Development Database (Cihák et al., 2013), the International Monetary Fund’s
Financial Access Survey, and the BIS data on bank and total credit (Dembiermont et al.,
2013) for the respective overlapping samples. In the data appendix, I also compare the
data to those recently published in the IMF Global Debt Database and those compiled
by Jordà et al. (2016). Reassuringly, the total credit data I constructed are comparable
and follow highly similar trends over time for all sources. A natural interpretation of
my data is thus that it represents the underlying sectoral structure of total credit to
the private sector others have collected, plus an extension of these total credit series. I
present much more comprehensive evidence on the comparability and differences of
my data with existing sources in the data appendix.
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2.2.3 Additional Data
I create a long-run data set on macroeconomic data by combining existing data from
the World Bank, Penn World Tables, IMF International Financial Statistics, United Na-
tions, Barro and Ursua (2008), the Maddison Project Database (Inklaar et al., 2018),
Jordà et al. (2016), Dincecco and Prado (2013), and national sources. I discuss the con-
struction and sources of these variables in the online appendix. I also add data on
financial sector characteristics from a wide range of sources, most prominently the
World Bank Global Financial Development Database and the Doing Business Project.
The exact sources of these variables are also outlined in the online appendix.
2.3 Loan Portfolios in 120 Countries: Long-Run
Evidence
How is credit allocated across different sectors of the economy around the world, and
how has this changed over time? In this section, I provide some evidence on the evol-
ution of household and firm lending in 120 economies. I show that household credit
has, on average, more than tripled between the early 1950s and 2014. The aggregate
trends, however, hide important differences across country groups and sectors. While
the mortgage share in household credit has been approximately stable in advanced
economies, it is much lower and has in fact decreased in the rest of the world; con-
sumer credit, not housing is key to understanding the emerging market household
leveraging. I also highlight structural change in corporate financing, which has seen a
fundamental shift away from agriculture and manufacturing to construction and real
estate and the tertiary sector.
2.3.1 Aggregate Trends
It is instructive to begin with a look at the development of total private credit to GDP
around the world, an important indicator of the depth of financial sector activity. The
novelty of my data for this exercise is the extension of long-run credit series to the
period before 1960. I have data on total lending for 51 countries starting before 1940;
61 countries starting before 1950; and 78 countries before 1960. Figure 2.2 plots the
arithmetic mean of the credit to GDP ratio for three country groups: OECD econom-
ies, other advanced economies, and emerging economies.5 While the swift uptick
5I use the World Bank classification; “emerging” refers to middle and low income countries. All of
these are defined as of 2014. A list of the countries in each group can be found in the appendix.
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in economy-wide leverage in recent decades has been well-documented for a small
group of advanced economies (see e.g. Schularick and Taylor, 2012), it is arguably
much less appreciated that a similar “financialization” has not taken place to the same
extent in emerging economies. While OECD economies in the late 2000s reached an
average of more than 100% of private credit to GDP, the figure hovers around 45% for
emerging economies.
Next, the newly collected data allows a first glimpse at what sectoral credit alloc-
ation look like across countries, and how it has evolved over time. Figure 2.3 visu-
alizes the transformation of credit markets over the 70 year time span in the sample
by plotting arithmetic means of sectoral credit to GDP across countries. The composi-
tional changes over time are remarkable. Financial institutions in the mid-1970s used
to predominantly lend to non-financial corporations. Starting in the mid-1980s, with
the onset of considerable financial deepening, household credit has become increas-
ingly prominent. In fact, the overwhelming bulk of credit growth relative to economic
activity has been driven by households, especially since 1990; the ratio of non-financial
corporate credit stayed essentially flat between the early 1980s and the mid-2000s. A
major trend-break here is the Great Financial Crisis 2007-2008. In the run-up to the
crisis, household debt worldwide increased but only picked up in the non-financial
corporate sector in 2006 or 2007. As I will show later, this recent growth in corporate
lending was primarily driven by lending to the construction and real estate industries.
Importantly, the global deleveraging following the crisis was concentrated in corpor-
ate lending (both financial and non-financial).
While credit to non-bank financial institutions has also increased, the develop-
ments here are surprisingly muted. An important caveat in the case of inter-financial
lending, however, is the definition of what constitutes “credit”. While the data in many
countries include all types of credit contracts – including repos and other often-used
instruments of capital market lending – this may lead to important omissions because
financial institutions are the main issuers of corporate bonds in many countries (see
e.g. Gilchrist and Mojon, 2014). As I will show below, the surprisingly stable ratio of
credit to financial institutions may also partially reflect that they are disproportion-
ately more likely to use cross-border credit compared to non-financial corporations,
particularly in advanced economies. Taken at face value, the data nevertheless sug-
gest that the financing of (non-bank) financial institutions in fact is not a major part of
the domestic lending business of credit institutions around the world, which was one
of the central messages in Kay (2015).
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Figure 2.2: PRIVATE CREDIT TO GDP (IN %), 1910-2014
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Note: Figure 2.2 shows the arithmetic average of total credit to GDP, broken down by country group.
Country classification according to the World Bank.
Figure 2.3: GLOBAL SECTORAL CREDIT (IN % OF GDP), 1940-2014
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Note: Figure 2.3 plots the average ratio of sectoral credit to non-financial corporations, financial corpor-
ations (excl. banks) and households (incl. non-profits and sole proprietorships) to GDP.
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2.3.2 The Rise of Household Credit
In the previous section, I have documented that credit markets have expanded mainly
in relatively advanced economies and that household loans have been a major driver
all over the globe. I next turn to the question what accounts for the increase in house-
hold credit by differentiating between country groups and loan purposes.
Figure 2.4: SHARE OF HOUSEHOLD IN TOTAL CREDIT (IN %), BY COUNTRY GROUP
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Note: Figure 2.4 shows the yearly average share of household credit in total credit, broken down by
country group. OECD and non-OECD advanced economies are the high income countries as classified
by the World Bank, and emerging economies all others.
To begin, figure 2.4 plots the arithmetic mean ratio of household in total credit
by country groups according to their levels of economic development. The resulting
picture is striking. Household credit has taken up an ever increasing share in the loan
portfolio of banks all over the world.
While the OECD economies started from a much higher level, household lending
has seen a constant increase since the end of World War II, with a noticeable boom
in the mid-2000s. The picture here resembles the share of mortgage credit assembled
in Jordà et al. (2015), which shows a similar post-WWII drop and significant recovery
over time. The data suggest that this pattern also holds true for a broader set of 32
OECD countries.
I establish that household loans have also boomed across the rest of the globe. To
my knowledge, I am the first to document this stylized fact. Starting from a much
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lower base, the share of non-business credit has increased dramatically, from around
10% of total loans up to the late 1960s to around 40% today in both non-OECD ad-
vanced and emerging economies. This represents nothing short of a transformation of
the lending activity of banking systems.
Household lending has become a major part of banks’ business model around the
world. But what accounts for this staggering rise? In influential work, Jordà et al.
(2015) show the importance of mortgage credit for understanding financialization in
the major OECD economies. However, the lack of comparable cross-country data has
prevented an understanding of what drives household leverage in other countries. In
figure 2.5, I thus break down household lending into its mortgage and non-mortgage
component. Non-mortgage credit here largely represents consumer credit; technically,
it also includes other categories such as loans to households for the purchase of fin-
ancial instruments or student loans.6 The cross-country difference are again stark. In
OECD economies, residential mortgages have made up a relatively constant fraction
of around 60-70% of household loans between 1950 and today. Maybe unsurprisingly,
the housing boom of the 2000s can also be seen in the shares of debt taken on by house-
holds: the average ratio increased from around 60% in 2000 to 75% today.
The picture looks fundamentally different in non-OECD advanced and emerging
economies. In the former, the residential mortgage share has been on a constant in-
crease between 1980 and today, but is still below that of OECD countries at just over
55% in 2014. While I discuss more robustness for these findings below, the data for
non-OECD advanced economies is somewhat noisy due to the relatively small num-
ber of countries, most of which do not report long-run data. In developing countries,
the mortgage share has in fact decreased over the past decades and today hovers at
just over an average of 40%. Taken together with the evidence in figure 2.4, this im-
plies that consumer credit, not mortgages are at the heart of the emerging market
credit boom. In support of this, I show in the online appendix that the share of res-
idential mortgages to GDP has remained almost constant between around 1960 and
2014, while it has doubled in OECD and quadrupled in non-OECD advanced eco-
nomies. The “great mortgaging” appears to be an advanced economy phenomenon
(Jordà et al., 2015).
Given its importance in emerging countries, it is interesting to look at the compos-
ition of consumer credit, which is also possible using my data. Unfortunately, these
6As I discuss in the data appendix, the classification of consumer credit across countries does not
follow consistent patterns. As a result, some countries treat all non-mortgage lending to households
as “consumer credit”, while others only include the financing of durable goods. Using the share of
non-mortgages is thus a reasonable approximation of consumer lending.
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Figure 2.5: MORTGAGE SHARE IN HOUSEHOLD CREDIT (IN %), BY COUNTRY
GROUP
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Note: Figure 2.5 plots the average ratio of residential mortgages in household credit, broken down by
country group.
Figure 2.6: SHARE OF CONSUMER IN HOUSEHOLD CREDIT, IN %
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
OECD Non−OECD advanced Emerging
Consumer credit Car loans Credit cards
Note: Figure 2.6 plots the 2009-2014 average ratio of different consumer credit types in total household
credit, broken down by country group.
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time series are available for a much smaller number of countries and (except in a few
cases) only for a shorter time span. In figure 2.6, I present average ratios of differ-
ent types of consumer credit in total household lending for the period 2008-2014 only.
I calculate these values from 99 countries for total non-mortgage (“consumer”) credit
and 46 (26) countries for credit cards and car loans, respectively.7 The pattern confirms
the time series trend regarding residential mortgages: the share of consumer credit de-
clines with a country’s level of development. Again, the quantities here matter, given
the importance of household lending around the world. More than 15% of household
credit in emerging economies is accounted for by credit cards alone, and another 10%
by car loans. These ratios are much lower for OECD economies.8
The patterns presented in this section have important implications. Both theoretical
and empirical studies of household finance have, in many cases, focused on mortgage
credit (e.g. Badev et al., 2014; Cerutti et al., 2017b). These papers, however, tell us very
little about why consumer credit has expanded rapidly in emerging economies. Also, a
prominent mechanism for amplification effects between asset prices and credit is that
land values boost the liquidation values of housing assets, which in turn increases
debt capacity (see e.g. Chaney et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2013). These explanations are,
however, silent on the role of unsecured credit. In section 2.4, I explore a few potential
explanations for the rise of household credit.
2.3.3 Structural Change in Corporate Credit
Next, I turn to developments in the corporate credit market. It is a well-known phe-
nomenon that countries undergo economic structural change with increases in devel-
opment, mainly away from primary sectors towards manufacturing and then service
sectors. As such, one would expect to find similar trends in corporate credit. On the
other hand, the findings for residential mortgages above suggest an increasing role
of the housing sector, at least in advanced economies. Can we detect complementary
patterns in the composition of corporate financing?
Figure 2.8 plots the share for four sectors in total corporate lending: agriculture,
industry (consisting of manufacturing and mining), construction (which also includes
real estate developers), and all other sectors. Again, I differentiate between emerging
and advanced (OECD and non-OECD) economies. Consistent with structural change,
the share of lending to agriculture and industry has declined consistently since 1950.
7The pattern looks almost equivalent if I restrict the sample to countries for which I have either
credit card or car loan information or both.
8The numbers for car loans in OECD economies should be interpreted with caution because I only
have data for the US, Sweden, and Canada.
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Figure 2.7: CORPORATE AND HOUSEHOLD CREDIT (IN % OF GDP)
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Note: Figure 2.7 shows the yearly average ratio of corporate and household credit to GDP, broken down
by country group.
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What is striking, however, is just how similar this trend is between country groups.
The financing of industry, for example, has not “migrated” from advanced to emerging
economies; rather, the decline appears to be relatively uniform, which is somewhat
surprising, given the relocation of many manufacturers to developing countries.
The second major trend is that construction and real estate lending have come
to make up considerable shares of the aggregate corporate loan portfolio. In OECD
economies, which likely faced the highest demand for financing reconstruction after
World War II, in fact had a negligible share of construction credit (around 6%) in the
1950s. Today, this share has risen to more than 20%. While the housing boom of the
2000s has clearly played a role, the share had already grown in the 1990s. The trends
are almost equivalent in non-OECD advanced economies. Strikingly, a similar pattern
also holds true in developing countries. In the 1950s, lending to industry and agricul-
ture accounted for more than 70% of corporate financing. Today, the ratio is closer to
25%. At the same time, construction and real estate has increased from around 5% to
almost 20%. The loan portfolio of emerging markets has thus seen a profound shift.
What about other types of lending? Almost all over the globe, the tertiary sec-
tor has increased its lending share by a substantial margin. In advanced economies,
its share has increased from around 40% in the 1950s to around 60% in recent years.
Emerging economies have seen an increase from around 20% to 60% over the same
time period. Taken together, these findings suggest that the portfolio composition of
Deutsche Bank mentioned in the intro appears to be the rule rather than the excep-
tion: the financing of manufacturing and mining industries, the activity perhaps most
commonly associated with banking, has come to play only a miniscule role in under-
standing credit markets.
2.3.4 Robustness Tests
In the online appendix, I challenge the stylized facts I document above to a number of
sensitivity analyses. In particular, I present additional figures based on more balanced
samples and also allow for weighted averages based on a country’s GDP. The latter is
to identify whether the shifts I document are driven by the relatively large number of
small open economies in my sample, which contribute little to world GDP.
It is worth highlighting a few cases where these adjustments make a difference to
the results. First, the long-run evolution of credit to GDP by country groups is influ-
enced by weighting countries by their share in world GDP. China plays a pivotal role
here: because it makes up a large fraction of world GDP, and has recently experienced
a sustained credit boom, its inclusion in fact pushes the average credit-to-GDP ratio
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Figure 2.8: CORPORATE CREDIT COMPOSITION (IN %), 1950-2014
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Notes: These figures plot the average composition of corporate credit over time. All values are in percent
of total corporate credit. Industry refers to the manufacturing and mining sectors, Construction includes
real estate services where available, and Other are all other sectors.
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above that of advanced economies. Without China, however, the difference between
the financialization of advanced economies and the rest of the world becomes, in fact,
considerably larger when weighting by GDP (see figure 1 in the online appendix).
Using balanced samples for countries with data before 1960, 1970, or 1980, as well
as GDP-weighting, also creates an even stronger relative increase in the ratio of global
household debt to GDP (see figure 2 in the online appendix). For countries with data
before 1960, household credit now clocks in at over 50% of GDP alone, followed by
non-financial corporate lending at 40%. The other results presented up until now are
qualitatively unchanged when allowing for different adjustments and presnted in the
online appendix.
2.4 What Explains Higher Shares of Household Credit?
Up to this point in the paper, I have documented how credit markets have evolved
in the long-run all over the globe. One of the most striking stylized facts I uncover is
the rise of household credit, particularly in emerging economies. But what explains
whether countries have more or less household compared to firm credit? In this sec-
tion, I consider a few candidate theories to gain intuition, and find that some of them
are strongly rejected by the data; others, however, are consistent with a number of
simple correlations. While far from conclusive, this first set of results will hopefully
motivate and guide more rigorous empirical analysis in future work.
2.4.1 Country-specific, regional, or global factors?
Before diving into specific drivers, it is instructive to briefly assess how much of the
variation in the household debt share can be explained by time-invariant country
factors, as compared to time-varying global or regional factors. These can be neatly
summarized by the (adjusted) R2 of regressing the household credit share on dum-
mies for countries, regions, years, or combinations thereof.
The results in table 2.3 suggest that a large fraction of the variation in household
debt is due to country-specific factors that do not change over time (≈ 59%), but
adding year fixed effects helps to raise this fraction to ≈ 81%. Region-specific time
dummies, while informative by themselves, do not add anything above global time
factors once time-invariant country factors are taken into account. This suggests that
the bulk of what explains the use of household credit is either due to individual coun-
try factors that do not change over time or caused by global changes that affect coun-
tries more or less similarly over time.
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Table 2.3: EXPLAINING THE SHARE OF HOUSEHOLD CREDIT - FIXED EFFECTS R2
Dependent variable: Share of household credit in total credit
Country
Region Country + Region
Region FE Country FE Year FE × Year FE + Year FE × Year FE
Adj. R2 15% 59% 11% 29% 81% 82%
Notes: This table presents the adjusted R2 for regressions of the share of household in total credit on
fixed effects as indicated. The regions correspond to the World Bank classification of East Asia and Pa-
cific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, North
America, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.
2.4.2 Alternative Sources of External Financing
A straightforward explanation for the relative boom in household credit, particularly
in emerging economies, could be that firms have shifted to alternative sources of ex-
ternal financing. Recall that, due to data constraints, my data only cover domestic credit
and are often – but not always – limited to bank loans. However, it is well known
that corporate bond markets and cross-border lending have expanded rapidly in some
countries, and globalization has additionally fostered the use of trade credit. Can these
factors explain the relatively slow increase visible in the corporate credit data shown
here?
The data suggest that alternative sources of external financing cannot explain the
rise of household credit. Let us begin by looking at total cross-border loans to the
non-bank sector, as reported in the BIS locational banking statistics, for which a long
time series is available. Panel A of figure 2.9 plots the arithmetic mean of the ratio of
such cross-border loans to total domestic credit from my database over time, by coun-
try groups.9 While emerging economies have seen the most obvious lack of growth
in corporate credit over GDP, the share of cross-border lending has in fact decreased
in these countries since the mid-1980s. In the online appendix, I show that this is re-
markably robust with regard to sample composition, the choice of scaling variable,
and different methods of collapsing the data. For the years 2013 and 2014, I can also
differentiate between cross-border lending to non-financial corporations and financial
institutions (excluding banks). The data in panel B of figure 2.9 suggest that only fin-
ancial institutions in advanced economies use a relatively high share of cross-border
loans. Taken together, this makes it quantitatively implausible that corporations in
9I exclude a number of tax havens with extraordinarily high ratios of cross-border to domestic loans.
Note that I scale over total credit because there is also cross-border lending to households, but this does
not drive the results (see below).
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emerging economies have substituted domestic for foreign bank loans.
What about the development of bond markets? Figure 2.10 plots the arithmetic
mean of the ratio of bonds to non-financial corporations to total corporate credit over
time, again split up by development status. Indeed, the data suggest that bond mar-
kets have grown in importance, but only since the late-1990s – considerably later than
the stalling of corporate (bank) credit. Again, I show in the online appendix that this
finding is, again, highly robust. At an average share of 10-15% of domestic loans,
however, the volume of outstanding bonds in emerging markets appears too low to
account for the shift to household credit.
To get a better understanding of the relative importance of alternative sources of ex-
ternal financing, figure 2.11 plots domestic corporate credit and adds long-run series
on outstanding bonds to non-financial corporates, the value of export credits from
Berne Union, as well as the recent data on cross-border loans to non-financial cor-
porates.10 The data show that, even though alternative sources have become more
important, they cannot account for the stalling of corporate lending: the sum of do-
mestic loans, bonds, export credits, and cross-border loans today is still below that
in the mid-1980s. Weighing these ratios by a country’s GDP leads to a slightly larger
share of other sources of external financing, but their fraction nevertheless remains
small.
Regression evidence also suggests that household credit did not rise dispropor-
tionately in countries where alternative financing sources have become more common.
Panel A in table 2.4 plots the estimated coefficients of regressing the household debt
share on different measures of outside financing and year fixed effects (or year and
country fixed effects). This is equivalent to asking whether these sources are correl-
ated with a shift away from domestic corporate lending across and within countries.
From bonds and cross-border loans to measures of trade credit, leasing, and FDI, none
of the other financing sources are significantly correlated with the increase in house-
hold lending, and the (within) R2 is close to zero in all specifications. I conclude that
domestic corporate credit has not been substituted by other lenders.
2.4.3 Law and Finance
An influential body of work, starting with La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), argues that
legal systems are crucial to understanding financial sector outcomes. For the case
of credit markets, La Porta et al. (1997) show that countries with French or Nordic
10I restrict the sample to all country-years for which I have data on domestic lending and bonds to
avoid changes in composition.
34
legal origin appear to have lower ratios of debt to GDP. Could it be that legal origins
also affect the composition of credit? I put this to the test in column (1) of panel B
by regressing the share of household credit in a country on legal origin dummies.11
Note that, because legal origins are time-invariant, both regressions only include year
fixed effects. Indeed, I find that French origin is associated with a lower household
credit share, and Nordic origin with a higher one; theR2 in these regressions, however,
explains little of the 59% variation due to time-invariant country factors.
One important correlate of legal origin are differences in creditor rights, which
Djankov et al. (2007), Qian and Strahan (2007), Haselmann et al. (2010), and Bae and
Goyal (2009) find to matter for credit markets across countries. Building on their find-
ings, I regress the household credit share on the creditor rights index from Djankov
et al. (2007), which turns out to be statistically insignificant with and without coun-
try fixed effects. Using a measure of the strength of insolvency frameworks from the
World Bank Doing Business Survey for 2014, however, is positively associated with
household lending. The Legal Rights index from the same survey – which measures
how conducive collateral and bankruptcy laws are for lending – is also positive and
statistically significant. This meshes well with previous cross-sectional evidence in
Warnock and Warnock (2008) and Cerutti et al. (2017b), who show correlations of legal
rights with the ratio of mortgage debt to GDP, but do not show whether this implies
higher overall shares of household lending. The index, however, does not have pre-
dictive ability for within-country variation in household lending.
I also consider two indicators of debt enforcement (Djankov et al., 2008), also based
on World Bank Doing Business data. I find that both higher costs of court claims as
well as recovery rates for creditors are associated with household lending. The latter
yields a relatively high R2 of almost 17% and is also informative about the share of
household debt within countries.12
11For brevity, I only plot the bivariate correlations for French and Nordic origin, because these are
the only ones that are statistically significant in a multivariate regression that also include a dummy for
German origin (with Common Law serving as comparison group).
12The purely cross-sectional indicator of debt enforcement from Djankov et al. (2008) is also statist-
ically significant when restricting the data to the post-2000 period (unreported).
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Figure 2.9: COMPARING DOMESTIC AND CROSS-BORDER CREDIT
Panel A: Ratio of Cross-Border to Domestic Lending (in %)
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Note: Panel A plots the ratio of cross-border lending to the non-bank sector to total domestic credit to
the private sector, broken down by country group. Panel B plots the average share of cross-border and
domestic credit to GDP for 2013-2014, where I differentiate between lending to the financial sector (excl.
banks) and all other sectors (i.e. households and non-financial corporations). I exclude tax havens (see
text and online appendix).
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Figure 2.10: SHARE OF BONDS IN CORPORATE CREDIT, IN %
0
5
10
15
1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012
Advanced economies (46) Emerging economies (31)
Note: Figure 2.10 plots the ratio of outstanding bonds of non-financial corporations to total corporate
credit, broken down by country group. I exclude tax havens (see text and online appendix).
Figure 2.11: COMPARING SOURCES OF EXTERNAL FINANCING, IN % OF GDP
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Note: Figure 2.11 plots all sources of external financing as a fraction of GDP for countries that report
data on domestic corporate credit and non-financial corporate bonds. I exclude tax havens (see online
appendix).
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2.4.4 Demographic Factors, Income, and Inequality
The perhaps most obvious correlation one would expect with the share of household
credit is a country’s income level, as measured by GDP per capita. Cerutti et al. (2017b)
and Badev et al. (2014) , for example, find some evidence that the depth of mortgage
markets is higher in richer countries. In my data, I find that this measure alone ex-
plains around 33% of the variation in the household share in total lending in panel C,
and remains highly correlated even within a given country.
In principle, household credit might also depend on how a country’s income is
distributed between its citizens. Beck et al. (2007), for example, find that financial de-
velopment disproportionally benefits the poor across countries, and Beck et al. (2010)
find similar evidence for the staggered state-level lifting of US branching restrictions.
Across countries, I also find that more unequal incomes are associated with a lower
share of household debt. This contrasts with the argument that one driver of the ex-
pansion in household credit in the run-up to the Great Depression and Great Recession
may have been an increase in inequality (Kumhof et al., 2015; Mian and Sufi, 2011), also
stressed by Rajan (2010). Figure 2.12 shows that a country’s income level is an import-
ant mediator: once I include the log of GDP per capita as a control variable, a higher
income share of the top 10% has a positive correlation with household credit.13 Given
that the intuition in the latter group of papers is that households use debt to make
up for a decline in real incomes in advanced economies, this may not be completely
surprising.
Because income inequality is linked to saving-consumption decisions, the same
pattern also holds true for the ratio of consumption to GDP and savings to GDP. Jap-
pelli and Pagano (1994), for example, argue that better access to household credit may
decrease the savings rate. In a large cross-section of 111 countries, I indeed find a neg-
ative correlation, but only after conditioning on GDP per capita; without that control
a higher savings rate is associated with more household debt. Because savings and
consumption are negatively correlated, I find similar results for consumption to GDP
(with the opposite sign).
It is also intuitive that demographic factors should play a key role in shaping the
use of household credit across countries. This is probably most obvious for financing
housing, for which demographic variables are key drivers (e.g. Mankiw and Weil,
1989; Takats, 2012). In the newly collected data, I also find that the household credit
share is highly correlated with the share of the population between 30 and 49 – likely
13Note that including the log of GDP per capita does not change the results of the other regressions
presented here qualitatively.
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the main group to take out a mortgage in most countries. Consistent with Badev et al.
(2014), urbanization and household debt also appear to go hand-in-hand, both across
and within countries. This is likely driven by supply as well as demand factors, e.g.
because cities have higher house prices and smaller households, or because creditor
rights are easier to enforce where the collateral is located closely to a bank’s branches.
2.4.5 Financial Deregulation and Information Sharing
Financial deregulation is perhaps the single most prominent factor featured in popular
accounts of changes to the nature of financial intermediation (e.g. Kay, 2015). Easing
restrictions on lending, the story goes, have enabled financial institutions to extend
ever more household credit – at the expense of businesses serving the “real” economy
(Foroohar, 2016; Turner, 2015).
There is some empirical evidence to support this narrative. Mian et al. (2017a) show
that US banking deregulation in the 1980s was associated with a boom-bust cycle in
household debt and house prices. Relatedly, Favara and Imbs (2015) show that inter-
state branching deregulation increased mortgage credit and house prices and Di Mag-
gio and Kermani (2017) find similar effects using federal preemptions to local laws
against predatory lending. These findings are also consistent with recent models that
allow for a relaxation of borrowing constraints to households (e.g. Bahadir and Gu-
mus, 2016; Justiniano et al., 2015), one source of which may be changes to regulation.
Chakraborty et al. (2018) argue that, in the United States, mortgage lending crowds
out corporate lending during housing booms.
Can changes to regulatory frameworks also help to explain the share of household
credit across countries? I take this hypothesis to the data in columns (1) through (4) in
panel D, using the financial reform index from Abiad et al. (2010) and the Fraser Insti-
tute’s measure of credit market freedom as indicators of deregulation. The estimated
coefficients are positive and highly statistically significant in 3 out of 4 cases.14 The
regressions also yield the highest R2s I find outside of the results for GDP per capita,
but they do not seem to be driven by differences in income levels: figure 2.12 shows
that they are largely unaffected when controlling for the log of GDP per capita. This
suggests that the short and medium-term deregulation effects identified in previous
14Note that the correlation with the deregulation index from Abiad et al. (2010) is absorbed by
the year fixed effects, but is statistically significant at the 1% level with country fixed effects only.
This is likely because deregulation occurs in waves, and including time dummies may thus be “over-
controlling” (Mian et al., 2017b), i.e. wash away some of the “true” effect of deregulation. Indeed, a
regression of the deregulation index on year fixed effects yields an adjusted R2 of around 48% in my
sample.
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work are also reflected in long-term correlations within and across up to 105 countries.
Another critical institutional input for household lending are information sharing
institutions (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993; Frame et al., 2001; Petersen and Rajan, 2002).
In developing countries in particular, private credit bureaus and public credit regis-
tries have been associated with more lending relative to GDP (Djankov et al., 2007),
both to firms (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002; Brown et al., 2009) and households (Warnock
and Warnock, 2008; Jappelli et al., 2008). However, it is unclear whether better inform-
ation sharing should lead to a higher share of household credit. I put this question
to the test in columns (5) to (12), where I differentiate between private bureaus and
public registries, as well as between the existence of such institutions (measured by a
dummy variable) and their coverage (as % of adults, only available from 2004). The
data strongly suggest that household credit is more prominent where private credit
bureaus are present across but also within countries. The evidence for public registries
is considerably weaker, as in previous papers, which may reflect heterogeneity across
country groups (also see Djankov et al., 2007). As in the case of financial deregulation,
these findings are unaffected by controlling for GDP per capita (unreported).
2.4.6 Discussion
To summarize, the data reveal a few striking patterns. First, alternative sources of firm
financing do not explain higher shares of household credit. Second, legal frameworks
are not only associated with the size, but also composition of debt markets, at least across
countries. Third, demographic factors such as the level and distribution of income, as
well as aging and urbanization, are highly correlated with household lending. Fourth,
financial deregulation and information sharing institutions have the highest explanat-
ory power for the share of household in total private debt, outside of GDP per capita.
These correlations should not be taken as definitive answers, but rather as a guide
for future work, which should attempt to establish causal relationships using more
rigorous empirical designs.
2.5 Implications
After uncovering a new set of stylized facts about credit markets around the globe, it
is instructive to consider how this evidence squares with existing theories of financial
development and macro-financial linkages. In his classic survey of the financial de-
velopment literature, Levine (2005) summarizes the functions of financial systems as
(1) producing information ex ante about possible investments and allocate capital; (2)
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monitoring investments and exert corporate governance after providing finance; (3)
facilitating the trading, diversification, and management of risk; (4) mobilizing and
pooling savings; and (5) easing the exchange of goods and services. “Financial devel-
opment”, then, is defined as an improvement in how well financial systems perform
these functions. It seems like a fair characterization that most of the literature on the
role of credit in financial development has at least implicitly focused on these func-
tions in the context of corporate financing. For example, Levine (1997) uses the parable
of Fred, a hypothetical truck manufacturing entrepreneur, to illustrate how finance
affects economic growth. Two of the key insights of his excellent summary are that
“production requires capital” and “Fred will require outside funding if he has insuffi-
cient savings to initiate his truck project.”
A more efficient allocation of resources between firms and industries in particular
has also been at the core of many empirical studies (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1998;
Wurgler, 2000; Bertrand et al., 2007). These papers, however, tell us very little about
the massive increase in household credit around the world I have documented here. In
fact, the samples studied in many papers, often limited to manufacturing, account for
an ever decreasing share of banks’ loan portfolio. To pick up Levine’s parable, Fred’s
ability to take out a mortgage or a car loan appears to have become an increasingly
important part of what banks do, rather than the provision of working capital. Of
course, this does not imply that firms necessarily face credit constraints as a result. But
it does suggest that many papers neatly identify effects on the intensive margin, which
have to be interpreted alongside the extensive margin of the actual credit allocation
across sectors.
Studies of the amplifying effects of leverage on business cycles (starting with the
classic papers Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Bernanke et al., 1999) have largely focused on
interactions between firm balance sheets and the financial sector (see e.g. Caballero and
Krishnamurthy, 2003; Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014). The evidence I present here
suggests that models with a focus on household balance sheets may be increasingly in-
formative, given the prominence of household lending (see e.g. Justiniano et al., 2015;
Greenwald, 2016; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2016; Martin and Philippon, 2017; Mian
et al., 2017b). The striking compositional shifts in corporate credit are also worth high-
lighting here. In advanced economies, approximately 20% of corporate credit today
is extended to construction and real estate companies, and another 20% to financial
institutions. This suggests that modeling heterogeneity in sectoral characteristics may
be a fruitful endeavour going forward.
A key question raised by my study is which factors are responsible for the boom
in household debt all over the world, and for mix of household debt into mortgages
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and non-mortgages. While I provide some first evidence, this can only been seen as
suggestive and as a guidance for future work. It is also unclear whether the stalling
of corporate credit, particularly in emerging economies, reflects supply or demand
factors. A first striking indication is that external financing sources do not seem to
have offset the stalling of corporate credit, despite the fact that GDP and household
credit have grown substantially in developing countries; normally, not situations one
would characterize as typical for a lack of credit demand. It thus seems plausible that
credit supply might at least be partially responsible, which raises the question whether
household credit has “crowded out” firm lending – as argued by, among others, Turner
(2015), Kay (2015), and Foroohar (2016).
The dataset I present also opens a wealth of opportunities for future research. For
one, it remains largely unclear why some credit booms end in crises and others are
associated with productivity miracles. Analyzing whether booms can be differenti-
ated depending on the sectors in which they occur is particularly pressing for policy
makers. The data may also prove to be a useful laboratory for understanding why dif-
ferent types of credit supply shifts often suddenly, which often results in a boom-bust
pattern (Mian and Sufi, 2018). One particular interesting case are episodes of financial
liberalization, the effects of which remain somewhat contested. On one hand, evid-
ence on the deregulatory process in the United States has overwhelmingly found be-
neficial effects (see Kroszner and Strahan (2014) for an excellent survey). On the other
hand, there is also some evidence that liberalization is often followed by crises with
substantial output costs (e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). Going forward,
it would be worth investigating whether changes in credit composition can explain
these divergent experiences.
2.6 Conclusion
The Great Financial Crisis 2007-2008 has prompted a call to arms to study macro-
financial linkages, in particular the role of credit in the macroeconomy. Despite this
research interest, the paucity of comparable cross-country data has forced researchers
to work either with broad macroeconomic aggregates or draw on usually confiden-
tial data from credit registries or proprietary sources. At the same time, analyzing the
nature of financial crises and the effects of financial reforms has been hampered by a
lack of detailed credit data that cover a country’s entire banking system. I present a
large novel dataset on sectoral credit for 120 countries to remedy these problems.
The data show that aggregate measures of private credit conceal considerable changes
in the composition of lending over time and across countries. Indeed, these shifts are
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nothing short of a transformation of what financial institutions do, both in advanced
and emerging economies. I provide a few tentative answers about what can and can-
not explain these findings. While only a first step, I show that the stalling of corporate
credit is unlikely a result of the development of corporate bond markets, cross-border
lending, or other alternative sources of external financing. Rather, higher shares of
household debt are associated with demographic factors, the income distribution, fin-
ancial deregulation, and the development of information sharing institutions. I also
find some evidence that legal frameworks play a role. These insights will hopefully
guide more empirical work going forward.
The trends I uncover here also present us with major new questions: Why do
households in advanced economies use mortgages so much more frequently than
those in emerging economies? Has household credit crowded out corporate credit?
Do composition shifts in corporate credit reflect industrial change, or are other forces
at work? Which types of credit are most important for understanding the relationship
between financial development, financial crises, and economic growth? I expect that
the data unveiled here will give impetus to new research into a better understanding
of credit markets and their interlinkages with macroeconomic dynamics.
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Appendix
Table 2.5: COUNTRY GROUPS, WORLD BANK CLASSIFICATION (2014)
OECD Non-OECD advanced Emerging
Australia Antigua & Barbuda Albania Kenya
Austria Argentina Anguilla Kyrgyz Republic
Belgium Bahrain Armenia Lesotho
Canada Barbados Azerbaijan Macedonia
Chile Cyprus Bangladesh Malawi
Czech Republic Hong Kong Belize Malaysia
Denmark Kuwait Bhutan Maldives
Estonia Latvia Bolivia Mauritius
Finland Lithuania Botswana Mexico
France Malta Bulgaria Mongolia
Germany Oman Cambodia Montserrat
Greece Qatar China Morocco
Hungary Russian Federation Colombia Nepal
Iceland Saudi Arabia Costa Rica Nicaragua
Ireland Seychelles Curacao & Sint Maarten Nigeria
Israel Singapore Dominica Pakistan
Italy St. Kitts & Nevis Dominican Republic Panama
Japan Taiwan Egypt Peru
Luxembourg Trinidad & Tobago El Salvador Philippines
Netherlands United Arab Emirates Ethiopia Romania
New Zealand Uruguay Fiji Sierra Leone
Norway Venezuela Georgia South Africa
Poland Ghana Sri Lanka
Portugal Grenada St. Lucia
Slovak Republic Guatemala St. Vincent
Slovenia Guyana Suriname
South Korea Haiti Tanzania
Spain Honduras Thailand
Sweden India Tunisia
Switzerland Indonesia Turkey
United Kingdom Iran Uganda
United States Jamaica Ukraine
Jordan Zimbabwe
Kazakhstan
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Figure 2.12: EXPLAINING THE HOUSEHOLD CREDIT SHARE: INCOME CONTROL
Panel A: Income inequality
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Panel B: Consumption / GDP
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Panel C: Financial deregulation
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Panel D: Information sharing
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Notes: These figures show binned scatter plots of the household credit share and the variables listed in
the panel headers. All values were adjusted for year fixed effects; the plots on the right further include
the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in constant USD from the Maddison Project as control variable.
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Chapter 3
Electoral Cycles in Prudential
Regulation
3.1 Introduction
In the wake of the Great Financial Crisis 2008-2009, many countries have made sweep-
ing changes to financial regulation (see, e.g., Duffie, 2017; Yellen, 2017). Because bank-
ing crises tend to follow periods of high growth in credit (Kindleberger and Aliber,
2005; Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012; Schularick and Taylor, 2012), there has been
widespread agreement in policy and academic circles that prudential regulation is ne-
cessary to ease the negative externalities of financial sector disruption and “curb the
credit cycle” (IMF, 2017; Aikman et al., 2015). A growing empirical literature has es-
tablished that macroprudential tools in particular can be effective in stabilizing growth
in credit and house prices (see e.g. BIS, 2017).1 As a result, prudential policies have be-
come widely used: out of 119 countries surveyed in Cerutti et al. (2015), 107 regulators
reported using at least one macroprudential tool in 2013, compared to 76 in 2000.
A potential issue for implementing prudential regulation is that policies which re-
strict access to credit may have immediate effects on the median voter, and thus come
with political costs (Dagher, 2017). As a result, politicians may have considerable in-
centives to intervene – formally or informally – with regulatory decision making. Ex-
amples of suspicious coincidences abound: In Germany, for example, the parliament
blocked the introduction of income-based limits for borrowers (debt-to-income and
debt-service-to-income ratios) just eight weeks before the 2017 elections.2 In many
countries, governments have direct representatives on the committees responsible for
macroprudential decisions (Edge and Liang, 2017). This might be a binding constraint:
In June 2017, for example, the Belgian finance ministry blocked a proposal by the
1Among many other country case studies, Jiménez et al. (2017), Aiyar et al. (2016), Aiyar et al.
(2014), Gambacorta and Murcia (2017), and Epure et al. (2017) show that prudential policies affect
loan and firm-level outcomes. Altunbas et al. (2018) show that macroprudential policy affects bank
risk. Ayyagari et al. (2017) find some evidence for effects of macroprudential tools on firm outcomes
across countries. Macroeconomic evidence includes IMF (2011), Kuttner and Shim (2016), Akinci and
Olmstead-Rumsey (2015), and Cerutti et al. (2015).
2See the Annual Report of the German Council of Economic Experts.
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National Bank of Belgium to increase the risk weights on mortgages with high loan-
to-value ratios to address an increase in systemic risk in the mortgage market (NBB,
2017). Drawing on a plethora of case studies, Dagher (2017) argues that regulatory
changes in the run-up to banking crises seem to be the rule rather than the exception.
The risk of political intervention is at times acknowledged in policy circles (e.g.
Haldane, 2017). As Horvath and Wagner (2016) put it: “Pressure from the financial in-
dustry and politicians will make it difficult for regulators to impose additional capital
when excesses start to materialise.” This contrasts with a lack of empirical evidence.
In this paper, I attempt to fill this void by testing for the existence of electoral cycles in
the use of prudential regulation in the run-up to 217 elections in 58 countries between
2000 to 2014.
I find that countries are much less likely to tighten prudential tools, and somewhat
more likely to loosen them, in the quarters prior to an election. This finding turns
out to be a strikingly clear and robust feature of the data. Consistent with govern-
ment clout over policy decisions, the election cycle is strongest for the tightening of
sector-specific capital buffers that target mortgage and consumer credit – arguably the
policies which most directly affect the median voter. Crucially from a policy perspect-
ive, such targeted tools have also been found to be the most effective in curbing credit
and house price growth (e.g. Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey, 2015).
I also find strong evidence that policy makers are less tough on financial sector risks
in “good times”, when memories of previous crises may seem more distant (Reinhart
and Rogoff, 2009b; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; Bordalo et al., 2017). In particular,
elections matter more for regulatory decisions when credit and GDP growth are high,
and booming stock returns and economic forecasts signal optimism about the future.
This may not be coincidental: Antoniades and Calomiris (2018) show that voters pun-
ish Presidential candidates for contractions in mortgage credit, but do not reward them
during boom times. Of course, such boom times are precisely when prudential policy
is supposed to help cushion bank balance sheets against a reversal of fortunes. As
such, the electoral cycle weakens efforts to decrease the pro-cyclicality of the financial
sector. In contrast, I find no evidence that countries with more concentrated banking
sectors - which one would expect to have greater lobbying powers - have a stronger
election cycle.
A common view among academics and policy makers alike is that a strengthening
of institutions is a potential remedy for political economy dilemmas. In the case of
monetary and macroprudential policy, central bank independence is often referred
to as a backstop for political interference (Cukierman, 1992; Eijffinger and de Haan,
1996; Crowe and Meade, 2007). To quote the former director of the IMF’s Monetary
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and Capital Markets Department, “... in many countries the central bank is unique
in being insulated from lobbying and political pressures, which is important to make
macroprudential policy work.”3 On the other hand, many prominent case studies
on the political economy of finance are countries with arguably excellent institutions,
such as the United States or the United Kingdom (Calomiris and Haber, 2014).
In the data, I find very limited evidence that central bank independence mitigates
the electoral cycle in prudential regulation, which at best shows a quantitatively small
and inconsistent mediating effect. For example, the electoral cycle in sector-specific
capital buffers is still around half as strong for countries in the top tercile of central
bank independence compared to the average effect, and in fact more pronounced for
the use of other prudential tools. In contrast, central bank independence appears to
have a large and consistent effect on electoral cycles in monetary policy. While coun-
tries with low central bank independence show signs of lower policy rates, higher base
money growth, and a strengthening exchange rate prior to elections, the effect changes
sign for those with highly independent monetary authorities. Other measures of insti-
tutional quality and democratic development also have limited moderating effects on
prudential measures. Further, the electoral cycle has not become weaker in the wake
of sweeping post-crisis reforms; if anything, I find larger coefficients in the later period
of the sample. Taken together, this suggests that the forces intrinsic in the democratic
process may create strong incentives for politicians to directly intervene in credit mar-
ket regulation via targeted tools, even in countries where central bank independence
appears to insulate monetary policy.
Identifying electoral cycles empirically is a non-trivial task, because changes to
prudential regulation, election dates, and the state of the economy may be jointly de-
termined. Most obviously, elections may be irregular, that is held before or after the
dates set by a country’s constitution or common practice (Ito, 1990; Alesina et al., 1992).
However, endogenous election timing turns out to play little role in the setting I study:
the effects I uncover are basically equivalent in the full sample and a sample of “regu-
lar” elections. I also find that pre-election periods are strikingly similar to other times
in macroeconomic and financial fundamentals. In other words, “treated” time periods
(i.e. pre-election quarters) both across and within countries do not differ in observ-
able characteristics from “control” periods (i.e. all other quarters). This is important
because there is considerable evidence for electoral cycles in government-controlled
bank lending, investment, fiscal policy, as well as other policy levers (e.g. Dinc, 2005;
Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya, 2004; Jului and Yook, 2012; Jens, 2017). These cycles, in
turn, may have an effect on the stance of prudential regulation.
3See the transcript of José Viñals’ speech at the Brookings Institution.
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I show that my results change little when I control for macroeconomic and finan-
cial sector variables in my regressions, including a large number of leads and lags. The
quarterly dimension of the data further allow me to introduce a full set of country ×
year fixed effects; effectively, this means comparing the quarters surrounding elec-
tions within the same country in the same year. The remaining identifying assumption,
then, is that there are no unobserved factors that are (1) sufficiently orthogonal to the
large set of quarterly control variables I employ, and (2) systematically correlated with
election timing within a given year in the same country. I argue that this assumption is
likely to hold. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that the cross-country setting I
study does not provide random variation in election timing that would be plausibly
orthogonal to the state of the economy. As such, I view the results I provide here as a
largely descriptive exercise.
This paper is embedded in a growing body of work on the political economy of
finance. My first contribution is to show that elections influence discretionary changes
to financial regulation, in particular macroprudential (and microprudential) tools. As
such, I provide some empirical evidence to suggest that political limitations are a po-
tential weakness of the post-crisis consensus on how to address the build-up of sys-
temic risk. My second contribution is to examine the circumstances in which political
interference may impact regulation. I show that stronger central bank independence
– and institutional frameworks more broadly – have very limiting moderating effects.
At the same time, central bank independence is an important moderator for political
cycles in monetary policy. The electoral cycle I document is also uncorrelated with
proxies of the market power of financial institutions. Taken at face value, this sug-
gests that it is not driven by powerful special interests exerting power over politicians.
Consistent with theories of opportunistic regulatory cycles, I find that benign eco-
nomic conditions characterized by higher economic and credit growth drive an easing
of financial regulation prior to elections.
My work is related to three broad strands of the literature. First, it is grounded
in the vast literature on electoral cycles in economic policies and outcomes. There
is considerable evidence that political incumbents benefit from better economic per-
formance and a classic literature argues incumbents have incentives to manipulate
policies to this end (see e.g. Nordhaus, 1975; MacRae, 1977; Rogoff and Sibert, 1988).
My focus on elections extends papers documenting political cycles in, among others,
fiscal transfers (e.g. Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya, 2004), local tax rates (e.g. Foremny
and Riedel, 2014), or monetary policy (e.g. Alesina et al., 1992; Block, 2002; Clark and
Hallerberg, 2000). Perhaps most closely related is work by Brown and Dinc (2005),
Dam and Koetter (2012), and Behn et al. (2015), who show that bank bail-outs by gov-
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ernments are much less likely prior to elections in emerging economies and Germany,
respectively.4 In contrast to these studies, I focus on changes in prudential regulation,
which are much more frequent than bank bailouts. My work also adds directly to Her-
rera et al. (2014), who show that rises in the popularity of governments (which they
call “political booms”) predict financial crises, over and above financial and macroe-
conomic variables. The results I present meshes well with their finding that financial
regulation is pro-cyclical with respect to government popularity.
Second, I add to the literature on election cycles on bank lending. Previous work
by Sapienza (2004), Dinc (2005), Cole (2009), Carvalho (2014), Halling et al. (2016),
and Englmaier and Stowasser (2017) suggests that government ownership of banks is
associated with “political lending” during election periods. In contrast, I focus on dis-
cretionary policies set by regulators, not the credit decisions of financial institutions.
Third, my paper is also related to work that describes financial sectors outcomes as
bargaining between special interest groups (such as bankers or powerful incumbents)
and politicians (e.g. Kroszner and Strahan, 1999; Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Braun and
Raddatz, 2008; Benmelech and Moskowitz, 2010; Calomiris and Haber, 2014). Among
others, Mian et al. (2010), Mian et al. (2013), and Chavaz and Rose (2016) provide evid-
ence how special interests shape legislative decisions in financial regulation. While
such studies are concerned with developments in the medium- and long-run, I show
that politics also matter for frequent, discretionary decisions taken by regulators in the
post-crisis framework.
3.2 Data and Empirical Strategy
3.2.1 Data
I combine three different types of data for the empirical analysis: (1) data on the use of
regulatory tools, (2) election dates, and (3) data on macroeconomic and financial sector
conditions. I briefly discuss these in turn and refer the interested reader to the online
appendix, which outlines the sources and variable construction in more detail, as well
as detailed summary statistics.
The basis for the analysis in this paper is the cross-country database on changes
in prudential policy instruments compiled by Cerutti et al. (2017a). This dataset com-
prises quarterly data on changes in the intensity of widely used regulatory tools for
64 countries for 2000 Q1 through 2014 Q4. In particular, the data differentiate between
4Liu and Ngo (2014) study bank failures around elections, but do not investigate the actions of
policy makers.
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capital buffers (both general and sector-specific), limits to interbank exposures, con-
centration limits, loan-to-value (LTV) ratio limits, and reserve requirements. The total
of nine measures is aggregated into two indexes, where one tracks changes in any
instrument and a second changes in sector-specific capital requirements, where the
latter can refer to real estate credit, consumer credit, or other specific requirements. I
discuss the use of each tool in more detail in section 3.2.3; Cerutti et al. (2017a) provide
more details. Table 3.9 in the appendix plot the total number of tightening and loosen-
ing episodes for each tool. In the online appendix table 3.16, I plot the correlations
between the individual measures. This exercise shows that only a few of them move
in tandem, suggesting that there is considerable variation across time and countries in
their use.
I match the data on changes to prudential regulation with election dates in 58
democratic countries. Theories of electoral cycles posit that politicians may attempt
to influence key policy variables to target special interest groups or the median voter.
As such, identifying such cycles requires countries with reasonably credible elections
where domestic policies are likely to bite. In the main estimation sample, I thus only
keep countries that have a score of above 0 on the Polity IV democracy score in all
sample years from 2000 through 2014. This requirement eliminates five countries from
the dataset on prudential regulation (China, Hong Kong, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and
Vietnam). I further drop Luxembourg, where – given its role as a tiny financial center
country – prudential regulation may not predominantly target the domestic economy.
In section 3.3.2, I show that the sample selection makes no difference to the results I
present throughout the paper.
To identify elections, I start with the Polity IV database, Database of Political In-
stitutions (Beck et al., 2001), Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon et al., 2017),
and the Global Elections Database (Brancati, 2017), which list the month and year of
elections throughout the world. I begin by identifying the most relevant elections by
country, which are usually centered around the selection of chief executives. In presid-
ential systems such as the United States, power is normally concentrated in the office
of the president. In parliamentary systems, prime ministers or premiers are the rel-
evant figures, which are elected in parliamentary elections. Since the classification is
unclear in a few cases, I hand-check all elections drawing on additional information
from various internet resources, starting with Wikipedia. I also cross-check my classi-
fication with that in Jului and Yook (2012). The full list of elections is reported in the
online appendix table 3.24. Table 3.23 further reports the number of tightening and
loosening episodes across countries, the number of elections, and the type of elections
used. Changes in prudential policy stance are widely distributed across countries and
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thus provide a lot of variation.
The main variable of interest is a dummy Eit that takes the value of 1 in quar-
ters before an election takes place. I follow previous studies in using the pre-election
quarter to identify political cycles in quarterly data (see e.g. Schultz, 1995; Canes-
Wrone and Park, 2012). This choice is also motivated by the finding of Akhmedov and
Zhuravskaya (2004) that such cycles may have a relatively short length and thus be
underestimated in low frequency data. Further, research on the effectiveness of mac-
roprudential policies suggests that these affect the macroeconomy with a lag of about
one quarter (e.g. BIS, 2017). In section 3.3.1, I explore how regulation changes from
one year before until one year after elections and find that these only vary consistently
for pre-election quarters.
Theory predicts that political cycles should be particularly strong when incum-
bent governments are uncertain about the electoral outcome. I thus also differentiate
elections by whether they can be regarded as relatively “close”, in the sense of their
outcome being hard to predict. Because the uncertainty about electoral outcomes is
unobservable, I follow Jului and Yook (2012) and Canes-Wrone and Ponce de Leon
(2018) in using within-country variation in actual election results as a proxy. For par-
liamentary systems, I consider elections where the government achieves a margin of
victory below the country-specific median as relatively close, based on the share of
parliamentary seats. For presidential systems, I use elections that are below the me-
dian in the last-round presidential vote share.5
The third group of variables are macroeconomic and financial sector controls. Since
changes in regulation likely depend on the state of the economy and the financial sec-
tor in particular, I control for key quarterly macroeconomic variables taken from the
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics and the OECD, as well
as annual financial sector data from the World Bank’s Global Financial Development
database. I discuss the exact variable construction of these and a few additional vari-
ables for cross-sectional tests in the online appendix table 3.11. Table 3.10 in the online
appendix provides descriptive statistics for the entire estimation sample.
3.2.2 A Case Study of Serbia
Do political considerations play a role in the implementation of prudential regulation?
For illustration, consider the particular case of Serbia between 2002 and 2008. Serbia
is a parliamentary republic, where the president holds a largely ceremonial post. The
5The results are qualitatively similar if I instead define close elections based on the margin of victory
in vote shares between the government and opposition or their strongest parties.
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modern-day Republic of Serbia was founded in 1992 as a union with Montenegro after
the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992. After the tumul-
tuous Yugoslav and Kosovo wars of the 1990s, president Miloševic´ was overthrown
after the disputed 2000 presidential elections amid demonstrations. In its aftermath,
the Democratic Opposition of Serbia won an absolute majority in the first free parlia-
mentary elections.
Figure 3.1: ELECTIONS AND PRUDENTIAL REGULATION – THE SERBIAN CASE
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This figure plots tightening and loosening episodes in the prudential regulation index in Serbia for 2002
through 2008. The dashed vertical lines indicate the dates of parliamentary elections.
Throughout the particularly volatile first years of the newly democratic Serbia,
there was a striking pattern of changes to prudential regulation around parliament-
ary elections (see figure 3.1). Both before the vote in December 2003 – in the wake of
reformist prime minister Ðind¯ic´’s assassination – and the elections in early 2007, the
National Bank of Serbia eased prudential regulation, mainly through reserve require-
ments.6 A similar picture can be seen prior to the early 2008 elections, which were
held after prime minister Koštunica’s government dissolved as a result of Kosovo’s
unilateral declaration of independence. For the latter, however, the onset of the Global
Financial Crisis may also play a role. In both the 2003 and 2008 election, there was
6Note that, until July 2003, Serbia and Montenegro’s central bank was the National Bank of
Yugoslavia.
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further a loosening in close proximity after the vote, which can be suggestive of overly
lax policy prior to an election (Alesina et al., 1992).
In all three elections, the incumbent Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) and its pre-
decessor, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), fought for re-election in years
with a relative slow-down in economic growth. While there may be many alternative
explanations, the pattern of regulatory changes around elections in Serbia could also
reflect political considerations. The hypothesis I test in the next section is whether the
pattern of an easing of regulation prior to elections is limited to the admittedly special
case of Serbia, or rather a general feature of the data.
3.2.3 Basic Correlations
Do regulators systematically loosen or tighten prudential measures prior to elections?
In this section, I use data on 58 countries from 2000 through 2014 to provide some basic
correlations as an introductory exercise. At this stage, these should not be interpreted
as causal effects; rather, the goal is to illustrate the patterns in the raw data.
Figure 3.2: CHANGES IN (MACRO)PRUDENTIAL POLICY, BY PRE-ELECTION
QUARTER
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This figure plots simple averages of changes in the prudential regulation index and sector-specific cap-
ital buffers in pre-election quarters and all other quarters. Positive values indicate a tightening, negative
values a loosening of regulation.
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Figure 3.2 plots the average change in the prudential regulation index and the in-
dex of sector-specific capital buffers for all quarters for which I have data, depending
on whether it is prior to an election. The bar chart suggests that regulation is, on aver-
age, tightened in every quarter, but less so in pre-election quarters. For sector-specific
tools, the effect is almost diametrically opposed: regulation is loosened before elec-
tions and tightened in all other periods.
Table 3.16 plots these changes and those in all macroeconomic and financial sec-
tor control variables. It also shows the difference between pre-election and all other
quarters and challenges these to a simple two-sided t-test for statistical significance.
The data confirm that the pattern shown in 3.2 is significantly different from zero for
the sector-specific buffer and 3 out of the 9 individual regulatory tools, with p-values
close to the 10% threshold for 2 other measures. In particular, pre-election quarters
saw a loosening of regulation for real estate capital buffers sectoral capital tools (and
no changes to other sectoral buffers); concentration limits (also aimed at loan com-
position); and interbank exposures. I find no effect for general capital requirements,
loan-to-value limits, or reserve requirements.
Importantly, there seems to be no systematic difference in financial and macroeco-
nomic conditions between the election and non-election periods. For the vast majority
of variables, the p-values for statistical significance are in excess of 0.5 – clearly, pre-
election periods do not seem to be particularly different in regard to the state of the
economy on average. Even for those variables with p-values closer to thresholds of
statistical significance, the differences are quantitatively small. This will become im-
portant for causal inference later, because a valid caveat to the observation of softer
regulation before elections is that it may be driven by differences in the broader eco-
nomic climate.
3.2.4 Empirical Strategy
The backbone of the empirical analysis are standard fixed effects dynamic panel re-
gressions of the type:
∆Rit = αi + αt + βEit + γCit + ψ(L)Rit−1 + εit, (3.1)
where i and t index countries and year-quarters, respectively, and αi and αt refer to a
full set of fixed effects. As discussed later, I also consider specifications with country×
year fixed effects, αiy.
Eit is the pre-election dummy, taking the value of 1 if an election takes place in
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Table 3.1: VARIABLE MEANS, BY PRE-ELECTION QUARTER
Note: This table presents simple averages of the variables used in the empirical analysis, di-
vided by whether a country held an election in the following year-quarter. The sample is
the estimation sample including all controls, as in columns (2) and (7) of table 3.2. The p-
value in the right column is based on a two-sided t-test that allows for unequal variances
of the samples under the null hypothesis that the difference between the variables is zero.
Pre-election Other Pr(Diff.) = 0
quarter quarters Difference (p-value)
Index measures
∆ Prudential regulation index 0.043 0.052 0.008 0.816
∆ Sector-specific capital buffer -0.007 0.014 0.021 0.014
Individual regulatory tools
∆ Real estate capital buffer -0.007 0.009 0.016 0.044
∆ Consumer credit capital buffer 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.157
∆ Other capital buffer 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.144
∆ General capital requirement 0.036 0.022 -0.014 0.396
∆ Concentration limit -0.012 0.018 0.030 0.018
∆ Interbank exposure 0.000 0.021 0.021 0.000
∆ Loan-to-value ratio 0.080 0.024 -0.056 0.259
∆ Reserve requirements (FC) 0.007 0.005 -0.002 0.905
∆ Reserve requirements (LC) -0.022 -0.008 0.014 0.576
Bank variables
Bank capitalisation (%) 8.251 8.273 0.022 0.945
Lending concentration 66.746 66.886 0.140 0.935
Cost to income ratio (%) 56.931 57.166 0.235 0.842
Non-performing loans (%) 4.901 5.065 0.164 0.714
ROA 0.908 1.112 0.203 0.251
Z-score 10.058 10.234 0.176 0.760
Foreign bank share (%) 35.799 35.505 -0.293 0.893
Macro variables
Government exp./GDP 0.177 0.172 -0.005 0.241
Money market rate 4.398 4.443 0.045 0.932
Base money growth 0.163 0.133 -0.030 0.323
Real credit growth 0.070 0.084 0.015 0.278
Real GDP growth 0.036 0.032 -0.004 0.484
∆ Current account/GDP -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.856
Total trade/GDP 0.888 0.865 -0.023 0.608
Investment/GDP 0.230 0.228 -0.002 0.648
Consumption/GDP 0.576 0.580 0.004 0.635
Inflation 0.038 0.039 0.001 0.760
Exchange rate (US$) 220.720 319.186 98.467 0.363
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country i in year-quarter t + 1, and 0 otherwise. In principle, election timing may be
endogenous to changes in financial regulation; I address this in section 3.3.1 by re-
stricting the sample to “regular” elections that are held within the limit implied by a
country’s constitution or regular practice. Because most elections in my sample are
indeed regular (see table 3.15 in the online appendix), this adjustment makes no dif-
ference to any of the results presented in the paper.7
Cit is a vector of macroeconomic variables that describe the state of the economy
and the financial sector; for the full set of controls, I use 11 quarterly macro and 7 an-
nual banking sector variables.8 (L)∆Rit−1 is a vector of lags of the dependent variable
up to account for autocorrelation in regulatory decisions; in the baseline regressions, I
set the lag polynomial (L) to 4.9 εit is an error term that is assumed to be well-behaved.
Standard errors are clustered by country.
I estimate all baseline regressions using ordinary least squares (OLS). In some spe-
cifications, I transform the dependent variables into dummies to indicate a tightening
or loosening of prudential policy, which suggests the use of maximum likelihood es-
timators such as logit or probit in many applications. In my setting, however, this is
infeasible because of the combination of two-way fixed effects, interaction terms, and
completely separated variables.10 However, I replicate all regressions with dummy
dependent variables using standard logit regressions as well as the bias-corrected lo-
git estimator for two-way fixed effects described in Fernández-Val and Weidner (2016)
7In unreported regressions, I also tried instrumenting election dates using “predictable” elections
by exploiting the fact that fixed legislative periods generate plausibly exogenous variation in the exact
election timing from the perspective of the pre-sample period. This approach yields estimates very
similar to those obtained via OLS.
8These include government spending/GDP, a money market interest rate, the growth of central
bank reserves, real credit growth, real GDP growth, current account/GDP, total trade/GDP, invest-
ment/GDP, private consumption/GDP, CPI growth, the nominal USD exchange rate, bank capitaliza-
tion, a measure of banking sector concentration, banks’ cost-to-income ratio, the NPL ratio, bank return
on assets, bank Z-score, and the share of foreign banks. See the online appendix for the exact variable
descriptions.
9Lag selection tests using the Bayesian or Akaike information criteria suggest autocorrelation of
between 1 and more than 8 quarters. I use 4 lags as a baseline compromise. As I show in section 3.3.2,
the exact number of lags makes virtually no difference to the results. The results are also unaffected
by Nickell bias, because they also hold using specifications without lagged dependent variables (see
section 3.3.2); this is unsurprising, given that I have 56 quarters of observations per country.
10Complete separation of a variable arises when a variable perfectly an outcome. This is the case
in my setting because, for example, out of the 51 changes in sector-specific capital requirements in the
sample, none occur in pre-election quarters. Models with such variables cannot be estimated using
maximum likelihood because the likelihood of no change in sector-specific capital requirements in pre-
election quarters is infinity by definition.
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in section 3.3.2.
The goal of estimating equation 3.1 is for the coefficient βˆ to capture the likeli-
hood that a change in the regulation measure R is influenced by an upcoming elec-
tion. The estimation abstracts from time-invariant country-specific factors that may
have an impact, e.g. how often regulation is generally changed in country i, as well
as time-specific factors in quarter t, e.g. the Great Financial Crisis 2007-2008. Next,
I investigate to which extent pre-election periods differ in their underlying economic
fundamentals from other times.
3.2.5 Are Pre-Election Quarters Different?
A potential challenge for identifying electoral cycles in regulation is that the macroe-
conomic variables in vector Cit may themselves be subject to an electoral cycle. If, for
example, financial conditions prior to elections are relatively gloomy, regulators may
see less reason to interfere or loosen existing measures. In the data, we may thus ob-
serve a negative correlation of Eit and ∆Rit even in the absence of a true causal effect.
Whether observable macroeconomic or financial sector fundamentals are different in
the run-up to elections is an empirical question. In section 3.2.3, I already showed that
there is no evidence that macroeconomic conditions in my sample differ between pre-
election quarters and other periods on average. Another way to think about this is that
the “treatment group” (pre-election quarters) and “control group” (all other quarters)
are randomly assigned across observable differences.
I explore this issue in more detail in table 3.17 in the online appendix, where I
regress each of the macroeconomic and financial sector controls on the pre-election
quarter dummy. Whether one includes fixed effects or not, none of the variables con-
sistently exhibits an electoral cycle. In other words, pre-election quarters appear to be
highly similar in macroeconomic fundamentals compared to other quarters.
The remaining identifying assumption is that unobserved time-varying country
factors that are sufficiently orthogonal to the variables in vector Cit do not have a
pronounced independent election cycle affecting Rit, conditional on Cit. I argue that
this assumption is likely to hold in practice, given the relatively large number of 18
baseline control variables in Cit.11
11In robustness checks, I further use up to 4 lags and leads of each of these variables, which yields
a total of 18 + 4 × 18 + 2 × 18 = 126 covariates; alternatively, I use the first principal components
of 20 financial sector and the 11 macroeconomic controls. In unreported results, I also experimented
with including interactions of all control variables with the pre-election dummy, which considerably
increases the point estimate of βˆ and leaves statistical significance intact.
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To further address the issue of potential unobserved factors, I also allow for a spe-
cification of equation 3.1 that includes country×year fixed effects by replacing the term
αi with αiy where y indexes years. Effectively, I only compare the quarters around elec-
tions in the same country in the same year. This considerably eases the identifying as-
sumption I have to make. In particular, there would have to be an omitted factor that
affects prudential regulation at high frequency and is sufficiently orthogonal to the
quarterly control variables in Cit to bias βˆ consistently above zero. While this seems
like a rather mild assumption to make, I want to stress that in the absence of random
variation in elections across countries, the results presented here should be interpreted
as descriptive.
3.3 Elections and Prudential Regulation
3.3.1 Baseline Results
Table 3.2 shows the main results of running equation 3.1. I start by differentiating
between the broad prudential regulation index and the index of sector-specific capital
requirements, which particularly target real estate and consumer credit. I then turn to
the impact on individual tools and graphical evidence below.
Looking at aggregate tightening and loosening jointly, the coefficients for the broad
prudential regulation index presented in panel A always attract a negative sign, but
lack statistical significance in some specifications. The negative sign implies less strin-
gent changes to prudential regulation in the run-up to elections. The p-values of 13%
and 11% in columns (1) and (4), respectively, are closest to conventional levels of stat-
istical significance. When adding the full set of macroeconomic and financial sector
controls including 4 lags and 2 leads of each variable in column (5), the coefficient
become significant at the 5% level. One explanation for this result may be the clearly
much smaller sample in column (5), which could inflate the coefficient estimate. Al-
ternatively, it may be crucial to appropriately control for the current, past, and (ex-
pected) future economic environment to isolate the effect of upcoming elections on
changes to prudential regulation.
However, as we saw in section 3.2.3, many of the index changes are due to changes
in general capital requirements. In panel B, I thus turn to changes in the index of
sector-specific tools. In column (1), I begin by running the OLS fixed effects regression
without controls. The coefficient of −0.021 is highly statistically significant at the 5%
level. It is also remarkably large: since the mean change of the sector-specific capital
buffer is 0.049, pre-election quarters explain almost half of the average regulatory de-
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Table 3.2: MAIN RESULTS – ELECTIONS AND PRUDENTIAL REGULATION
Note: This table shows coefficients from estimating equation 3.1. The dependent variable is the change
in the prudential index in panel A and the change in sector-specific capital buffers in panel B. All es-
timations include four lags of the dependent variable as covariates and other controls as indicated. See
text for variable descriptions. Standard errors are clustered by country in columns (1) through (3) and
heteroskedasticity-robust in columns (4) and (5) due to small cluster size, with ***, **, and * denoting
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The † refers to a p-value of 0.104.
Only Add Add country × Add lagged Add lead
FE controls year FE controls controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A:∆ Prudential regulation index
Pre-Election Quarter -0.043 -0.024 -0.037 -0.065† -0.102**
(0.028) (0.037) (0.035) (0.040) (0.041)
Countries 58 51 51 49 46
Observations 3,190 2,213 2,199 1,674 1,274
R2 0.123 0.133 0.481 0.204 0.309
Panel B:∆ Sector-specific capital buffer
Pre-Election Quarter -0.021** -0.026*** -0.025** -0.025** -0.023*
(0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013)
Countries 58 51 553 49 46
Observations 3,190 2,213 2,199 1,674 1,274
R2 0.046 0.072 0.489 0.134 0.204
AR(4) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes – Yes Yes
Country-Year FE Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls (18) Yes Yes Yes Yes
4 lags of controls (72) Yes Yes
2 leads of controls (36) Yes
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cision. Next, I introduce the vector of 18 macroeconomic and financial sector control
variables to account for potential differences in fundamentals in column (2). Because
of the relatively large number of controls, this reduces the number of countries from
58 to 51; the point estimate, however, is now even more precisely estimated and in-
creases to−0.026. This model specification will serve as the baseline model for the rest
of the paper. In column (3), I add country× year effects, which effectively means com-
paring the electoral cycle within the same country in the same year. As outlined above,
this makes it highly unlikely that unobservables are driving the result and yields an
almost unchanged coefficient of −0.025. The fact that conditioning on a full set of
country-year dummies does little to the point estimate is not surprising because, I will
discuss momentarily, the entire effect on regulation is concentrated in the quarter prior
to the election.
Could it be that I am not sufficiently conditioning on past fundamentals? After all,
the state of the economy in the previous quarters may explain both current regulation
and election timing. In column (4), I introduce the contemporaneous controls as well
as 4 lags of each variable, which again slightly decreases the sample size. The point
estimate and its statistical precision, however, remain unaffected, despite the inclusion
of 18 + 4 × 18 = 90 covariates.12 As a last check, I further add 2 leads of each of the
control variables, yielding a total of 18+4×18+2×18 controls. The idea is that, while
I do not have data on forecasts of each variable, future realizations may serve as a
proxy for expected changes in these fundamentals. This may be important in studying
policy changes where the expected future state of the economy is key, which creates a
“foresight problem” when they are not controlled for (Ramey, 2016). Again, this leaves
the point estimate largely unchanged at −0.023 and still significant at the 10% level.
This is rather remarkable given the drop in degrees of freedom from including 126
covariates in the regression besides the election dummy.13 The fact that the coefficient
on sector-specific capital buffers is almost unchanged across specifications suggests
that differences in economic or financial conditions, e.g. due to electoral cycles in
these variables, are unlikely to drive the regulatory easing prior to elections.
Next, I investigate differences in the timing and competitiveness of elections in
table 3.3. Again, panel A begins by plotting the results for the prudential regulation
index. Column (1) reproduces the baseline specification (as in column (2) from table
12Note that for this model and that in column (5) I use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors,
because the lags leave me with insufficient observations to cluster standard errors by country.
13Note that the point estimates are virtually unchanged when including more than two leads (or
additional lags), but the diminished degrees of freedom then push the p-values slightly above the 10%
threshold.
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Table 3.3: MAIN RESULTS – DIFFERENCES ACROSS ELECTIONS
Note: This table shows coefficients from estimating equation 3.1. The dependent variable is
the change in the prudential index in panel A and the change in sector-specific capital buffers
in panel B. All estimations include four lags of the dependent variable as covariates and other
controls as indicated. In column (2), I restrict the pre-election dummy to “regular” elections,
defined as those that were not held late or prematurely (while tolerating one quarter of differ-
ence); column (3) uses the remaining “irregular” elections. In column (4), I restrict elections to
those that are relatively “close”, as defined in the text; column (5) uses the relatively less close
elections. Standard errors are clustered by country, with ***, **, and * denoting statistical sig-
nificance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The † refers to a p-value of 0.107.
Election timing Election outcome
Baseline Regular Irregular Close Not close
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A:∆ Prudential regulation index
Pre-Election Quarter -0.024 -0.046 0.033 -0.098† -0.006
(0.037) (0.047) (0.041) (0.059) (0.046)
Countries 51 51 51 43 48
Observations 2,213 2,213 2,213 672 1,393
R2 0.133 0.133 0.133 0.306 0.143
Panel B:∆ Sector-specific capital buffer
Pre-Election Quarter -0.026*** -0.030** -0.015 -0.067** -0.006
(0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.029) (0.009)
Countries 51 51 51 43 48
Observations 2,213 2,213 2,213 672 1,393
R2 0.072 0.072 0.071 0.175 0.101
AR(4) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls (18) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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3.2) for convenience. Similar to the results shown before, the results on election timing
in columns (2) and (3) lack statistical precision. Taken at face value, they suggest the
presence of an electoral cycle only during “regular” elections, defined as those that
are held within the time frame specified in a country’s constitution or established as
regular practice.14 In column (4), I restrict the sample to close elections, defined as
those that are more competitive than the median election in a given country. The point
estimate is now −0.098 with a p-value of 0.107, considerably larger than the baseline
of−0.024; less contested elections in column (5) attract a coefficient of−0.006 and thus
do not have an effect on prudential regulation. Despite the lack of statistical power for
the prudential index, this is already a first indication that the electoral cycle is driven
by periods when incumbents expect election outcomes to be uncertain – and thus have
stronger incentives to intervene.
Panel B paints a much clearer picture for the sector-specific capital buffer. Regu-
lators are twice as likely to forgo tightening sectoral buffers in the run-up to regular
compared to irregular elections. This is intuitive from a political economy angle, be-
cause incumbent politicians may be able to influence policy more when the timing
of elections is predictable. Also recall that table 3.15 showed that three quarters of
all elections in my sample can be considered regular. As such, the baseline coeffi-
cient of −0.026 is naturally closer to that of −0.030 for regular elections in column (2)
than that of−0.015 for irregular elections. This also suggests that endogenous election
timing does not appear to be major factor in my setting; I will thus use the baseline
pre-election dummy for the remainder of the paper.15
In columns (4) and (5), I again split the sample by whether pre-election dummy
precedes election outcomes that are more or less likely to be predictable upfront. The
point estimate for close elections in column (4) now jumps to −0.067 (statistically sig-
nificant at the 5% level), while that for elections that are not contested is an order of
magnitude smaller and close to 0 in column (5). This suggests that the electoral cycle in
sector-specific capital buffers, similar to that for prudential tools on average, is limited
periods where incumbents face uncertainty about election outcomes.
As a next exercise, I differentiate between tightening and loosening episodes for the
prudential index and sector-specific capital buffers in table 3.4. The dependent vari-
able is now a dummy equal to 1 for the respective changes, and 0 otherwise. Because
14I allow one quarter deviation from the exact quarter of the previous election, which is unlikely to
reflect severe meddling with election timing. The results, however, are virtually unchanged if I do not
make this correction.
15All results I present in the following are almost unchanged if I use the “regular elections” dummy
instead. However, this comes at the cost of reducing the number of elections, which may yield a less
general result.
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Table 3.4: REGRESSIONS BY PRUDENTIAL TOOL AND TIGHTENING/LOOSENING
EPISODES
Note: This table shows coefficients from estimating equation 3.1 with and without country × year
fixed effects (αiy , where the dependent variable is a dummy for a tightening or loosening of the
indicated prudential instrument. Each cell represents an individual regression, where I only plot
the estimated coefficient of the pre-election quarter dummy βˆ. All estimations include four lags
of the dependent variable as covariates but no other control variables. The coefficient on the
loosening of general capital requirements cannot be estimated because these requirements are never
loosened in the sample (as in Cerutti et al. (2017a)). Standard errors are clustered by country,
with ***, **, and * denoting statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Tightening Loosening
βˆαi βˆαiy βˆαi βˆαiy N
∆ Prudential regulation index -0.011 -0.002 0.035** 0.035** 3,190
∆ Sector-specific capital buffer -0.015*** -0.016** 0.003 0.002 3,190
∆ Real estate capital buffer -0.011*** -0.011* -0.001 -0.003 3,190
∆ Consumer credit capital buffer -0.002** -0.004 0.003 0.004 3,190
∆ Other capital buffer -0.005** -0.004 -0.001 0.001 3,190
∆ Capital requirements -0.001 -0.004 – 2,970
∆ Concentration limit -0.017*** -0.013 0.008 0.008 1,773
∆ Interbank exposure -0.022** -0.018** -0.001 0.000 1,013
∆ Loan-to-value ratio 0.039 0.069** 0.027 0.044* 960
∆ Reserve requirements (FC) -0.016* -0.010 -0.002 -0.002 3,190
∆ Reserve requirements (LC) -0.004 -0.001 0.020 0.022 3,190
Country FE Yes – Yes –
Country × Year FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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the sample size is somewhat smaller for concentration limits, interbank exposure lim-
its, and LTV ratio limits in particular, I focus on OLS regressions without controls. I
report the coefficients from the baseline specification 3.1 βˆαi and that of a regression
including country × year fixed effects, βˆαiy .16
The findings suggest that electoral cycles in prudential regulation are pervasive
across a wide range of tools. While there is little evidence of an average effect on the
regulation index, the results here suggest that regulators are 3.5% more likely to loosen
constraints in the run-up to an election for both the baseline and country-year FE spe-
cification. This is a large effect, given that the unconditional probability of a loosening
in the estimation sample is 5%. A lower likelihood of tightening of regulation prior
to elections can be observed for all the sector-specific capital requirements, but also
concentration limits and interbank exposures. Similar to the patterns in the raw data,
the effect sizes imply that almost none of the tightening episodes occur in pre-election
quarters, even after adjusting for country and time fixed effects.
I find more limited evidence for reserve requirements or general capital require-
ments, which do not target particular sectors. The picture is also unclear for changes
to loan-to-value limits, which however are only available for a small subset of the data-
set in Cerutti et al. (2017a); this may explain why I find some (however inconsistent)
evidence for both a tightening and loosening prior to elections. Taken together, these
results suggest that (1) there is considerable heterogeneity in the political cyclicality of
prudential regulation, and (2) sector-specific tools, broadly speaking to include inter-
bank and concentration limits, appear to react particularly strong to upcoming elec-
tions. Judging by the highly similar coefficients in the specification with and without
country × year effects, these findings are unlikely to be driven by omitted factors.
I next tease out the full dynamic path of regulatory reaction to elections in figure
3.3, where I differentiate between close and other elections.17 Since there is only con-
sistent evidence for a cycle in the loosening of the regulation index and a tightening
of sector-specific capital requirements, I focus on these two measures in the graphical
analysis. To get a glimpse of how elections impact regulation, I estimate equation 3.1
with four lags and leads of the election dummy Eit as well as the full control vari-
able vector, and plot the estimated coefficients. Figure 3.3 paints a clear picture: the
electoral cycle in prudential regulation is highly concentrated in the quarters prior to
elections, and is only statistically significant for contested, close elections – precisely
16All results presented here are almost unchanged when including the full vector of controls (avail-
able upon request).
17In 3.4 in the online appendix, I show that the results in fact look very similar for the entire sample
of elections.
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Figure 3.3: ELECTIONS AND PRUDENTIAL REGULATION – GRAPHICAL EVIDENCE
PANEL A: LOOSENING OF PRUDENTIAL REGULATION INDEX
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PANEL B: TIGHTENING OF SECTOR-SPECIFIC CAPITAL BUFFERS
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Notes: These figures show the dynamic effect of elections on the loosening of the prudential regulation
index (Panel A) and the tightening of sector-specific capital buffers (Panel B). For each estimation, the
sample is divided into close elections and all other elections, as defined in the text. The plotted coeffi-
cients are the
4∑
t=−4
βˆt estimated using the OLS regression Rit = αi + αt +
4∑
t=−4
βtEit + γCitεit, where
Rit is one of the outcome dummies. The regressions also include four lags of the dependent variable.
Standard errors are clustered by country.
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those situations when governments may believe to benefit from easily flowing credit.
This confirms findings in the previous literature that electoral cycles are often short-
lived and thus require data at relatively high frequency (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya,
2004). It is also consistent with evidence that the effect of macroprudential tools kicks
in after one or two quarters; the election quarter itself always attracts a statistically
insignificant coefficient. I do not find statistically significant rebalancing in the post-
election period, which could be a systematic reaction to a too loose policy stance before
(Alesina et al., 1992). The lack of such rebalancing suggests that – on average – fore-
gone tightening or excessive loosening in the election run-up have permanent effects.
The implied magnitudes of the estimates are also worth highlighting: For the ag-
gregate prudential regulation index in figure (A.1), the estimates suggest that a loosen-
ing is around 10% more likely in the quarter prior to elections. Sector-specific capital
buffers have an around 5% lower likelihood to be tightened between 1 and 3 quarters
prior to the election in figure (B.1). These are large effects.
3.3.2 Robustness
In the previous section, I established some evidence for an electoral cycle in the use
of prudential regulatory tools. A clear concern for the type of cross-country panel
regression I use is that it may not be robust to changes in estimation technique or
model specification; sample composition; or different sets of control variables. In table
3.5, I thus present a wide range of validity exercises to showcase the robustness of
the coefficient estimates βˆ while taking into account potential non-linearities between
tightening and loosening episodes.
I begin by addressing concerns regarding the exact model specification and es-
timation technique in Panel A. It turns out that the coefficients I find are remarkably
stable, independent of the included set of fixed effects or lags of the dependent vari-
able. In unreported regressions, I further experimented with including additional lags
and found that the results did not change. They also hold when using the mean group
estimator (Pesaran and Smith, 1995) to account for heterogeneous effects across coun-
tries. This is an important result because it suggests that there is little underlying
heterogeneity in the pooled main estimate I report in table 3.4. In the online appendix
figure 3.5, I also plot the distribution of coefficients estimated by country, which are
negative for the sector-specific capital buffer in virtually all sample countries.
Since the dependent variables used here are all dummies, it is common practice to
use non-linear models such as logit regressions. In the case here, however, I run into
the problems of (1) complete separation, and (2) bias in the use of two-way fixed effects
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Table 3.5: ELECTIONS AND PRUDENTIAL REGULATION – ROBUSTNESS
Note: This table shows coefficients from estimating equation 3.1 using OLS, where the dependent vari-
able is a dummy for a tightening or loosening of the indicated prudential instrument (the prudential
regulation index or sector-specific capital buffer). Each cell represents an individual regression, where
I only plot the estimated coefficient of the pre-election quarter dummy βˆ. All estimations include four
lags of the dependent variable as covariates as well as country and year-quarter fixed effects, unless
otherwise indicated. Any control variables that were included are indicated in the first column. The
coefficient on the loosening of general capital requirements cannot be estimated because these require-
ments are never loosened in the sample (as in Cerutti et al. (2017a)). Standard errors are clustered by
country, with ***, **, and * denoting statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Tightening Loosening
∆ Index ∆ SSCB ∆ Index ∆ SSCB
Panel A: Model specification
No FE -0.002 -0.016*** 0.017 0.004
Time FE only -0.013 -0.015*** 0.023 0.005
AR(0) -0.011 -0.015*** 0.024 0.004
AR(1) -0.011 -0.015*** 0.028* 0.004
Mean Group Estimator, no FE 0.004 -0.016*** 0.023 0.003
Logit, no FE -0.051 — 0.586** 0.538
Logit, time FE only -0.179 — 0.762** 1.019
Logit, both FE -0.150 — 0.775** 1.024
Panel B: Sample selection
Consensus democracies only -0.015 -0.014*** 0.039** 0.004
No militaristic leaders -0.004 -0.016*** 0.042** 0.004
Drop Africa -0.012 -0.016*** 0.037** 0.004
Drop Asia -0.007 -0.012*** 0.048** 0.004
Drop Americas -0.020 -0.016*** 0.034* -0.000
Pre-crisis only -0.003 -0.012** 0.048 0.010
Post-crisis only -0.006 -0.020*** 0.022 -0.002
Panel C: Additional controls
Only bank controls 0.002 -0.016*** 0.023 -0.001
20 bank controls -0.007 -0.017*** 0.028 0.002
Only macro controls -0.008 -0.019*** 0.035* 0.007
Factor controls -0.014 -0.018*** 0.031 0.003
Regulation × Time FE -0.022 -0.016*** 0.048** 0.004
Region × Time FE -0.019 -0.014** 0.031 -0.001
Development × Time FE -0.001 -0.014*** 0.043** 0.005
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because of the incidental parameter problem. Since none of the tightening episodes
of the sector-specific capital buffer occur in pre-election quarters, it is not possible
to estimate the maximum likelihood in a standard logit framework, which is infinity
by definition. However, the bias-corrected estimator of Fernández-Val and Weidner
(2016) enables the estimation of panel logit regressions with two-way fixed effects.
This yields somewhat higher statistical significance of the pre-election dummy for the
loosening of the prudential regulation index throughout.
In Panel B, I deal with concerns regarding sample selection. I start by dropping all
countries that, at any point in the sample, are not defined as an (electoral) democracy
by both Polity IV and Freedom House. As an alternative proxy for authoritarianism,
I drop countries where either the chief executive or defense minister is a military of-
ficer. If anything, this increases both the point estimates and statistical significance. I
next drop the continents of Africa, Asia, and the Americas in turn to validate that the
findings are not driven by a particular region. I find that they are not. Similarly, I di-
vide the sample into the pre-crisis (up to 2006) and post-crisis (from 2007) period and
find similar results, with somewhat larger coefficients on the sectoral capital buffer
tightening (but smaller coefficient on the index loosening).
Finally, I deal with the issue of cherry-picking of control variables in Panel C. I
start by including only bank controls or macro controls, or alternatively controlling
for 20 (instead of 7) financial system controls from the World Bank’s Global Financial
Development database. This makes only tiny differences to the point estimates. I
also address the fact that the control variables are likely to be highly collinear. To
overcome this issue, I separately take the first principal component of the 10 quarterly
macro variables and 20 indicators of financial conditions, and control for these in the
fourth row of Panel C; this also makes no difference to the results. Next, I control for
the number of macroprudential tools in a given year via Cerutti et al. (2015), interacted
with year-quarter dummies, which does not make a difference, either. At last, I control
for detailed region × time or World Bank development level × time dummies, which
also leaves the estimates unchanged.
Overall, it seems fair to conclude that a lower likelihood of a regulatory tighten-
ing of sectoral capital buffers – and to a lesser extend, higher likelihood of a general
loosening – is a highly robust feature of the data.
3.4 Exploring Heterogeneity
The results in the previous sections suggest the existence of an electoral cycle in the
use of prudential regulation. But what drives it? Theories of cycles in economic policy
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usually suggest that they are the result of either (1) powerful special interest groups
attempting to influence policies in their favor (e.g. Kroszner and Strahan, 1999; Da-
gher, 2017), or (2) incumbent politicians attempting to influence policies to increase
their chance of re-election (e.g. Nordhaus, 1975; Tufte, 1980; Canes-Wrone and Ponce
de Leon, 2018). In the first case, we would expect that measures of the market power of
the financial industry should influence the correlation between elections and pruden-
tial regulation. In the latter case, we would expect that the economic outlook plays
a particular role. If incumbent politicians can claim that the current state of the eco-
nomy is good because of their competency, this might give them a strong incentive to
urge regulators not to interfere with the financial sector; this also meshes well with
the finding of Antoniades and Calomiris (2018) that voters punish governments for a
credit crunch, with no reward during a boom.18 A potential third explanation is eco-
nomic policy uncertainty, which has been found to spike around close elections (Baker
et al., 2016): if regulators await voting outcomes similarly to what can be observed for
firm investment (Jului and Yook, 2012), this may explain a more cautious stance prior
to elections.
In this section, I test how well these theories fit the data in the case of regulatory
cycles. I implement these tests by introducing an interaction term of the pre-election
quarter dummy with measures of market power, economic outlook, and uncertainty
in the baseline regression 3.1. Since the evidence for a cycle in the aggregate prudential
regulation index is limited, I focus on sector-specific capital buffers.19
Table 3.6 plots the results. In columns (1) through (3), I attempt to test for hetero-
geneity in the power of financial institutions over governments. The theoretically most
sound variable would be an index of interlinkages between politicians, regulators, and
bankers; unfortunately, I am not aware of such measures on a cross-country basis. I
thus begin by using two variables which are likely correlated with such linkages and
included in the controls. The first is a measure of banking sector concentration, where
one would expect that more concentrated sectors with few powerful institutions are
able to wield larger lobbying powers.20 The second is the market share of foreign
banks. The latter is based on the intuition developed in Rajan and Zingales (2003) that
foreign bank ownership decreases the sway of politicians over financial institutions
18An alternative hypothesis is that interference is more likely when the economic situation is relat-
ively poor. However, as we will see below, the evidence appears to be more consistent with interference
in good times – which is also consistent with my main finding of a reduced tightening prior to elections.
19In unreported regressions, I find that interactions of the pre-election dummy with the variables
presented here are all insignificant in predicting changes in the prudential regulation index.
20The results here are similar when using other measures of competition, namely the Boone indicator,
H-statistic, or Lerner index instead (available upon request).
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(see also Calomiris and Haber (2014)).
73
Ta
bl
e
3.
6:
E
L
E
C
T
IO
N
S
A
N
D
S
E
C
T
O
R
-S
P
E
C
IF
IC
C
A
P
IT
A
L
B
U
FF
E
R
S
–
H
E
T
E
R
O
G
E
N
E
IT
Y
N
ot
e:
Th
is
ta
bl
e
sh
ow
s
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s
fr
om
es
ti
m
at
in
g
eq
ua
ti
on
3.
1
us
in
g
O
LS
.
Th
e
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
th
e
ch
an
ge
in
th
e
se
ct
or
-s
pe
ci
fic
ca
p-
it
al
bu
ff
er
s
in
de
x.
M
ea
su
re
re
fe
rs
to
th
e
m
ea
su
re
of
m
ar
ke
t
po
w
er
,
ec
on
om
ic
ou
tl
oo
k,
or
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
y
lis
te
d
in
th
e
to
p
ro
w
.
A
ll
es
-
ti
m
at
io
ns
in
cl
ud
e
fo
ur
la
gs
of
th
e
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
as
co
va
ri
at
es
an
d
th
e
ba
se
lin
e
co
nt
ro
l
va
ri
ab
le
s
as
de
sc
ri
be
d
in
th
e
te
xt
.
“C
on
ne
c-
te
d
fir
m
s”
in
co
lu
m
n
(3
)
is
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
fir
m
s
w
it
h
po
lit
ic
al
co
nn
ec
ti
on
s
fr
om
Fa
cc
io
(2
00
6)
(b
y
m
ar
ke
t
ca
pi
ta
liz
at
io
n)
.
“C
am
pa
ig
n
fin
an
-
ci
ng
”
in
co
lu
m
n
(4
)
is
an
in
de
x
of
le
ga
l
re
st
ri
ct
io
ns
on
ca
m
pa
ig
n
fin
an
ci
ng
co
ns
tr
uc
te
d
fr
om
th
e
ID
EA
Po
lit
ic
al
Fi
na
nc
e
D
at
ab
as
e.
St
an
d-
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
by
co
un
tr
y,
w
it
h
**
*,
**
,
an
d
*
de
no
ti
ng
st
at
is
ti
ca
l
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
1%
,
5%
,
an
d
10
%
le
ve
l,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
M
ar
ke
tp
ow
er
Ec
on
om
ic
ou
tl
oo
k
U
nc
er
ta
in
ty
Ba
nk
Fo
re
ig
n
C
on
ne
ct
ed
C
am
pa
ig
n
G
D
P
G
D
P
Ba
nk
∆
C
re
di
t-
to
-
EP
U
co
nc
.
ba
nk
sh
ar
e
fir
m
s
fin
an
ci
ng
fo
re
ca
st
gr
ow
th
R
O
A
G
D
P
ga
p
in
de
x
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
Pr
e-
el
ec
ti
on
qu
ar
te
r
-0
.0
18
-0
.0
39
*
-0
.0
35
**
-0
.0
38
-0
.0
12
-0
.0
18
**
-0
.0
18
*
-0
.0
33
**
-0
.0
49
(0
.0
30
)
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
14
)
(0
.0
36
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
36
)
M
ea
su
re
-0
.0
17
-0
.1
46
–
–
0.
00
9*
0.
12
9
0.
00
2
0.
00
4
0.
00
1
(0
.0
51
)
(0
.0
98
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.1
08
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
20
)
Pr
e-
el
ec
ti
on
×
M
ea
su
re
-0
.0
13
0.
03
5
0.
01
6
0.
08
7
-0
.0
06
**
-0
.2
35
**
-0
.0
08
**
-0
.0
11
**
0.
02
2
(0
.0
50
)
(0
.0
42
)
(0
.0
42
)
(0
.2
20
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.1
11
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
34
)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
2,
21
3
2,
21
3
1,
76
6
2,
21
3
2,
12
5
2,
21
3
2,
21
3
1,
59
3
1,
60
0
R
2
0.
07
2
0.
07
2
0.
07
7
0.
07
2
0.
07
6
0.
07
2
0.
07
2
0.
08
4
0.
09
5
C
ou
nt
ry
FE
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ti
m
e
FE
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
C
on
tr
ol
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
74
Strikingly, I find that the interaction terms with these variables are statistically in-
distinguishable from zero at reasonable levels of confidence. In column (3), I use the
share of politically connected firms (by market capitalization) constructed by Faccio
(2006) as an indicator for linkages between private firms and the government. This
measure is arguably more closely related to the theoretical notion of revolving doors,
but is unfortunately not specific to the financial sector. Again, the interaction term is
close to zero and has the “wrong” sign, indicating that higher connections mitigate
the cycle. As a last check, I use legal limits to campaign financing rules as a meas-
ure of lobbying in column (4). More precisely, I construct a country-level index based
on bans and limits on private income; regulations of spending; and reporting, over-
sight and sanctions from the Political Finance Database of the Institute for Democracy
and Electoral Assistance. Again, the interaction term is clearly insignificant. Based on
these admittedly imperfect proxies, the regulatory cycle thus does not appear to be
more pronounced in countries where individual institutions are likely to have higher
market power. One interpretation of this result is that financial sector lobbying may
not be the driving force behind the cycle.
Next, I introduce measures that are designed to capture optimism about the cur-
rent state of the economy in the quarter prior to elections. In column (5), I add the
interaction term with the World Bank GDP forecast for the year of the election. The
interaction term has negative coefficient of −0.006 and highly statistically signific-
ant. This implies that prudential regulation is more likely to ease prior to elections
when forecasts about the future state of the economy are more optimistic. The coeffi-
cient implies a large economic effect: a one standard deviation increase in the growth
forecast (about 3.05) implies a total decrease in sector-specific regulatory tightness of
−0.015 − 0.006 × 3.05 ≈ −0.033, which is more than twice the mean of the dependent
variable in the estimation sample of 0.012.21 Next, I use the actual year-on-year GDP
growth in column (6) as an optimism proxy. I find similar results. Because the health of
the financial sector is highly procyclical, positive economic developments are also as-
sociated with higher bank profitability and credit growth. I thus introduce interactions
with the banking system’s return on asset (ROA) and changes in the credit-to-GDP gap
(as calculated by the BIS) in columns (7) and (8). Again, the interaction terms on both
are highly statistically significant and negative.
As a last hypothesis, I test whether the results can be explained by uncertainty. Ju-
lui and Yook (2012), for example, find that firm investment is lower in the run-up to
elections, especially those with uncertain outcomes. Through a plethora of tests, they
21I find highly similar results using stock returns as an indicator of expectations about future eco-
nomic activity (results available upon request).
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show that this is most likely to reflect uncertainty about future policies. In principle,
it is possible that this uncertainty also affects regulator decisions. In column (9), I thus
introduce an interaction term with the standardized index of economic policy uncer-
tainty (Baker et al., 2016).22 The interaction term, however, introduces a positive sign
and is far from conventional levels of statistical significance. If anything, this would
imply that regulators are more likely to tighten prior to elections when uncertainty is
high, which is inconsistent with the “waiting out” hypothesis. In the online appendix
table 3.22, I show that this result is robust across a wide variety of specifications of the
EPU index.
Taken together, the findings presented here suggest that the electoral cycle is highly
procyclical: prudential regulation is less likely to tighten prior to elections when the
state of the economy and its projected future path look bright. Particularly import-
ant is that these periods tend to coincide with increases in economy-wide leverage as
measured by the credit-to-GDP gap, the very measure regulators are expected to pay
considerable attention to. This is consistent with the interpretation that political pres-
sures can deter regulators from reigning in the pro-cyclicality of financial sector risk
taking. Uncertainty does not appear to play a role in mediating the regulatory cycle.
3.5 Does Central Bank Independence Reign in the
Electoral Cycle?
A natural question that arises from documenting an electoral cycle in regulatory meas-
ures is whether better institutions play a mitigating role. In the case of monetary
policy, a broad consensus holds that central bank independence can ease political eco-
nomy concerns for policy makers (see e.g. Cukierman, 1992; Eijffinger and de Haan,
1996; Crowe and Meade, 2007). On the other hand, many of the cautionary tales re-
garding political pressures in the design of financial regulation are countries with ar-
guably excellent institutions in international comparison, such as the United States,
the United Kingdom, Germany, or Spain (Dagher, 2017; Calomiris and Haber, 2014).
The latter would suggest that better institutions may be insufficient to “tame” regulat-
ory cycles.
22Because the economic policy uncertainty index is only available for a sub-group of countries, I
assign the value of the aggregate European EPU to EU countries for which I do not have data. I also
assign the values for China to Taiwan. By increasing the sample size, this stacks the odds against finding
a null result, but admittedly introduces noise. Table 3.22 shows that, in practice, this adjustment makes
no difference to the results.
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I challenge these competing hypotheses to an empirical test by introducing inter-
action terms with the central bank independence measure from Garriga (2016) in table
3.7. Strikingly, the results in columns (1) and (3) suggest that both for changes in the
prudential index as well as sector-specific capital buffers, higher central bank inde-
pendence does not consistently mitigate the electoral cycle. The point estimates are
far from statistically significant at conventional levels (t = −0.36 and t = 1.43, respect-
ively) In fact, the estimate of the interaction term Pre− election quarter×CBI for the
prudential index is negative, indicating that countries with more independent central
banks are less likely to tighten regulation in the run-up to elections.
A potential explanation of this finding could be that central banks differ markedly
in their decision making power over (macro)prudential policy. I thus restrict the
sample to countries where the central bank has at least 50% voting power for mac-
roprudential decisions in columns (2) and (4), according to the classification in Cerutti
et al. (2015). As it turns out, this yields very similar estimates. If anything, the neg-
ative interaction term for the prudential index is now even more precisely estimated
(t = −1.38); for the sector-specific capital buffer, the t-statistic drops to 1.02.
Could it be that central bank independence has no effect in my sample at all? As
a counter-factual test, I build on previous studies (e.g. Block, 2002) and replace the
dependent variable with three simple measures of monetary policy: the policy rate,
base money growth, and the change in the exchange rate. This is equivalent to asking
the question whether, in the same sample, central bank independence is a moderat-
ing factor for political cycles in monetary policy.23 This builds on evidence in Clark
and Hallerberg (2000) for electoral cycles in monetary policy in OECD economies (see
also Garriga (2016)). Importantly, recall the finding from 3.2.3 that the measures of
monetary policy I use here clearly do not exhibit an electoral cycle on average.24
23Note that the Eurozone countries are excluded for the regressions of the central bank rate and
exchange rate, because national authorities do not have influence over these in a monetary union. I
do not exclude the Eurozone countries for base money growth, because central bank reserves are still
under some control of the national authorities, e.g. through the use of reserve requirements (Cerutti
et al., 2015). However, the point estimate is almost equivalent when excluding the Eurozone countries
(unreported).
24More accurately, 3.2.3 shows that there is no electoral cycle in base money growth, the exchange
rate, and a money market interest rate (which are used as control variables throughout). Because the
money market interest rate and central bank policy rate have a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.83, I
do not find an average electoral cycle for the policy rate, either (t = 0.38). Also note that excluding the
money market rate as a control variable makes no difference to the results in table 3.7 or 3.8.
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Columns (5) through (7) present the results of this exercise. Strikingly, the inter-
action term Pre − election quarter × CBI is statistically significant in all three spe-
cifications. The coefficient signs suggest that central bank independence decreases
electoral pressures for monetary policy. For the policy rate, the estimate of −0.545 for
the pre-election dummy suggests that central banks are more likely to ease monet-
ary policy prior to elections; however, the interaction term of 1.193 suggests that this
effect is fully mitigated by a two standard deviation shift in central bank independ-
ence. Similarly, base money growth is higher before elections, but much less so in
countries with highly independent central banks. Finally, the results in column (7)
suggest that exchange rates are more likely to strengthen in quarters before elections,
but considerably less so when central banks are more independent. Taken together,
these results suggest that while central bank independence is effective in moderating
monetary policy, it is not so for prudential policy.
Could it be that the model specification in 3.7 is introducing a downward bias in the
interaction terms by assuming linear effects? I investigate this question in 3.8, which
instead splits the estimation sample into terciles of central bank independence. This
yields highly similar results: again, I find little evidence for a systematic mitigating
effect of central bank independence on the electoral cycle in prudential regulation.
Even in the top tercile of independence, the coefficient on Pre − election quarter still
has a coefficient of−0.01, which is around half of the average effect documented in 3.2.
In contrast, measures of monetary policy clearly exhibit large differences in outcomes
across the distribution of central bank independence. In the bottom tercile, upcoming
elections are associated with significantly higher base money growth and appreciating
exchange rates, while the estimated coefficient turns negative and close to zero in the
top tercile.
In the online appendix, I conduct further validity checks. 3.18 splits the sample
into terciles but drops all control variables and re-runs regressions of the individual
prudential tools on the pre-election dummy. As above, this yields highly inconsistent
coefficients across regulatory tools. The only consistent results appear to be that real
estate capital buffers exhibit a weaker and concentration limits a stronger electoral cycle
in countries with higher central bank independence. Table 3.19 uses a plethora of
alternative measures of central bank independence from Garriga (2016) and Crowe
and Meade (2007) (on which Garriga’s data is based). Across all specifications, I find
that the interaction term of pre-election quarters with central bank independence is
statistically indistinguishable from zero.
In table 3.20, I further investigate whether differences in macroprudential policy
institutions as classified by Edge and Liang (2017) are a source of heterogeneity. I
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Table 3.8: CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE – TERCILE SAMPLE SPLITS
Note: This table plots the estimated coefficients from regressions of different measures of pruden-
tial regulation and monetary policy on the pre-election quarter dummy, split by terciles of cent-
ral bank independence. The columns under “Low = High?” report a χ2-test for the equality of
coefficients between the coefficient on the pre-election dummy in the first and third tercile, and
the associated p-value. All regressions include the full set of controls introduced above, except for
panel D which omits base money growth and panel E which omits the exchange rate (which are
the respective dependent variables). All models further include country and year-quarter fixed ef-
fects as well as four lags of the dependent variable. The sample is restricted to countries out-
side of the Eurozone for the policy rate (panel C) and exchange rate (panel E), which are outside
of the national central bank’s control in a monetary union. Standard errors are clustered by coun-
try, with ***, **, and * indicating statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
CBI Tercile Low = High?
Low Medium High χ2 p-value
Panel A: Prudential regulation index
Pre-election quarter -0.005 0.030 -0.066 0.673 0.412
(0.069) (0.071) (0.046)
Observations 684 703 826
R2 0.096 0.041 0.051
Panel B: Sector-specific capital buffer
Pre-election quarter -0.065* -0.022 -0.010 3.511* 0.061
(0.031) (0.023) (0.008)
Observations 684 703 826
R2 0.076 0.033 0.039
Panel C: Central bank policy rate
Pre-election quarter -0.121 0.090 0.363 4.484** 0.034
(0.116) (0.104) (0.271)
Observations 504 523 692
R2 0.886 0.928 0.925
Panel D: Base money growth
Pre-election quarter 0.062** 0.008 -0.014 4.521** 0.033
(0.024) (0.056) (0.026)
Observations 684 703 786
R2 0.653 0.446 0.555
Panel E: ∆ Exchange rate
Pre-election quarter 0.020** 0.006 -0.011 3.690* 0.055
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Observations 504 523 700
R2 0.590 0.611 0.669
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find that the effects are strikingly homogenous across countries. The only noteworthy
difference I find is that in countries where the Ministry of Finance has no vote over
macroprudential decisions, the electoral cycle is stronger. If anything, this goes against
the intuition that central bank independence mitigates political interference.
As a last exercise, I investigate whether other institutional variables matter. In par-
ticular, I draw on a standard set of variables that describe a country’s institutional
quality and level of democracy, and again interact these with the pre-election dummy.
For brevity, the results are presented in table 3.21 in the online appendix. Similar to
the effects of central bank independence, I find very limited evidence that institutions
mitigate the systematic correlation of upcoming elections and the stance of pruden-
tial policy. For the sector-specific capital buffer, the results in columns (1) through (3)
suggest that political stability, voice and accountability, and government effectiveness
are helpful in mitigating electoral cycles. The implied magnitudes, however, are fairly
small. Even for the most precisely estimated interaction, it takes almost a three stand-
ard deviation increase in the level of voice and accountability to undo the main effect
of upcoming elections (3×0.018×0.664 ≈ 0.036). The interaction terms on the pruden-
tial index are negative (albeit imprecisely estimated), if anything suggesting an adverse
effect. Other standard measures of institutions or democracy do not have moderating
power for regulatory cycles.
Overall, the results presented in this section suggest that better institutions – in-
cluding higher central bank independence – do not appear to sufficiently insulate
countries from electoral cycles in prudential regulation. At the same time, the es-
timates presented here suggest that central bank independence does mitigate cycles in
monetary policy, consistent the previous literature (e.g. Eijffinger and de Haan, 1996).
3.6 Conclusion
Since the Great Financial Crisis of 2008-2009, central banks and financial regulators
have focused on prudential measures to limit the build-up of systemic risk with the
goal of preventing costly banking crises or soften their adverse impact. In this paper,
I show that such prudential regulation exhibits a striking electoral cycle: regulatory
tools were much less likely to be tightened (and somewhat more likely to be loosened)
in the quarters preceding 207 elections across 58 countries between 2000 and 2014.
This electoral cycle in prudential tools is remarkably stable across countries and in-
stitutional regimes. Importantly, central bank independence does not appear to be an
important moderating factor. This does not mean that central bank independence is ir-
relevant: monetary policy reacts much less strongly to upcoming elections in countries
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where monetary authorities are relatively independent.
The effect I document is not driven by strategic timing of elections and unlikely
to be a relict of political cycles in other economic or financial conditions. Pre-election
quarters do not appear to be systematically different from other periods in observ-
able characteristics; further, the results are almost unchanged when conditioning on
country× year effects. Importantly, I find that the correlation with upcoming elections
is among the highest for the tightening of sector-specific capital buffers for residential
mortgages and consumer credit that are likely to most directly affect the median voter.
If this reflects the influence of politicians over regulators, it may be an effective way
to sway voters: Antoniades and Calomiris (2018) show that voters punish Presidential
candidates for a contraction in mortgage credit, but do not reward them for booms.
I also find that higher economic growth and future growth prospects, as well as
an increase in the credit-to-GDP gap and bank profitability, all exacerbate the electoral
cycle. Of course, the very point of macroprudential tools is to cushion banks against
the build-up of risk during these boom times. Taken at face value, this suggests that
political pressures can prevent efforts to decrease the pro-cyclicality of the financial
sector.
The findings presented here call for more research into potential political limita-
tions of current financial stability frameworks. It has been widely assumed that central
bank independence would shield regulators from the most severe political pressures.
This rests on the finding that independence leads to less politically-sensitive monet-
ary policy decisions, a finding I confirm here. Could it be that things are different for
targeted prudential tools that arguably affect the median voter much more directly?
If corroborated by more evidence, this would raise the question whether stricter rules
(rather than discretion) are the right recipe for the design of macroprudential policy.
Another potential policy implication might be that time-invariant limits to the busi-
ness model of financial institutions – rather than time-varying changes – could serve
as a backstop. To the extent that changing such limits require legislation that is con-
siderably more involved and time-consuming than the calibration of prudential tools,
they are likely to be more resilient to short-term political pressures. Haldane (2017)
stresses that, in light of political economy questions, “there is a debate to be had ...
about the appropriate degree of discretion to confer on regulators”. I hope that the
empirical evidence presented here is a useful step in informing this debate.
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3.7 Appendix
Table 3.9: TIGHTENING AND LOOSENING EPISODES, BY PRE-ELECTION QUARTER
Note: This table plots the number of tightening and loosening episodes for all prudential tools in
the dataset of Cerutti et al. (2017a) that overlap with the election data criteria described above.
Tightening episodes Loosening episodes
Pre-election Other Pre-election Other
Total quarters quarters Total quarters quarters
Index measures
∆ Prudential regulation index 327 22 305 165 15 150
∆ Sector-specific capital buffer 51 0 51 16 2 14
Individual regulatory tools
∆ Real estate capital buffer 35 0 35 13 1 12
∆ Consumer credit capital buffer 8 0 8 2 1 1
∆ Other capital buffer 15 0 15 5 0 5
∆ General capital requirement 88 7 81 0 0 0
∆ Concentration limit 30 0 30 1 1 0
∆ Interbank exposure 24 0 24 1 0 1
∆ Loan-to-value ratio 45 9 36 17 3 14
∆ Reserve requirements (FC) 84 3 81 49 2 47
∆ Reserve requirements (LC) 106 7 99 146 11 135
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Table 3.10: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF ESTIMATION SAMPLE
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics for the main variables used throughout the
paper. The sample is the estimation sample from table 3.2, columns (2) and (7).
Observations Mean Median Std. Dev.
Index measures
∆ Prudential regulation index 3190 0.057 0 0.392
∆ Sector-specific capital buffer 3190 0.012 0 0.188
∆ Individual regulatory tools
∆ Real estate capital buffer 3190 0.006 0 0.123
∆ Consumer credit capital buffer 3190 0.002 0 0.059
∆ Other capital buffer 3190 0.004 0 0.094
∆ General capital requirement 2970 0.032 0 0.176
∆ Concentration limit 1793 0.015 0 0.131
∆ Interbank exposure 1043 0.019 0 0.144
∆ Loan-to-value ratio 1061 0.032 0 0.262
∆ Reserve requirements (FC) 3190 0.010 0 0.261
∆ Reserve requirements (LC) 3190 -0.008 0 0.324
Bank variables
Bank capitalization (%) 2958 8.353 7.900 3.350
Lending concentration 3001 67.458 68.078 20.486
Cost to income ratio (%) 3121 56.837 56.732 14.976
Non-performing loans (%) 2951 5.394 3.200 5.854
ROA 3128 0.885 1.096 4.446
Z-score 3132 10.399 8.357 7.491
Foreign bank share (%) 2912 35.345 33.000 24.811
Macro variables
Government exp./GDP 2898 0.174 0.183 0.047
Money market rate 3095 5.027 3.595 6.966
Base money growth 3052 0.427 0.100 15.506
Real credit growth 2892 0.086 0.057 0.194
Real GDP growth 2898 0.029 0.031 0.108
∆ Current account/GDP 2916 0.000 0 0.147
Total trade/GDP 2934 0.879 0.740 0.549
Investment/GDP 2886 0.227 0.222 0.045
Consumption/GDP 2886 0.582 0.578 0.086
Inflation 3082 0.044 0.030 0.063
Exchange rate (US$) 3058 311.945 3.631 1333.133
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3.8 Online Appendix
3.8.1 Variable Construction
Details on Control Variables
The bank control variables come from the World Bank’s Global Financial Development
database, which in turn compiles data from many different sources. The sources of the
macroeconomic control variables are the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Inter-
national Financial Statistics and the OECD (see table 3.11). Since the data availability
is highly heterogeneous across different transformations of the variables, I combine
these to maximize sample size. Because the coverage of the IMF is much broader, I
start with their most commonly available variables, which are then further enriched
with other versions as available. I then add the OECD data using the same procedure.
For Argentina, I further obtain data on the ratio of consumption and gross fixed capital
formation to GDP, as well as CPI growth, from the website of the Instituto Nacional
de Estadística y Censos (indec).
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3.8.2 Additional Figures
Figure 3.4: ELECTIONS AND PRUDENTIAL REGULATION – ALL ELECTIONS
PANEL A: LOOSENING OF PRUDENTIAL REGULATION INDEX
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PANEL B: TIGHTENING OF SECTOR-SPECIFIC CAPITAL BUFFERS
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These figures show the dynamic effect of elections on the loosening of the prudential regulation in-
dex (Panel A) and the tightening of sector-specific capital buffers (Panel B). They plot the estimated
OLS coefficients βˆt of the regression ∆Rit = αi + αt +
4∑
t=−4
βtEit + εit, where ∆Rit is one of the out-
come dummies. The regressions also include four lags of the dependent variable. Standard errors are
clustered by country.
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Figure 3.5: KERNEL DENSITY OF PRE-ELECTION DUMMY ESTIMATION BY COUN-
TRY
PANEL A: LOOSENING OF PRUDENTIAL REGULATION INDEX
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PANEL B: TIGHTENING OF SECTOR-SPECIFIC CAPITAL BUFFERS
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These figures show the kernel density distribution of the coefficient estimates βˆ from running time
series regressions of the type ∆Rt = α + βEt + εt for each country that has at least one change in the
policy variable. ∆Rt refers to one of the outcome dummies.
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3.8.3 Additional Tables
Table 3.15: CROSS TABULATION OF REGULAR AND IRREGULAR ELECTIONS
Notes: This table shows the proportion of elections that are regular. Elections are defined as “regular”
if they are held within the time frame specified in a country’s constitution or by legislative practice.
Pre-Election Quarter Other Quarters Total
Irregular 54 2,983 3,073
Regular 153 0 153
Total 207 2,983 3,190
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Table 3.17: TESTING FOR ELECTORAL CYCLES IN OTHER VARIABLES
Note: This table shows coefficients from estimating panel regressions of the type Ckit = α +
βEit + εit, where Ckit is one of the control variables in vector Cit (shown in the left column). To
make the estimated coefficients comparable, the dependent variable in each regression is stand-
ardized to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1 and the sample is the estimation
sample including all controls, as in columns (2) and (7) of table 3.2. The independent vari-
able is the pre-election quarter dummy. The coefficients in the right column are from regressions
that also include country and year-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by coun-
try, with ***, **, and * denoting statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
No FE Country, Time FE
βˆ S.E. βˆ S.E.
Bank variables
Bank capitalisation (%) -0.006 (0.057) 0.002 (0.017)
Lending concentration -0.007 (0.042) -0.045* (0.023)
Cost to income ratio (%) -0.016 (0.041) -0.043 (0.036)
Non-performing loans (%) -0.027 (0.034) -0.023 (0.029)
ROA -0.047 (0.032) -0.040 (0.034)
Z-score -0.024 (0.032) -0.025 (0.018)
Foreign bank share (%) 0.012 (0.035) -0.006 (0.007)
Macro variables
Government exp./GDP 0.097* (0.055) -0.011 (0.034)
Money market rate -0.007 (0.031) 0.008 (0.018)
Base money growth 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002)
Real credit growth -0.070 (0.047) -0.050 (0.046)
Real GDP growth 0.035 (0.039) 0.058* (0.034)
∆ Current account/GDP -0.003 (0.012) -0.002 (0.015)
Total trade/GDP 0.043 (0.030) 0.014 (0.011)
Investment/GDP 0.045 (0.082) 0.086 (0.066)
Consumption/GDP -0.043 (0.060) -0.007 (0.030)
Inflation -0.017 (0.026) 0.001 (0.021)
Exchange rate (US$) -0.074 (0.064) 0.004 (0.005)
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Table 3.18: CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND THE ELECTORAL CYCLE – BY
TOOL
Note: This table shows coefficients from estimating equation 3.1 using OLS. The dependent vari-
able is the change in the (macro)prudential tool on the left column. Each cell represents the
estimated coefficient on the pre-election quarter dummy for each of the terciles of the time-
varying central bank independence measure from Garriga (2016), extended to 2014 by assum-
ing no change between 2013 and 2014 (which, however, makes no difference to the results).
All regressions include country and year-quarter fixed effects, but no controls. Results are al-
most equivalent when excluding controls (unreported). Standard errors are clustered by country,
with ***, **, and * denoting statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
CBI Tercile Low = High?
Low Medium High χ2 p-value
∆ Prudential regulation index -0.007 -0.072 -0.030 0.175 0.676
∆ Sector-specific capital buffer -0.053** -0.012 -0.003 4.340** 0.037
∆ Real estate capital buffer -0.030* -0.007 0.004 4.170** 0.041
∆ Consumer credit capital buffer -0.019 0.003 -0.002 1.418 0.234
∆ Other capital buffer -0.002 -0.007 -0.004 0.052 0.820
∆ Capital requirements -0.006 0.032 -0.016 0.384 0.536
∆ Concentration limit -0.004 -0.014 -0.045** 4.015** 0.045
∆ Interbank exposure -0.005 -0.005 -0.032 0.929 0.335
∆ Loan-to-value ratio 0.088 -0.105** 0.062 0.077 0.782
∆ Reserve requirements (FC) -0.005 -0.051 -0.006 0.000 0.987
∆ Reserve requirements (LC) 0.027 -0.073 -0.002 0.679 0.410
93
Ta
bl
e
3.
19
:
C
E
N
T
R
A
L
B
A
N
K
IN
D
E
P
E
N
D
E
N
C
E
A
N
D
T
H
E
E
L
E
C
T
O
R
A
L
C
Y
C
L
E
–
R
O
B
U
S
T
N
E
S
S
N
ot
e:
Th
is
ta
bl
e
sh
ow
s
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s
fr
om
es
ti
m
at
in
g
eq
ua
ti
on
3.
1
us
in
g
O
LS
.
Th
e
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
th
e
ch
an
ge
in
th
e
pr
ud
en
ti
al
in
de
x
in
pa
ne
l
A
an
d
th
e
ch
an
ge
in
se
ct
or
-s
pe
ci
fic
ca
pi
ta
l
bu
ff
er
s
in
pa
ne
l
B.
A
ll
es
ti
m
at
io
ns
in
cl
ud
e
fo
ur
la
gs
of
th
e
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
an
d
al
l
ot
he
r
co
nt
ro
l
va
ri
ab
le
s
as
de
sc
ri
be
d
in
th
e
te
xt
.
G
ar
ri
ga
re
fe
rs
to
th
e
ti
m
e-
va
ry
in
g
ce
nt
ra
l
ba
nk
in
de
pe
nd
en
ce
m
ea
su
re
ta
ke
n
fr
om
G
ar
ri
ga
(2
01
6)
,
ex
-
te
nd
ed
to
20
14
by
as
su
m
in
g
no
ch
an
ge
be
tw
ee
n
20
13
an
d
20
14
(w
hi
ch
,
ho
w
ev
er
,
m
ak
es
no
di
ff
er
en
ce
to
th
e
re
su
lt
s)
.
C
ro
w
e-
M
ea
de
re
fe
rs
to
th
e
ti
m
e-
in
va
ri
an
t
ce
nt
ra
l
ba
nk
in
de
pe
nd
en
ce
m
ea
su
re
fr
om
C
ro
w
e
an
d
M
ea
de
(2
00
7)
,
w
hi
ch
re
fe
rs
to
th
e
ye
ar
20
03
.
C
ol
um
ns
(1
)
th
ro
ug
h
(4
)
ar
e
us
in
g
th
e
fu
ll
sa
m
pl
e,
w
hi
le
co
lu
m
ns
(5
)
th
ro
ug
h
(8
)
ar
e
re
st
ri
ct
ed
to
th
e
sa
m
pl
e
of
co
un
tr
ie
s
w
he
re
th
e
ce
nt
ra
l
ba
nk
ha
s
at
le
as
t
50
%
de
-
ci
si
on
ri
gh
ts
ov
er
m
ac
ro
pr
ud
en
ti
al
to
ol
s
as
id
en
ti
fie
d
by
C
er
ut
ti
et
al
.
(2
01
5)
.
R
es
ul
ts
ar
e
al
m
os
t
eq
ui
va
le
nt
w
he
n
ex
cl
ud
in
g
co
nt
ro
ls
(u
nr
ep
or
-
te
d)
.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
by
co
un
tr
y,
w
it
h
**
*,
**
,
an
d
*
de
no
ti
ng
st
at
is
ti
ca
l
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
1%
,
5%
,
an
d
10
%
le
ve
l,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
Fu
ll
Sa
m
pl
e
H
ig
h
C
en
tr
al
Ba
nk
D
ec
is
io
n
Sh
ar
e
G
ar
ri
ga
C
BI
C
ro
w
e-
M
ea
de
C
BI
(2
00
3)
G
ar
ri
ga
C
BI
C
ro
w
e-
M
ea
de
C
BI
(2
00
3)
U
nw
ei
gh
te
d
W
ei
gh
te
d
U
nw
ei
gh
te
d
W
ei
gh
te
d
U
nw
ei
gh
te
d
W
ei
gh
te
d
U
nw
ei
gh
te
d
W
ei
gh
te
d
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
Pa
ne
lA
:P
ru
de
nt
ia
lr
eg
ul
at
io
n
in
de
x
Pr
e-
el
ec
ti
on
qu
ar
te
r
0.
02
9
0.
04
1
0.
06
2
0.
06
6
0.
25
5
0.
27
3
0.
15
7
0.
16
6
(0
.1
60
)
(0
.1
41
)
(0
.1
00
)
(0
.1
09
)
(0
.1
80
)
(0
.1
92
)
(0
.1
32
)
(0
.1
36
)
C
BI
0.
31
9
0.
38
0*
*
–
–
0.
44
3
0.
74
0*
*
–
–
(0
.2
18
)
(0
.1
60
)
(0
.3
34
)
(0
.2
93
)
Pr
e-
el
ec
ti
on
qu
ar
te
r
×
C
BI
-0
.0
81
-0
.0
96
-0
.1
34
-0
.1
43
-0
.3
43
-0
.3
52
-0
.2
09
-0
.2
27
(0
.2
28
)
(0
.1
89
)
(0
.1
34
)
(0
.1
51
)
(0
.2
49
)
(0
.2
47
)
(0
.1
68
)
(0
.1
79
)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
2,
21
3
2,
21
3
2,
16
3
2,
16
3
1,
23
0
1,
23
0
1,
18
0
1,
18
0
R
2
0.
13
3
0.
13
4
0.
13
2
0.
13
2
0.
18
5
0.
18
8
0.
18
6
0.
18
6
Pa
ne
lB
:S
ec
to
r-
sp
ec
ifi
c
ca
pi
ta
lb
uf
fe
r
Pr
e-
el
ec
ti
on
qu
ar
te
r
-0
.1
04
*
-0
.1
02
-0
.0
61
-0
.0
68
-0
.0
71
-0
.0
86
*
-0
.0
65
*
-0
.0
70
*
(0
.0
60
)
(0
.0
63
)
(0
.0
38
)
(0
.0
41
)
(0
.0
48
)
(0
.0
45
)
(0
.0
37
)
(0
.0
38
)
C
BI
0.
34
8*
**
0.
18
4
–
–
0.
40
0*
**
0.
28
8
–
–
(0
.1
09
)
(0
.1
39
)
(0
.1
31
)
(0
.2
32
)
Pr
e-
el
ec
ti
on
qu
ar
te
r
×
C
BI
0.
11
8
0.
11
0
0.
05
0
0.
06
4
0.
07
3
0.
08
9
0.
06
3
0.
07
1
(0
.0
82
)
(0
.0
83
)
(0
.0
47
)
(0
.0
53
)
(0
.0
71
)
(0
.0
62
)
(0
.0
46
)
(0
.0
49
)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
2,
21
3
2,
21
3
2,
16
3
2,
16
3
1,
23
0
1,
23
0
1,
18
0
1,
18
0
R
2
0.
07
8
0.
07
5
0.
07
4
0.
07
4
0.
10
3
0.
09
9
0.
09
9
0.
09
9
94
Ta
bl
e
3.
20
:
D
O
M
A
C
R
O
P
R
U
D
E
N
T
IA
L
P
O
L
IC
Y
IN
S
T
IT
U
T
IO
N
S
M
O
D
E
R
A
T
E
T
H
E
E
L
E
C
T
O
R
A
L
C
Y
C
L
E
?
N
ot
e:
Th
is
ta
bl
e
sh
ow
s
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s
fr
om
es
ti
m
at
in
g
eq
ua
ti
on
3.
1
us
in
g
O
LS
.T
he
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
th
e
ch
an
ge
in
th
e
pr
ud
en
ti
al
in
de
x
in
pa
ne
lA
an
d
th
e
ch
an
ge
in
se
ct
or
-s
pe
ci
fic
ca
pi
ta
lb
uf
fe
rs
in
pa
ne
lB
.A
ll
es
ti
m
at
io
ns
in
cl
ud
e
fo
ur
la
gs
of
th
e
de
pe
nd
en
tv
ar
ia
bl
e.
Th
e
sa
m
pl
e
is
sp
lit
us
in
g
da
ta
fr
om
Ed
ge
an
d
Li
an
g
(2
01
7)
de
pe
nd
in
g
on
w
he
th
er
a
co
un
tr
y
ha
s
a
m
ac
ro
pr
ud
en
ti
al
co
m
m
it
te
e
(c
ol
um
ns
1
th
ro
ug
h
3)
;t
he
ce
nt
ra
lb
an
k
is
in
ch
ar
ge
of
a
co
un
te
r-
cy
cl
ic
al
ca
pi
ta
lb
uf
fe
r
(c
ol
um
ns
4
th
ro
ug
h
6)
;a
nd
w
he
th
er
th
e
co
un
tr
y’
s
M
in
is
tr
y
of
Fi
na
nc
e
ha
s
a
vo
te
in
m
ac
ro
pr
ud
en
ti
al
de
ci
si
on
s
(c
ol
um
ns
7
th
ro
ug
h
9)
.T
he
co
lu
m
ns
“D
iff
.(
p-
va
lu
e)
”
re
po
rt
th
e
p-
va
lu
e
of
a
χ
2
-t
es
to
ft
he
eq
ua
lit
y
of
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s
fo
r
th
e
pr
e-
el
ec
ti
on
qu
ar
te
r
du
m
m
y
ac
ro
ss
th
e
re
-
sp
ec
ti
ve
m
od
el
s.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
by
co
un
tr
y,
w
it
h
**
*,
**
,a
nd
*
de
no
ti
ng
st
at
is
ti
ca
ls
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
at
th
e
1%
,5
%
,a
nd
10
%
le
ve
l,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
M
ac
ro
pr
ud
en
ti
al
C
om
m
it
te
e
C
en
tr
al
Ba
nk
in
C
ha
rg
e
of
C
C
Y
B
M
in
is
tr
y
of
Fi
na
nc
e
ha
s
Vo
te
Ye
s
N
o
D
iff
.(
p-
va
lu
e)
Ye
s
N
o
D
iff
.(
p-
va
lu
e)
Ye
s
N
o
D
iff
.(
p-
va
lu
e)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
Pa
ne
lA
:P
ru
de
nt
ia
lr
eg
ul
at
io
n
in
de
x
Pr
e-
el
ec
ti
on
qu
ar
te
r
-0
.0
31
-0
.0
69
0.
58
5
-0
.0
57
-0
.0
49
0.
90
0
-0
.0
50
-0
.0
38
0.
83
8
(0
.0
34
)
(0
.0
65
)
(0
.0
49
)
(0
.0
38
)
(0
.0
38
)
(0
.0
46
)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
2,
03
5
82
5
1,
43
0
1,
48
5
1,
70
5
1,
15
5
R
2
0.
12
7
0.
22
9
0.
14
7
0.
13
0
0.
12
5
0.
19
3
Pa
ne
lB
:S
ec
to
r-
sp
ec
ifi
c
ca
pi
ta
lb
uf
fe
r
Pr
e-
el
ec
ti
on
qu
ar
te
r
-0
.0
20
*
-0
.0
19
0.
95
5
-0
.0
22
-0
.0
26
0.
82
2
-0
.0
08
-0
.0
41
*
0.
15
6
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
23
)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
2,
03
5
82
5
1,
43
0
1,
48
5
1,
70
5
1,
15
5
R
2
0.
05
7
0.
12
7
0.
09
1
0.
05
4
0.
07
3
0.
09
2
95
Ta
bl
e
3.
21
:
O
T
H
E
R
IN
S
T
IT
U
T
IO
N
S
A
N
D
T
H
E
E
L
E
C
T
O
R
A
L
C
Y
C
L
E
IN
P
R
U
D
E
N
T
IA
L
R
E
G
U
L
A
T
IO
N
N
ot
e:
Th
is
ta
bl
e
sh
ow
s
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s
fr
om
es
ti
m
at
in
g
eq
ua
ti
on
3.
1
us
in
g
O
LS
.
Th
e
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
th
e
ch
an
ge
in
th
e
pr
ud
en
ti
al
in
de
x
in
Pa
ne
l
A
an
d
th
e
ch
an
ge
in
se
ct
or
-s
pe
ci
fic
ca
pi
ta
l
bu
ff
er
s
in
co
lu
m
n
Pa
ne
l
B.
A
ll
es
ti
m
at
io
ns
in
cl
ud
e
fo
ur
la
gs
of
th
e
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
as
co
va
ri
at
es
an
d
al
l
ot
he
r
co
nt
ro
l
va
ri
ab
le
s
as
de
sc
ri
be
d
in
th
e
te
xt
.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
by
co
un
tr
y,
w
it
h
**
*,
**
,
an
d
*
de
no
ti
ng
st
at
is
ti
ca
l
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
1%
,
5%
,
an
d
10
%
le
ve
l,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
Po
lit
ic
al
Vo
ic
e
an
d
G
ov
er
nm
en
t
Ec
on
om
ic
D
em
oc
ra
cy
C
iv
il
Po
lit
ic
al
st
ab
ili
ty
ac
co
un
ta
bi
lit
y
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s
fr
ee
do
m
(P
ol
it
y)
lib
er
ti
es
ri
gh
ts
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
Pa
ne
lA
:∆
Pr
ud
en
ti
al
re
gu
la
ti
on
in
de
x
Pr
e-
el
ec
ti
on
qu
ar
te
r
-0
.0
11
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
11
0.
33
3
0.
08
4
-0
.0
37
-0
.0
25
(0
.0
43
)
(0
.0
76
)
(0
.0
69
)
(0
.4
16
)
(0
.1
42
)
(0
.0
81
)
(0
.0
75
)
M
ea
su
re
0.
09
3*
*
0.
04
6
0.
04
8
0.
02
6
0.
00
5
-0
.0
38
-0
.0
16
(0
.0
44
)
(0
.0
78
)
(0
.0
73
)
(0
.0
55
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
25
)
(0
.0
22
)
Pr
e-
el
ec
ti
on
qu
ar
te
r
×
M
ea
su
re
-0
.0
20
-0
.0
23
-0
.0
09
-0
.0
49
-0
.0
15
0.
00
8
0.
00
1
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
69
)
(0
.0
49
)
(0
.0
55
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
43
)
(0
.0
44
)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
2,
09
6
2,
09
6
2,
09
6
2,
21
3
2,
10
1
2,
21
3
2,
21
3
R
2
0.
13
7
0.
13
5
0.
13
5
0.
13
2
0.
13
8
0.
13
2
0.
13
2
Pa
ne
lB
:∆
Se
ct
or
-s
pe
ci
fic
ca
pi
ta
lb
uf
fe
r
Pr
e-
el
ec
ti
on
qu
ar
te
r
-0
.0
24
**
*
-0
.0
35
**
*
-0
.0
32
**
*
-0
.1
19
-0
.0
36
-0
.0
13
-0
.0
19
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
79
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
14
)
M
ea
su
re
-0
.0
17
-0
.0
45
-0
.0
64
*
-0
.0
17
-0
.0
01
0.
01
5
0.
00
7
(0
.0
30
)
(0
.0
36
)
(0
.0
36
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
13
)
Pr
e-
el
ec
ti
on
qu
ar
te
r
×
M
ea
su
re
0.
01
2*
0.
01
8*
*
0.
01
2*
0.
01
3
0.
00
1
-0
.0
07
-0
.0
04
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
05
)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
2,
09
6
2,
09
6
2,
09
6
2,
21
3
2,
10
1
2,
21
3
2,
21
3
R
2
0.
07
3
0.
07
3
0.
07
4
0.
07
2
0.
07
5
0.
07
2
0.
07
2
C
ou
nt
ry
FE
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ti
m
e
FE
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
C
on
tr
ol
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
96
Ta
bl
e
3.
22
:
E
C
O
N
O
M
IC
P
O
L
IC
Y
U
N
C
E
R
T
A
IN
T
Y
A
N
D
T
H
E
E
L
E
C
T
O
R
A
L
C
Y
C
L
E
IN
P
R
U
D
E
N
T
IA
L
R
E
G
U
L
A
T
IO
N
N
ot
e:
Th
is
ta
bl
e
sh
ow
s
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s
fr
om
es
ti
m
at
in
g
eq
ua
ti
on
3.
1
us
in
g
O
LS
.
Th
e
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
th
e
ch
an
ge
in
th
e
pr
ud
en
ti
al
in
de
x
in
Pa
ne
l
A
an
d
th
e
ch
an
ge
in
se
ct
or
-s
pe
ci
fic
ca
pi
ta
l
bu
ff
er
s
in
co
lu
m
n
Pa
ne
l
B.
Th
e
da
ta
of
ec
on
om
ic
po
lic
y
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
y
is
fr
om
()
Ba
ke
r2
01
6.
In
co
lu
m
ns
(3
)
an
d
(4
),
I
ex
cl
ud
e
th
e
EU
co
un
tr
ie
s
an
d
Ta
iw
an
,
fo
r
w
hi
ch
I
as
si
gn
th
e
ag
gr
eg
at
e
Eu
ro
pe
an
an
d
C
hi
ne
se
EP
U
in
th
e
ba
se
lin
e
es
ti
m
-
at
io
n,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
A
ll
es
ti
m
at
io
ns
in
cl
ud
e
fo
ur
la
gs
of
th
e
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
as
co
va
ri
at
es
an
d
al
l
ot
he
r
co
nt
ro
l
va
ri
ab
le
s
as
de
sc
ri
be
d
in
th
e
te
xt
.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
by
co
un
tr
y,
w
it
h
**
*,
**
,
an
d
*
de
no
ti
ng
st
at
is
ti
ca
l
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
1%
,
5%
,
an
d
10
%
le
ve
l,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
Ba
se
lin
e
EP
U
Ba
se
lin
e
EP
U
N
o
EU
/T
W
N
Lo
g(
EP
U
)
∆
EP
U
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
Pa
ne
lA
:P
ru
de
nt
ia
lr
eg
ul
at
io
n
in
de
x
Pr
e-
el
ec
ti
on
qu
ar
te
r
-0
.0
54
0.
09
1
-0
.0
25
0.
07
9
-0
.0
47
-0
.0
43
-0
.0
19
0.
67
1
(0
.1
30
)
(0
.1
15
)
(0
.1
61
)
(0
.1
49
)
(0
.0
43
)
(0
.0
43
)
(0
.5
59
)
(0
.5
71
)
EP
U
0.
00
2
0.
00
1
0.
01
8
-0
.0
05
-0
.0
07
-0
.0
08
0.
00
3
-0
.0
03
(0
.0
28
)
(0
.0
42
)
(0
.0
31
)
(0
.0
46
)
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
39
)
(0
.0
30
)
(0
.0
37
)
Pr
e-
el
ec
ti
on
qu
ar
te
r
×
EP
U
0.
00
3
-0
.1
61
-0
.0
31
-0
.1
47
-0
.0
31
-0
.0
60
-0
.0
07
-0
.1
54
(0
.1
32
)
(0
.1
29
)
(0
.1
68
)
(0
.1
67
)
(0
.0
63
)
(0
.0
69
)
(0
.1
17
)
(0
.1
23
)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
2,
12
1
1,
60
0
1,
02
1
83
2
2,
10
5
1,
58
8
2,
12
1
1,
60
0
R
2
0.
12
5
0.
12
9
0.
14
5
0.
17
1
0.
12
7
0.
13
2
0.
12
5
0.
13
0
Pa
ne
lB
:S
ec
to
r-
sp
ec
ifi
c
ca
pi
ta
lb
uf
fe
r
Pr
e-
el
ec
ti
on
qu
ar
te
r
-0
.0
54
*
-0
.0
49
-0
.0
49
-0
.0
53
-0
.0
27
**
-0
.0
28
**
-0
.0
99
-0
.1
86
(0
.0
28
)
(0
.0
36
)
(0
.0
32
)
(0
.0
42
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.1
37
)
(0
.1
30
)
EP
U
-0
.0
02
0.
00
1
-0
.0
02
0.
00
1
0.
01
1
0.
00
7
-0
.0
10
-0
.0
11
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
14
)
(0
.0
22
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
27
)
Pr
e-
el
ec
ti
on
qu
ar
te
r
×
EP
U
0.
03
0
0.
02
2
0.
01
1
0.
02
0
0.
00
2
-0
.0
02
0.
01
5
0.
03
3
(0
.0
22
)
(0
.0
34
)
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.0
42
)
(0
.0
14
)
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.0
26
)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
2,
12
1
1,
60
0
1,
02
1
83
2
2,
10
5
1,
58
8
2,
12
1
1,
60
0
R
2
0.
06
4
0.
09
5
0.
12
7
0.
18
9
0.
06
4
0.
09
6
0.
06
4
0.
09
5
C
ou
nt
ry
FE
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ti
m
e
FE
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
C
on
tr
ol
s
(1
8)
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
97
Table 3.23: TYPES AND NUMBER OF ELECTIONS, BY COUNTRY
Tightening Loosening Type of Number of
Country ∆Index ∆SSCB ∆Index ∆SSCB Election Elections
Argentina 9 0 13 2 Presidential 3
Australia 5 1 1 1 Legislative 5
Austria 2 0 2 0 Legislative 4
Belgium 1 0 1 0 Legislative 4
Brazil 15 5 9 4 Presidential 3
Bulgaria 11 2 5 1 Legislative 4
Canada 6 0 2 0 Legislative 5
Chile 1 0 2 0 Presidential 3
Colombia 3 0 2 0 Presidential 4
Croatia 11 2 5 0 Legislative 4
Czech Rep. 2 0 2 0 Legislative 4
Denmark 4 0 2 0 Legislative 4
Estonia 5 1 5 2 Legislative 3
Finland 2 0 1 0 Legislative 3
France 6 0 2 0 Presidential 3
Germany 3 0 0 0 Legislative 4
Greece 1 0 1 0 Legislative 5
Hungary 3 0 6 0 Legislative 4
Iceland 3 0 6 0 Legislative 4
India 17 6 9 2 Legislative 3
Indonesia 9 0 1 0 Presidential 3
Ireland 4 2 1 0 Legislative 3
Israel 8 4 0 0 Legislative 4
Italy 2 0 1 0 Legislative 4
Japan 2 0 0 0 Legislative 5
Latvia 9 0 9 3 Legislative 4
Lebanon 4 0 2 0 Legislative 4
Lithuania 3 0 3 0 Legislative 4
Malaysia 7 2 2 0 Legislative 3
Malta 2 0 3 0 Legislative 3
Mexico 3 0 0 0 Presidential 3
Mongolia 4 0 1 0 Legislative 4
Netherlands 6 0 1 0 Legislative 5
New Zealand 2 0 0 0 Legislative 5
Nigeria 6 1 2 0 Presidential 3
Norway 5 1 2 2 Legislative 4
Peru 15 1 6 0 Presidential 4
Philippines 13 1 6 0 Presidential 2
Poland 6 3 2 0 Legislative 4
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Table3.23: TYPES AND NUMBER OF ELECTIONS, BY COUNTRY (CONTINUED)
Tightening Loosening Type of Number of
Country ∆Index ∆SSCB ∆Index ∆SSCB Election Elections
Portugal 3 0 2 0 Legislative 4
Romania 9 0 8 0 Legislative 4
Russia 14 1 5 0 Presidential 4
Serbia 15 2 11 1 Legislative 6
Singapore 10 0 0 0 Legislative 3
Slovakia 2 0 5 0 Legislative 4
Slovenia 3 1 1 0 Legislative 5
South Africa 2 0 0 0 Legislative 3
South Korea 10 1 4 0 Presidential 3
Spain 3 1 4 0 Legislative 4
Sweden 8 2 0 0 Legislative 4
Switzerland 5 3 0 0 Legislative 3
Taiwan 8 0 4 0 Presidential 4
Thailand 7 4 3 0 Legislative 5
Turkey 16 3 4 0 Legislative 3
Ukraine 4 0 8 0 Presidential 2
United Kingdom 3 0 0 0 Legislative 3
United States 2 0 0 0 Presidential 4
Uruguay 5 1 3 0 Legislative 2
Total 349 51 180 18 217
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Table 3.24: LIST OF ELECTIONS IN ESTIMATION SAMPLE
Country Quarter Country Quarter Country Quarter Country Quarter
Argentina 2003q4 Germany 2002q3 Malaysia 2013q2 Singapore 2001q4
Argentina 2007q4 Germany 2005q3 Malta 2003q2 Singapore 2006q2
Argentina 2011q4 Germany 2009q3 Malta 2008q1 Singapore 2011q2
Australia 2001q4 Germany 2013q3 Malta 2013q1 Slovakia 2002q3
Australia 2004q4 Greece 2000q2 Mexico 2000q3 Slovakia 2006q2
Australia 2007q4 Greece 2004q1 Mexico 2006q3 Slovakia 2010q2
Australia 2010q3 Greece 2007q3 Mexico 2012q3 Slovakia 2012q1
Australia 2013q3 Greece 2009q4 Mongolia 2001q2 Slovenia 2000q4
Austria 2002q4 Greece 2012q2 Mongolia 2005q2 Slovenia 2004q4
Austria 2006q4 Hungary 2002q2 Mongolia 2009q2 Slovenia 2008q3
Austria 2008q3 Hungary 2006q2 Mongolia 2013q2 Slovenia 2011q4
Austria 2013q3 Hungary 2010q2 Netherlands 2002q2 Slovenia 2014q3
Belgium 2003q2 Hungary 2014q2 Netherlands 2003q1 South Africa 2004q2
Belgium 2007q2 Iceland 2003q2 Netherlands 2006q4 South Africa 2009q2
Belgium 2010q2 Iceland 2007q2 Netherlands 2010q2 South Africa 2014q2
Belgium 2014q2 Iceland 2009q2 Netherlands 2012q3 Spain 2000q1
Brazil 2002q4 Iceland 2013q2 New Zealand 2002q3 Spain 2004q1
Brazil 2006q4 India 2004q1 New Zealand 2005q3 Spain 2008q1
Brazil 2010q4 India 2009q2 New Zealand 2008q4 Spain 2011q4
Bulgaria 2001q2 India 2014q2 New Zealand 2011q4 Sweden 2002q3
Bulgaria 2005q2 Indonesia 2004q3 New Zealand 2014q3 Sweden 2006q3
Bulgaria 2009q3 Indonesia 2009q3 Nigeria 2003q2 Sweden 2010q3
Bulgaria 2013q2 Indonesia 2014q3 Nigeria 2007q2 Sweden 2014q3
Canada 2000q4 Ireland 2002q2 Nigeria 2011q2 Switzerland 2003q4
Canada 2004q2 Ireland 2007q2 Norway 2001q3 Switzerland 2007q4
Canada 2006q1 Ireland 2011q1 Norway 2005q4 Switzerland 2011q4
Canada 2008q4 Israel 2003q1 Norway 2009q3 Taiwan 2000q1
Canada 2011q2 Israel 2006q1 Norway 2013q3 Taiwan 2004q1
Chile 2005q4 Israel 2009q1 Peru 2000q2 Taiwan 2008q1
Chile 2009q4 Israel 2013q1 Peru 2001q2 Taiwan 2012q1
Chile 2013q4 Italy 2001q2 Peru 2006q2 Thailand 2001q1
Colombia 2002q2 Italy 2006q2 Peru 2011q2 Thailand 2005q1
Colombia 2006q2 Italy 2008q2 Philippines 2004q2 Thailand 2007q4
Colombia 2010q2 Italy 2013q1 Philippines 2010q2 Thailand 2011q3
Colombia 2014q2 Japan 2000q2 Poland 2001q3 Thailand 2014q1
Croatia 2000q1 Japan 2003q4 Poland 2005q3 Turkey 2002q4
Croatia 2003q4 Japan 2005q3 Poland 2007q4 Turkey 2007q3
Croatia 2007q4 Japan 2009q3 Poland 2011q4 Turkey 2011q2
Croatia 2011q4 Japan 2012q4 Portugal 2002q1 Ukraine 2004q4
Czech Rep. 2002q2 Korea Rep. Portugal 2005q1 Ukraine 2010q1
Czech Rep. 2006q2 Korea Rep. Portugal 2009q3 United Kingdom 2001q3
Czech Rep. 2010q4 Korea Rep. Portugal 2011q2 United Kingdom 2005q2
Czech Rep. 2013q4 Latvia 2002q4 Romania 2000q4 United Kingdom 2010q2
Denmark 2001q4 Latvia 2006q4 Romania 2004q4 United States 2000q4
Denmark 2005q1 Latvia 2010q4 Romania 2008q4 United States 2004q4
Denmark 2007q4 Latvia 2011q3 Romania 2012q4 United States 2008q4
Denmark 2011q3 Lebanon 2000q3 Russia 2000q1 United States 2012q4
Estonia 2003q1 Lebanon 2005q2 Russia 2004q1 Uruguay 2004q4
Estonia 2007q1 Lebanon 2009q2 Russia 2008q1 Uruguay 2009q4
Estonia 2011q1 Lebanon 2010q2 Russia 2012q1
Finland 2003q1 Lithuania 2000q4 Serbia 2000q4
Finland 2007q1 Lithuania 2004q4 Serbia 2003q4
Finland 2011q2 Lithuania 2008q4 Serbia 2007q1
France 2002q2 Lithuania 2012q4 Serbia 2008q2
France 2007q2 Malaysia 2004q1 Serbia 2012q2
France 2012q2 Malaysia 2008q1 Serbia 2014q1
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Chapter 4
Busy Bankruptcy Courts and the Cost
of Credit
4.1 Introduction
“Our judicial resources are strained. And the cost to society of
an overburdened bankruptcy system ... is enormous.”
– U.S. District Judge Barbara Lynn1
It is well known that legal frameworks play an important part in shaping the cost
of financing across countries.2 Creditor and property rights, in particular, have been
associated with the development of larger and more sophisticated financial sectors.3
Yet, surprisingly little is known about the implementation of such laws into practice,
and how important the enforcement of legal frameworks is for financial contracts.
In this paper, I use exogenous changes to the caseload of US bankruptcy courts
to evaluate the effect of judicial efficiency on ex-ante contracting. The main variation
stems from the introduction of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Pro-
tection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). BAPCPA was a substantial reform to consumer bank-
ruptcy law in the US and made it considerably harder for individuals to default on
their debts. In the two years following its implementation, the US bankruptcy system
saw the largest drop in the number of bankruptcy filings since the first records in 1899:
a drop in bankruptcy filings of around 55% between 2005 and 2007.4 This drop con-
siderably reduced the number of cases per bankruptcy court, and thus the workload
1As reported in the National Law Journal (http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=
1202431566285/Judiciary-Asks-Congress-for-More-Bankruptcy-Judges?slreturn=
20170902154758).
2See the seminal work of La Porta et al. (1997), La Porta et al. (1998), Levine (1999), and Levine et al.
(2000).
3This is documented by, among others, Djankov et al. (2007), Qian and Strahan (2007), Bae and
Goyal (2009), Davydenko and Franks (2008), Haselmann et al. (2010), and Acharya et al. (2011).
4This assessment is based on the bankruptcy case data from the Federal Ju-
dicial Center (FJC), available at https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/
caseloads-bankruptcy-cases-1899-2016. There was one slightly larger year-on-year de-
crease in 1944, which was likely war-related. See figure 4.1.
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of bankruptcy judges. Importantly, BAPCPA left the legal framework and filing of
business bankruptcies largely unaffected, which provides a relatively clean setting to
isolate a role for judicial efficiency.
Estimating the causal effect of judicial efficiency empirically is a challenging task.
As an example, consider the cross-sectional relationship between loan terms and the
caseload per judge across bankruptcy districts in the United States in figure 4.6. A
lower caseload is correlated with lower spreads and higher maturities, consistent with
previous findings in Djankov et al. (2008) and Jappelli et al. (2005). However, it is
impossible to infer from this correlation whether judicial efficiency has a causal effect
on credit contracts, because areas with busy courts likely also differ in other aspects.
This is particularly true for studies using cross-country variation, where more efficient
enforcement and better loan outcomes are likely jointly determined by differences in
bankruptcy codes (e.g. Favara et al., 2017). As a result, it remains fundamentally un-
clear whether more efficient courts themselves matter in isolation, or whether they are
merely an outcome of other factors.
Compared to the previous literature, I am able to plausibly assess the quantitat-
ive importance of judicial efficiency under mild identifying assumptions by making
use of exogenous variation within and across US bankruptcy districts in a difference-
in-differences set up. By combining quasi-random exposure to BAPCPA with pre-
determined borrower characteristics, I can further assess to which extent this is driven
by the supply-side factors rather than potentially unobserved local demand. In my
setting, I find that the entire effect of an exogenous drop in bankruptcy court caseload
works through an outward shift in credit supply.
To identify the effect of BAPCPA, I exploit cross-sectional exposure to the reform
generated by the share of non-business bankruptcies that courts handled prior to its
enactment. Because BAPCPA almost exclusively targeted consumer cases, there is a
strong linear relationship between the share of non-business filings in a bankruptcy
district’s total caseload and the subsequent drop in the caseload per judge (Iverson,
2016). The share of consumer cases is highly persistent and largely driven by the con-
centration of economic activity across states. As a result, the non-business caseload
share is orthogonal to observable borrower and county characteristics within states,
and shows only a handful of significant geographical correlates across states. This cre-
ates exogenous variation in the impact of BAPCPA across bankruptcy districts under
mild identifying assumptions.
I find that busy bankruptcy courts matter substantially for the cost and maturity
structure of credit contracts. In the baseline specification, a drop of 91 hours of work-
load per year (or two work-weeks) for the average bankruptcy judge decreases interest
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rate spreads by around 16 basis points and increases loan maturities by around 7%.
Because BAPCPA led to the largest recorded drop in bankruptcy filings, my estimates
imply that the reform decreased spreads by 40 basis points and increased maturities
by 13%. In the data, the effects occur contemporaneously with the actual drop in court
caseload in the beginning of 2006 when the uncertainty over the impact of BAPCPA
was lifted. This is consistent with creditors pricing in higher expected recovery val-
ues on loan contracts in real time with observable changes to court efficiency. Other
legislative steps towards the reform had no noticeable effect on loan terms; changes to
court backlog, not the reform itself, are driving my results.
Importantly, the methodology I employ lets me rule out a host of alternative ex-
planations. First, my estimates are unlikely to be driven by relaxed credit conditions in
the run-up to the 2007-08 financial crisis. A bankruptcy district’s exposure to BAPCPA
is largely uncorrelated with exposure to the housing boom, particularly within states.
I also find that the change in loan terms persisted with a similar magnitude until the
end of the sample in 2012: this suggests that the boom and bust in mortgage credit is
unlikely to be the driving factor. Excluding possibly securitized (CLO) loans and the
construction and nontradable industries also makes little difference. Second, I exploit
heterogeneity in firm characteristics before the reform, which allows me to compare
loan contracts within the same bankruptcy district in the same year. If borrowers cannot
credibly pledge future cash flows as collateral, judicial efficiency should affect ex-ante
contract terms by increasing higher expected recovery values to creditors in case a bor-
rower defaults. Consistent with this intuition, I find that the post-BAPCPA caseload
drop had substantially larger effects for borrowers with higher default risk and lower
expected liquidation values. The findings are also unlikely to reflect an unobserved
improvement in borrower fundamentals: a higher share of non-business cases has no
predictive power for the number of firm bankruptcies following the implementation
of BAPCPA, or during the Great Recession. Third, my results are not driven by minor
provisions of the reform that were aimed at corporate bankruptcies. A careful examin-
ation of these legal changes allow me to eliminate potentially affected firms from the
sample; if anything, I find more pronounced effects among firms who saw no change
in their bankruptcy framework.
The relatively clean setting I study enables me to back out a rough estimate of the
social costs of judicial inefficiency and the returns associated with hiring new judges.
While it requires a set of simplifying assumptions, changes to interest rate spreads
(a price term) and loan maturities translate naturally into a macroeconomic cost: the
US-wide interest burden of non-financial corporations. Higher spreads arising from
judicial inefficiency benefit neither creditors (who use it to compensate for lower ex-
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pected returns) nor borrowers (who have to devote more of their income to interest
payments); as such, they are a classic case of a deadweight loss. Drawing on work
on debt servicing costs from the Bank for International Settlements (Drehmann et al.,
2015), I calculate the savings and costs associated with resolving “excessive” court
backlog.
This exercise suggests that the historic drop in the caseload per judge following
BAPCPA saved US non-financial corporates between $8.1 and $15.3 billion in interest
payments per year. Using two simple approaches, I further show that reducing the
burden on bankruptcy judges may still be worthwhile today: the estimated social costs
of busy courts are at least $670 million per year. These costs could be reduced by
adding a few judgeships in key districts, for which my approach uncovers the highest
return to judges. The average implied fiscal multipliers of hiring additional judgeships
are above 100, which suggests that judicial efficiency presents a potentially sensible
area for government spending.
My paper builds on a large literature that highlights the importance of legal frame-
works in economic outcomes. First, and most directly, my work extends a few papers
that focus on the enforcement of existing laws, rather than legal reforms. Djankov et al.
(2008) use a representative bankruptcy case for 88 countries and show that higher debt
enforcement efficiency is associated with higher credit market development. Jappelli
et al. (2005) show a negative correlation of judicial efficiency and interest rate spreads
for Italian provinces. However, the purely cross-sectional nature of their empirical
analysis makes it difficult to infer how important enforcement is in a quantitative sense
compared to other predictors. I contribute to answering this question by using plaus-
ibly exogenous variation in judicial efficiency. In a recent paper, Favara et al. (2017)
show that riskier firms invest and grow less in countries with better debt enforce-
ment, and have higher equity volatility. Most directly, I build on the insight of Iverson
(2016) that BAPCPA constituted a shock to the US bankruptcy courts with the highest
pre-reform share of non-business bankruptcies. Iverson shows that the reduction in
court congestion decreased the time firms spent in court (as a function of firm size)
and lowered bank charge-offs for business lending. However, he does not address the
question whether this affected ex-ante contracting or consider the social costs. Broadly
related is also the work by Schiantarelli et al. (2016), who show that poor enforcement
increases the incentive of borrowers to default.
Second, I add to recent papers that analyze how the effect of bankruptcy reforms
depends on pre-existing judicial efficiency. Ponticelli and Alencar (2016) and Rodano
et al. (2016) show in the context of Brazil and Italy, respectively, that financial reforms
have interactions with the ex-ante functioning of court systems. Their findings, how-
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ever, do not tell us whether judicial efficiency per se has an independent effect. Be-
cause court backlog is partially an outcome of existing legal frameworks, major re-
forms should have a larger impact where judges are particularly overburdened even
if the backlog itself had no effect.
Third, this paper adds to the literature on legal determinants of credit contracts
more broadly. Qian and Strahan (2007), Bae and Goyal (2009), and Laeven and Ma-
jnoni (2005) show that better property rights, creditor rights, and legal institutions are
associated with lower loan spreads. Vig (2013) studies a legal reform in India which
increased creditor rights and decreased the delay between default and liquidation.
More broadly, my work is also related to a large literature highlighting that bank-
ruptcy frameworks have heterogeneous effects (e.g. Gropp et al., 1997; Acharya and
Subramanian, 2009; von Lilienfeld-Toal et al., 2012; Giovanni et al., 2012; Hackbarth
et al., 2015; Cerqueiro et al., 2017; Haselmann et al., 2010). This paper also speaks to
papers looking at how bankruptcy law is enforced in practice, such as Bris et al. (2006).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 4.2, I discuss the
institutional background governing bankruptcy in the United States generally and the
Bankruptcy Abuse and Protection Act of 2005 in particular. Section 4.3 introduces the
data and variables. Section 4.4 introduces the identification strategy. In section 4.5, I
show the main results. Section 4.6 provides a rough estimation of the implied social
costs of judicial inefficiency. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Background: Bankruptcy Courts in the United States
4.2.1 Courts and Judges
Bankruptcy courts in the United States are units of the district courts operating across
90 judicial districts in the mainland US.5 27 states only have a single bankruptcy dis-
trict, usually due to their smaller size or low population density. The decision-making
power over bankruptcy cases lies with the bankruptcy judge. As of September 2012,
there were 350 bankruptcy judgeships in the United States, out of which 34 were tem-
porary. Judges have full authority over their cases, e.g. whether debtors are eligible
to file for bankruptcy in a district or should receive debt relief. In the case of Chapter
11 filings, bankruptcy judges are responsible for confirming or disapproving plans of
reorganization and thus whether firms should be reorganized or liquidated. In partic-
ular, motions to dismiss cases or convert them to a Chapter 7 liquidation are a crucial
5In Arkansas, the Western and Eastern districts share bankruptcy judges, so I treat them as a single
district.
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decision for the fate of debtors firms. Bankruptcy judges in the United States are ap-
pointed for 14 years by the respective court of appeals in their district, as governed by
28 U.S.C. §152.
4.2.2 Measuring Judicial Efficiency
The number of bankruptcy judgeships in the United States has increased by 53%
between 1980 and 2010. This strongly contrasts with the staggering increase of 381%
in the total number of bankruptcy filings over the same time period. As a result, the
number of cases the average bankruptcy judge had to handle in 2010 is 3.1 times the
number of 1980. One of the reasons for this trend is that the creation of additional
judgeships requires the passage of a bill determined by the House of Representatives
as well as the Senate. The last change to the number of permanent bankruptcy judge-
ships was implemented through the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 1992. In October
2017, President Trump officially signed the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017, which
effectively adds four permanent judgeships and extends a number of temporary ones.
In 2005, as part of BAPCPA, 28 additional temporary judgeships were created, one of
which was discontinued in 2010.
The calculation above, however, does not take into account that different types of
bankruptcy cases differ markedly in the time they take to process. Consumer bank-
ruptcies in particular are usually settled without the debtor appearing in court, espe-
cially in the case of Chapter 7 cases. Naturally, this leads to a considerably lower time
effort on part of the bankruptcy judge. To accommodate these differences, the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States makes use of a weighting system to determine
the caseload of a bankruptcy district. These generic case weights are based on a 1989
study by Bermant et al. (1991) and are still in use today.
Table 4.8 in the appendix shows the approximated number of hours judges spend
on different types of consumer and business filings, which are the weights used in the
calculation of court caseload. Chapter 11 filings are clearly the most time-intensive,
with the average case taking around 8 hours. On the other extreme, consumer Chapter
7 cases only take an average of 6 minutes. While there is considerable heterogeneity
underlying these averages, these numbers reflect the best practice of the Judicial Con-
ference in evaluating the caseload of US bankruptcy courts. In the remainder of the
paper, I thus use the time-weighted number of cases filed per bankruptcy judge in a
district as a measure of judicial efficiency.
The relative share of different bankruptcy types changes very little within districts,
a fact I exploit in the identification strategy introduced below. An intuitive interpreta-
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tion of the weighted caseload variable is the number of hours per year a judge spends
on bankruptcy cases alone. Note that this estimate does not include other tasks, such
as adversary proceedings, court administration, and travel. According to Bermant
et al. (1991), work on cases and proceedings make up only 56.5% of a judge’s time;
29% are spent on court administration, work-related travel, and other judicial activit-
ies, and 14.5% on personal time during the work day.
Figure 4.1 plots the development of the weighted caseload per judge over time. In
1980, judges had an average workload of 503 hours per year. This increased to 1,102
hours per year by the end of 2004. For most of the period, the caseload hovered around
1,000 hours, before BAPCPA led to an unprecedented drop just before the Great Reces-
sion. Due to the magnitude of the economic downturn, cases spiked in the aftermath
of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, leading to a sharp increase in judge workload. The
high workload is a well-known fact in the judiciary and yields yearly recommenda-
tions by the Judicial Conference to create additional judgeships.6 When asked about
the court caseload by the Huffington Post, one district judge summarized the situation
as follows:
“For the most part, we’ve just resigned ourselves that this is our fate and there’s nothing we
can do about it. We’ve complained. We’ve begged. We’ve cajoled. We’ve done everything you
can humanly do to try to get additional judgeships.”7
A major reason why these requests have not been granted is that political polariz-
ation in Congress has made it extraordinarily difficult to pass the required bills. BAP-
CPA, which I discuss in more detail in the next section, is a prime example.
4.2.3 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 2005
On April 20, 2005 President George W. Bush signed into law the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, which made it considerably more
difficult for consumers to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7. The bill had a long
legislative history: originally drafted in 1997, the law was de-facto vetoed by Pres-
ident Clinton in 2000 and then introduced in each Congress, only to be shelved over
disagreements between Republicans and Democrats. BAPCPA was introduced in the
senate on February 1, 2005; and passed Senate on March 10 (and the House of Repres-
entatives on April 14). President Bush signed the bill shortly after on April 20, 2005.
However, most provisions only applied to cases filed on or after October 17, 2005.
6See the US Courts website for news releases on the Judicial Conference recommendations.
7As reported here by the Huffington Post online.
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Support for the act came mainly from banks and credit card companies, who expec-
ted to benefit from “a stronger hand in recovering unpaid consumer debt”.8 BAPCPA
introduced a number of amendments to steer debtors with incomes above the state
median from Chapter 7 towards Chapter 13, which required them to pledge future
income and allowed for less debt forgiveness. If a filer’s income is above the state
median, she is now subject to a “means test”. A major amendment was that post-
BAPCPA, filings can be dismissed based on a “presumption of abuse”, depending on
the outcome of the means test or through a finding of bad faith. BAPCPA also changed
various other aspects of consumer bankruptcy, e.g. by increasing the minimum time
between bankruptcy filings and limiting homestead exemptions, which allow debt-
ors to exempt the value of their homes from creditors. In addition, BAPCPA made
bankruptcy considerably more expensive: a report by the United States Government
Accountability Office estimates that attorney fees for Chapter 7 cases increased by ap-
proximately 50% and also increased filing fees (USGAO, 2008).
These changes led to a dramatic effect of BAPCPA on the caseload of the US bank-
ruptcy courts. Because the bill was signed in April but applied in large parts only
from October, many individuals attempted to make use of the “old” law in a rush to
file for bankruptcy. To illustrate, an American Banker article at the time reported that
“[p]eople were lined up around the block Friday at the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York, hoping to file the last business day before the new rules
took effect.”9 This spike can clearly be seen in the data on consumer case filings (see
figure 4.2). More importantly, the number of consumer bankruptcies collapsed in the
first quarter of 2006, once BAPCPA took effect and the courts had digested the filing
frenzy. As a result, caseload per judge more than halved, dropping to unprecedented
levels in the ballpark of what had last been seen around 1980. During 2006 and 2007,
there was only a slight upward correction, leaving bankruptcy judges with a consider-
ably lower caseload. The average caseload per judge in 2006 and 2007 was around 566
hours, the largest ever percentage change reduction of court workload in peace-time
from an average of 1,059 hours in 2004 and 2005.
I exploit this historic drop in the caseload of US bankruptcy courts as a shock to
judicial efficiency in my empirical analysis. The identifying assumption that I make is
that the effects I will document later are driven by a lower workload of judicial staff,
and not by a direct change in the legal framework governing business bankruptcies
8See the American Banker (October 17, 2005), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/
in-focus-as-new-bankruptcy-era-opens-whats-now-and-whats-next.
9See the American Banker (October 17, 2005), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/
in-focus-as-new-bankruptcy-era-opens-whats-now-and-whats-next.
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Figure 4.1: BAPCPA AND THE CASELOAD PER JUDGE
PANEL A: WEIGHTED CASELOAD PER JUDGE, 1990-2011
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PANEL B: YEAR-ON-YEAR PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN BANKRUPTCY FILINGS, 1900-2010
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Panel A plots the total weighted caseload per judge between 1990 and 2011. Intuitively, this measure
represents the hours per year that an average bankruptcy judge is expected to work on bankruptcy
cases (excluding other work). Panel B plots the year-on-year percentage changes in the total number of
bankruptcy filings in the United States from 1900-2010, excluding observations recorded during the two
World Wars. The latter data are from the Federal Judicial Center (https://www.fjc.gov/history/
courts/caseloads-bankruptcy-cases-1899-2016).
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Figure 4.2: NON-BUSINESS AND CHAPTER 11 CASES AROUND BAPCPA
PANEL A: NON-BUSINESS CASES FILED PER YEAR
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PANEL B: CHAPTER 11 BUSINESS CASES FILED PER YEAR
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These figures plot the annual number of non-business and chapter 11 bankruptcy cases filed between
1990 and 2011.
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or demand factors. While BAPCPA fundamentally reformed personal bankruptcy, it
left firm bankruptcies largely unaffected. Nevertheless, it is important to discuss a few
provisions that may be relevant for the large businesses in my sample.10
First, BAPCPA introduced a “drop dead” date for the exclusive right of a debtor-in-
possession to file a plan of reorganization. Before BAPCPA, the initial 120-day period
could be extended indefinitely; after BAPCPA, it was capped at 18 months. Since
this provision only applied to cases filed on or after October 17, 2005, it would not
“bite” until mid-April 2007.11 Second, BAPCPA introduced limits to the applicability
of automatic stay in bankruptcy for repeat filers to prevent abuse. The new §362(c)(3)
provided that for debtors filing within one year after a dismissed earlier chapter 7,
11, or 13 bankruptcy case, the automatic stay terminates 30 days after the filing.12 To
put this into perspective, Altman (2013) finds that 15% of debtors once in Chapter
11 ultimately file for bankruptcy again. Third, BAPCPA amends provisions regard-
ing the treatment of unexpired leases of non-residential real property, which has to
be returned to the lessor within 120 days (with a single possible court extension of
90 days). While this seemingly eased the previous 60-day requirement, it permitted
courts to grant only a single extension where no limit was in place prior to BAPCPA.
This particularly affected borrowers who make regular use of leasing, such as retail
and wholesale traders.
In my empirical analysis, I take great care to show that my findings are not driven
by these provisions. To begin, the non-business share in a bankruptcy district’s case-
load is virtually orthogonal to firm and loan characteristics. As such, there is no
reason why firms in districts with a higher exposure to the subsequent drop in case-
load would be differentially affected by the minor legal changes, except for BAPCPA’s
effect on judicial efficiency. I also show that my findings are unchanged if I drop the
firms that were likely most affected by these provisions.
10A contemporaneous briefing by Linklaters, available online, provides more detailed information.
11See, e.g. the discussion by Jones Day on their website.
12Of course, there are exceptions where filers or other parties can make a motion to provide evidence
the bankruptcy is filed in good faith with respect to the creditor(s). §362(i) further states that subsequent
cases should not be considered to be in bad faith if a prior dismissal was due to the creation of a debt
repayment plan.
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4.3 Data and Variable Construction
4.3.1 Loan Contract and Balance Sheet Information
The source of the loan-level information used throughout the paper is Dealscan, provided
by Thomson Reuters. The main variables I construct are the size of the loan (in logs),
the interest rate (as spread over a reference rate, usually LIBOR), and the natural log-
arithm of the loan maturity (in months). I further include a dummy for whether a loan
is secured with collateral.
Balance sheet data comes from the annual Compustat Fundamentals file, which
is extended with data on ratings from Mergent FISD. Following standard procedure
in the literature, I exclude firms in the finance and real estate business, as well as
regulated public utilities. All balance sheet variables are winsorized at the 1st and
99th percentile.13 I construct the firm-level control variables book leverage, total assets
(in natural logarithm), ROA, sales growth, a dummy for the existence of a credit rating,
and the share of fixed assets (tangibility) to increase precision. Following Nini et al.
(2009) and Sufi (2007), I further use the debt to cash flow ratio to proxy for credit risk,
which is captured using two dummy variables indicating whether a firm is in the top
quartile of the ratio or has negative cash flow.
The Compustat data is matched to Dealscan using the link provided by Roberts
and Sufi (2009). The resulting sample lasts from 1987 to 2012. The exact definitions of
all variables can be found in the appendix.
4.3.2 Bankruptcy Court Information
Data on the caseload and number of judges per bankruptcy district come from the Ad-
ministrative Office of the U.S. Courts. The caseload statistics can be found at http://
www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/caseload-statistics-data-tables.
The time series for the number of judges in each bankruptcy district was shared with
me by the Administrative Office via email. These data reach back to the start of the
matched Dealscan-Compustat sample in 1987.
4.3.3 Summary Statistics
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics of the estimation sample. The median borrower
is large, with more than 1 billion in assets (exp(7.049) ≈ $1, 152million), has positive
13The results presented here are not driven by these winsorization choices.
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sales growth of around 9%, and has a credit rating. Around 40% of firms had a loan
maturing after the passing of BAPCPA in April 2005 that had been taken out before,
which suggests a refinancing need. The loans taken out by the firms in my sample
reflect their size: the average loan has a size of around $208 million and comes with a
175 bps spread and a maturity of around 5 years (exp(4.094) ≈ 60months). Most loans
are backed by collateral. There is considerable variation across states in their exposure
to BAPCPA, i.e. the share of nonbusiness cases in the total weighted court caseload.
The median district has a nonbusiness share of around 81%.
4.4 Identification Strategy
4.4.1 The Effect of BAPCPA on Court Efficiency
To guide the empirical investigation, it is instructive to document how BAPCPA changed
the outcomes of court proceedings. As a first piece of evidence, figure 4.1 plots the av-
erage caseload per judge in the United States from 1990 and 2011. We can see that the
2005 reform led to a dramatic decrease in the caseload of judges.
Importantly, there is considerable heterogeneity across districts in how much their
caseload reacted. Because BAPCPA almost exclusively targeted consumer bankruptcies,
there is an almost linear relationship between the share of nonbusiness cases in total
caseload prior to the reform and the subsequent drop in caseload per judge. Figure 4.3
visualizes this point by plotting the non-business caseload share (Exposure) against
the drop in judge workload, where the drop is calculated as the difference between
the averages for 2006-2007 (Post-BAPCPA) and 2004-2005 (Pre-BAPCPA). I exploit this
cross-sectional variation to identify the effect of BAPCPA on loan terms.
Table 4.2 confirms the relationship in a regression framework. In column (1), I start
by regressing the drop in caseload per judge on the weighted non-business caseload
share (Exposure). The exposure variable is highly statistically significant (t = 4.77)
and implies that a standard deviation increase in the non-business share (about 12
percentage points) reduced the caseload per judge by 94 hours, or about 17% of the
average caseload drop (555 hours). In column (2), I introduce the number of judges
created by BAPCPA as an additional explanatory variable. The effect ofExposure now
increases, suggesting that the caseload drop is not driven by additional judges. In figure
4.3, the districts of Delaware (DE) and Southern New York (NY,S) are clear outliers. For
robustness, I drop these in column (3); this makes only a marginal difference to the
point estimates. At last, I restrict the sample to districts which will later be included in
the loan-level analysis in column (4). This makes little difference to the implied effect
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics of all variables used in the main es-
timation sample of the paper. See the appendix for variable definitions.
Variable N Mean SD p10 p50 p90
Borrower characteristics
Book leverage 3445 0.394 0.321 0.073 0.336 0.740
Log(Total assets) 3445 7.073 1.627 4.973 7.049 9.236
ROA 3445 0.130 0.097 0.049 0.119 0.229
Negative debt-to-cash flow 3445 0.019 0.136 0 0 0
High debt-to-cash flow 3445 0.522 0.500 0 1 1
Sales growth 3445 0.191 1.278 -0.060 0.093 0.418
Rating dummy 3445 0.594 0.491 0 1 1
Tangibility 3445 0.321 0.238 0.058 0.258 0.691
Refi need post-BAPCPA 3445 0.308 0.462 0 0 1
Credit rating (pre-reform) 1981 12.277 3.276 8 13.000 16
Log(Total assets) (pre-reform) 3360 7.109 1.621 5.08123 7.097 9.238662
Market leverage (pre-reform) 3023 0.316 0.236 0.054657 0.264 0.63837
Loan characteristics
Interest rate spread 3445 204.846 147.637 50.000 175.000 355.000
Log(Maturity) 3445 3.880 0.570 3.178 4.094 4.344
Log(Loan size) 3445 5.154 1.506 3.103 5.340 6.949
Collateral dummy 3445 0.761 0.426 0 1 1
Relationship dummy 3445 0.400 0.490 0 0 1
Term loan dummy 3445 0.374 0.484 0 0 1
District characteristics
Exposure 3445 0.770 0.132 0.694 0.807 0.875
High congestion dummy 2568 0.636 0.481 0 1 1
County characteristics
Manufacturing emp. Share 3432 0.083 0.049 0.029 0.075 0.135
Finance emp. Share 3436 0.058 0.023 0.031 0.055 0.088
Income per capita 3439 40092.350 12507.070 29232.000 35813.000 55124.000
Population density 3396 4069.109 12224.080 247.300 1467.200 3884.500
Republican vote (2000) 3396 45.582 13.456 28.600 47.800 61.300
High school graduates/Pop. 3396 82.184 8.135 74.600 82.800 90.500
Asians/Pop. 3396 4.687 4.836 1.100 3.400 9.800
Hispanics/Pop. 3380 0.135 0.126 0.018 0.086 0.330
African-Americans/Pop. 3396 14.970 12.268 2.200 10.800 28.200
Owner-occupied housing share 3396 62.361 12.625 52.000 63.200 76.300
∆ Real estate emp. (’01-’06) 3445 0.326 0.186 0.123 0.283 0.577
∆ Construction emp. (’01-’06) 3445 0.131 0.161 -0.042 0.109 0.347
∆ House prices (’02-’06) 2863 0.292 0.200 0.067 0.270 0.564
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of BAPCPA: a one standard deviation increase in the non-business share is associated
with a decrease in caseload of about 91 hours (0.083× 1, 093 ≈ 91).
Figure 4.3: NON-BUSINESS CASELOAD SHARE AND THE POST-BAPCPA CASE-
LOAD DROP
AK
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Nonbusiness Share in Weighted Caseload (2003)
This figure plots the drop in the caseload per judge against the share of non-business cases in the
weighted caseload of a bankruptcy district in 2003. The caseload drop is calculated as the difference
of the average caseload in a district between 2006-2007 and 2004-2005. The non-business share is the
weighted caseload for non-business bankruptcy cases as percentage of the total weighted caseload in
2003.
Did the large drop in non-business filings following BAPCPA also affect bank-
ruptcy outcomes for business cases that were not materially subject to the reform?
Iverson (2016) investigates this question drawing on the universe of Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcies from 2004 through 2007. He finds that BAPCPA reduced the time in court
for larger bankruptcies and made bankruptcy outcomes more efficient. In particular,
BAPCPA decreased the likelihood of small cases to be liquidated in Chapter 7, com-
pared to Chapter 11 reorganization, and the opposite for larg cases. The reform also
decreased the time in bankruptcy (as a function of firm size), as well as the likelihood
of repeat filings by previously bankrupt companies (recidivism). Iverson also finds
that BAPCPA reduced bank charge-offs on commercial lending, suggesting that more
efficient bankruptcy proceedings translate into higher recovery values for creditors.
A reasonable concern is that BAPCPA may have decreased the number of non-
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Table 4.2: THE SHARE OF NON-BUSINESS CASES AND THE BAPCPA CASELOAD
DROP
This table shows the effect of exposure to BAPCPA, as measured by the share of non-business cases in
a bankruptcy district court’s total weighted caseload, on the drop in caseload per judge following BAP-
CPA. The dependent variable is the difference between the average caseload per judge in 2006-2007
and 2004-2005. New Judges is the number of new judgeships per district added with BAPCPA through
the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2005 (28 judges in 20 districts). Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Drop in Caseload/Judge after BAPCPA
Full Drop Estimation
Sample DE/NY,S Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean of Dep. Var 555.11 555.11 561.62 561.00
S.D. of Exposure 0.119 0.119 0.119 0.083
Exposure 793.166*** 991.631*** 1,024.787*** 1,092.878***
(166.119) (159.206) (227.146) (175.217)
New Judges 110.115*** 118.643** 116.455***
(36.941) (50.242) (38.546)
Observations 89 89 87 80
Adj. R2 0.195 0.318 0.300 0.364
business filings but made such bankruptcy cases more difficult. Indeed, the U.S. Gov-
ernment Accountability Office found some evidence for higher fees and longer per-
case times in consumer cases in a 2008 report (USGAO, 2008). A potential result could
be that the court costs per case remained flat or even increased with BAPCPA, which
would go against the efficiency hypothesis. I explore this possibility empirically by
turning to case-level data on the liquidation proceeds and court expenses of chapter 7
cases overseen by the U.S. Trustee Program (USTP).
The USTP is in charge of overseeing private chapter 7 trustees, who are responsible
for the collection and liquidation of assets and their distribution to creditors. As part of
these individual cases, trustees are required to file a report with the USTP that breaks
down the distribution of liquidation values across creditors and also includes inform-
ation on court and administrative expenses. These data allow me to test whether court
expenses increased or decreased with BAPCPA, and further directly measure the im-
pact on recovery values, which I define as total bankruptcy receipts net of fees scaled
over the total incurred fees. Between 2004 and 2007, a total of 253,540 cases were repor-
ted to the USTP. Unfortunately, the USTP offices do not correspond to judicial districts;
some districts having multiple USTP offices, and some offices cover multiple districts.
I thus restrict the sample to the 27 states that only have a single bankruptcy district,
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and then run case-level regressions of the following type:
Yc = αs + αt + βPost−BAPCPAt × Exposures +Xc + εc, (4.1)
where c, s, and t denote cases, states, and year-months; Post − BAPCPAt is a
dummy equal to 1 for the years 2006 and 2007, and 0 for 2004 and 2005; Exposures is
the share of non-business bankruptcies in the total weighted district caseload in 2003;
and Xs are case-level control variables.14 I cluster standard errors by state and year-
month.
The results in table 4.11 in the online appendix show that BAPCPA reduced total
bankruptcy fees in areas with a higher share of non-business cases, controlling for the
size and length of the case. More importantly, BAPCPA decreased court expenses as
a fraction of total fees and increased recovery values (as measured by total net re-
ceipts as a fraction of the total fees). Quantitatively, a one standard deviation increase
in Exposure in the sample (0.062) is associated with a 8.7% reduction in court costs
(0.062× 1.389 ≈ 0.087) and a 4.4% increase in recovery values (0.062× 0.699 ≈ 0.044).
Figure 4.7 in the online appendix further shows that, consistent with a direct reform
effect, the impact on court costs started right after the law’s passing; slightly reversed
during the file-to-rush in the last quarter of 2005; and then turned clearly negative
in 2006 and 2007. At the same time, the effect on case fees was much smaller, albeit
slightly negative; court costs thus dropped more than total bankruptcy fees in areas
more exposed to the reform. Taken together with the evidence in Iverson (2016), these
results suggest that BAPCPA indeed increased judicial efficiency in the exposed dis-
tricts, despite provisions that made the consumer bankruptcy process more difficult.
4.4.2 BAPCPA and Ex-Ante Credit Terms
Identifying the causal effect of BAPCPA on credit contracts is challenging for a num-
ber of reasons. First, the effect was signed into law by President George W. Bush on
April 20, 2005 and most provisions applied to cases filed on or after October 17, 2005.
As such, the reform timing overlaps with the height of the credit and housing boom
of the 2000s that culminated in the Great Financial Crisis of 2007-2008. Second, con-
tract terms are affected by a host of observable and unobservable factors unrelated to
judicial efficiency, most importantly default risk.
I attempt to mitigate these issues by running difference-in-difference regressions of
14Note that the results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar without control variables (unre-
ported).
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the following form:
Yj = βPost−BAPCPAt × Exposured + γXijt + αt + αi + εj, (4.2)
where Yj is a contract term (the interest rate spread or the loan maturity) of credit
facility j. i denotes borrowers, d bankruptcy districts, and t years.
Post − BAPCPAt tags the post-BAPCPA period and is set to 0 for 2004 and 2005;
and 1 for 2006 and 2007. This timing is motivated by the fact that the actual drop
caseload per judge around the reform occurred only in January 2006, after a dramatic
“file to rush” in the run-up to the implementation date in mid-october (see figure 4.1).
In section 4.5, I show that the effect is indeed driven by the contemporaneous observed
drop in caseload, rather than the passing or implementation date of BAPCPA.15 The
coefficient of interest is β, which captures the effect of BAPCPA (Post − BAPCPAt)
conditional on the pre-reform share of non-business bankruptcies in a district in 2003
(Exposured). Note that Post − BAPCPAt and Exposured are absorbed by the fixed
effects αt and αi.
In the baseline set-up, I include year (αt) and borrower (αi) fixed effects. This means
that I track changes in the terms of borrowers issuing multiple loans between 2004
and 2007, which is important in my setting to control for unobserved default risk. As
I show later, the results also hold when including more stringent sets of fixed effects,
e.g. to track the same borrower-lender pair over time.
Of course, loan terms have many determinants that are unrelated to judicial ef-
ficiency. The advantage of the loan-level set-up here is that I can “match” contracts
using firm fundamentals and other contract characteristics by including the covariate
vector Xijt. In particular, I control for the interest rate or maturity (in logs), loan size
(in logs), a collateral dummy, a dummy for an existing lender-borrower relationship,
a dummy for term loans; as well as the lagged borrower fundamentals book leverage,
total assets (in logs), ROA, sales growth, a credit rating dummy, asset tangibility, and
two dummies for firms that have negative or top-quartile debt-to-cash flow ratios. See
the appendix for the exact variable definitions. To address concerns that these cov-
ariates might themselves be endogenous to BAPCPA, I present robustness exercises in
section 4.5.4 where I exclude all covariates; this has no bearing on the results. Through-
out the paper, standard errors are allowed to be heteroskedastic and correlated within
district-year clusters.16 In the robustness section, I also show that collapsing the loan
terms Yj into the “pre”- and “post”-period on the firm-level, as recommended by Ber-
15In the robustness section, I consider alternative time windows and show that the estimates are not
sensitive to the exact definition of the Post−BAPCPA dummy.
16The results are robust to alternative computations of standard errors, which I show in section 4.5.4.
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trand et al. (2004), leads to similar results.
4.4.3 Are Consumer-Centric Districts Different?
The main identifying assumption of the regression in equation 4.2 is that the differ-
ence in loan terms between 2006-2007 and 2004-2005 is not driven by observed and
unobserved factors that are unrelated to judicial efficiency but are correlated with
Exposured, i.e. the share of non-business bankruptcies in a district’s total weighted
caseload. In my setting, the potentially most important concern are differences across
districts in their exposure to the housing bubble during that period, but also funda-
mental differences in the pool of firm borrowers.
To investigate whether observable differences across bankruptcy districts are a
cause for concern, I plot correlations between Exposured and a host of covariates in
table 4.3. I obtain these correlations by averaging each characteristic on the district-
level and regressing it on the exposure measure.17 All dependent variables andExposured
are standardized to have mean 0 and a standard deviation of 1; this is to make mag-
nitudes comparable across regressions. Reassuringly, borrower and loan characterist-
ics in the pre-reform period seem to be largely orthogonal with exposure to BAPCPA
(see column (1) in panel A and B); the only coefficients slightly passing the 10% sig-
nificance threshold are a dummy for the existence of a credit rating and a dummy for
an existing lender-borrower relationship. This suggests that, from a borrower’s per-
spective, exposure to the drop in court caseload following BAPCPA was as good as
random.
Column (3) in panel C shows that Exposured is significantly correlated with a few
county characteristics, namely the share of manufacturing in total employment (pos-
itive), the share of finance employees (negative), income per capita (negative), and the
Republican vote share in 2000 (positive). There is a also negative correlation with the
share of Asians and Hispanics as fraction of the total population. Crucially, measures
of exposure to the intensity of the housing boom during the period do not appear
to be positively correlated with the nonbusiness caseload share. The share of owner-
occupied housing as well as changes in employment in the construction or real estate
sector are not statistically significant. The exposure variable is further negatively cor-
related with house price growth during the boom: if anything, this implies that there
was less of a demand boom in areas with a higher share of individual bankruptcies.
While it is possible to control for the interaction of Post − BAPCPAt with these
county characteristics, the few statistically significant correlations raise the question
17The results yield highly similar results if I do not average the characteristics.
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Table 4.3: Comparing Bankruptcy Districts Before the Reform
This table presents reports coefficients from regressing each firm, loan, and county characteristic
on the treatment variables Exposure and High congestion dummy. I standardize all dependent vari-
ables and the continuous Exposure treatment to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1
to make the coefficients comparable. The sample is the main estimation sample; see column (1)
and (4) in table 4.4. Exposure is a bankruptcy district’s share of non-business bankruptcy cases in
2003. High congestion dummy is a dummy equal to 1 for districts in the top quartile of a state’s
share of non-business bankruptcy cases in 2003; and 0 for districts in the bottom quartile. Firm
and loan characteristics refer to the pre-reform period (2004 and 2005). County characteristics
are as of 2003, except for the education, ethnic composition, and owner-occupied share variables
(which refer to 2000). All characteristics are averaged on the district-level; county characteristics are
weighted by population in 2003. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered by district.
High High
Congestion Congestion
Exposure Dummy Exposure Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Borrower characteristics Panel C: County characteristics
Book leverage -0.098 0.096 Manufacturing employment share 0.230*** 0.031
(0.097) (0.236) (0.079) (0.288)
Log(Total assets) -0.004 0.176 Finance employment share -0.423*** -0.259
(0.083) (0.246) (0.136) (0.256)
ROA 0.068 -0.060 Income/capita (× 1000) -0.486** -0.136
(0.065) (0.101) (0.222) (0.327)
Negative debt-to-cash flow -0.073 0.099 Population density -0.487 -0.375
(0.068) (0.099) (0.407) (0.420)
High debt-to-cash flow -0.112 0.152 Republican vote (2000) 0.428*** 0.208
(0.121) (0.258) (0.142) (0.262)
Sales growth 0.032 -0.028 High school graduates/Pop. -0.129 -0.006
(0.034) (0.126) (0.104) (0.258)
Rating dummy -0.142* -0.044 Asians/Pop. -0.272* -0.041
(0.085) (0.289) (0.148) (0.214)
Credit rating -0.116 0.277 Hispanics/Pop. -0.285** -0.000
(0.096) (0.318) (0.133) (0.317)
Tangibility -0.042 0.039 African-Americans/Pop. 0.261 0.215
(0.113) (0.259) (0.166) (0.265)
Owner-occupied housing share 0.356 0.474
Panel B: Loan characteristics (0.273) (0.330)
Log(Loan size) 0.081 -0.016 ∆ real estate employees (’01-’06) 0.001 0.118
(0.068) (0.228) (0.078) (0.260)
Log(Maturity) 0.122 -0.125 ∆ construction employees (’01-’06) -0.063 0.264
(0.109) (0.238) (0.114) (0.258)
Interest rate spread -0.051 0.024 ∆ house prices (’02-’06) -0.301*** -0.091
(0.078) (0.297) (0.095) (0.262)
Collateral dummy -0.129 -0.006
(0.110) (0.261)
Relationship dummy -0.192* -0.241
(0.113) (0.262)
Term loan dummy -0.122 -0.050
(0.108) (0.244)
120
whether unobserved district factors might drive my results. I attempt to circumvent
this issue twofold. First, I create a “High congestion” dummy variable that compares
the share of non-business caseload within states with multiple bankruptcy districts.
In particular, the dummy is 1 for districts in the top quartile of the ReformExposure
measure within a state; and 0 for districts in the bottom quartile. Effectively, this en-
ables me to compare the impact of BAPCPA within the same state. Columns (2) and (4)
of table 4.3 shows that the High exposure dummy is uncorrelated with all observable
borrower, loan, and county characteristics. In fact, the coefficient signs switch signs
for 11 out of the 15 borrower and loan controls. This makes it even more plausible that
any effect I find is indeed due to exposure to the reform, rather than other correlates.
Second, I exploit the fact that borrowers differ markedly in their refinancing needs,
default risk, and expected recovery values prior to the implementation of BAPCPA. As
I will outline in more detail below, this cross-sectional variation is plausibly exogenous
to the legal changes which were ultimately passed in April 2005. By including an
interaction term of the main effect Post−BAPCPAt ×ReformExposured with these
characteristics allows me to include a full vector of district × year dummies, which
absorbs all time-varying district-level correlates unrelated to judicial efficiency. I apply
this methodology in section 4.5.2.
4.4.4 Filing Location and the Issue of “Forum Shopping”
This paper studies the effect of judicial efficiency on ex-ante contracting outcomes. As
such, a critical question is which firms are exposed to the caseload of a given bank-
ruptcy district. In the empirical analysis throughout the paper, I assign borrowing
firms to bankruptcy districts based on their headquarter location, for which I have the
exact address data from Compustat. However, according to 28 U.S.C. §1408, firms in
the US can file for bankruptcy where they (1) are incorporated; (2) have their prin-
cipal place of business; or (3) have an affiliate that filed for bankruptcy. In practice,
this means that the largest nationwide firms can more or less file for bankruptcy in a
venue of their choice, a phenomenon often referred to as “forum shopping”. Delaware
and Southern New York are arguably the most frequent recipient districts of such
forum shopping cases. In many high-profile bankruptcy cases such as Enron, Polar-
oid, WorldCom or General Motors, the companies filed in bankruptcy districts where
they did not have the majority of their business operations. As a result, there is an
ongoing debate among legal practitioners and academics about the pervasiveness and
consequences of forum shopping.
The choice of assigning firms to bankruptcy districts based on their headquarter
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location is likely prudent for a number of reasons. First, forum shopping is relatively
rare in a quantitative sense. Iverson (2016) shows that out of all chapter 11 cases filed
at US bankruptcy courts between 2004 and 2007, 91.3% of the filings occurred within
a debtor’s headquarter state. The Commercial Law League of America (CLLA), an
advocate for reforming bankruptcy venue regulation, has identified a forum shop-
ping motive for 745 cases filed in the districts of Delaware and Southern New York
between 2004 and 2014.18 Even in these prominent districts, however, this accounts
for only 0.48% of overall bankruptcy filings and 2.36% of business cases.19 Further,
it is worth highlighting that bankruptcy judges are keenly aware of forum shopping
and regularly overrule requests to file in “dubious” locations.20 As a result, these fil-
ing numbers likely overstate the frequency of successful forum shopping, that is judges
approving requests to file in a district that is arguably not the main location of a bor-
rower’s business.
Second, forum shopping is mostly limited to “mega bankruptcy cases”, i.e. to the
largest nationwide companies. As I show in the empirical analysis, my estimates de-
crease with firm size, implying that smaller firms are more affected. This makes it
unlikely that I am picking up a spurious effect driven by firms that would likely file
for bankruptcy outside of their headquarter district. Even though the borrowers in
my sample are large, they are still considerably smaller than the median publicly lis-
ted forum shopper, which has $3.2 billion in assets.21 This is considerably above the
75th percentile of borrowers in my sample. The results also hold when excluding the
largest firms; states or industries who are the most frequent victims of forum shop-
ping; or adjusting for firms headquartered or incorporated in Delaware and Southern
New York. It is also unclear why exposure to BAPCPA – as measured by a bankruptcy
district’s pre-reform caseload share of nonbusiness filings – should be correlated with
a firm’s propensity to shop for a preferred venue. In fact, my exposure measure ap-
pears to be largely orthogonal to firm characteristics across districts.
Third, headquarter location is likely a sound proxy for the location of the majority
18See their website for data and reports at https://clla.site-ym.com/page/resources_
venue_rfm.
19These percentages are calculated by dividing the 745 cases identified by CLLA by the number of
overall business bankruptcy cases filed in Delaware and Southern New York between 2004 and 2014
(653,235 and 78,947, respectively). The total number of cases are from the US Courts statistics, see
section 4.3.2.
20See, for example, the discussion at https://www.law360.com/articles/676417/
the-bankruptcy-venue-debate-a-never-ending-story.
21See the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database (http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/
design_a_study.asp?OutputVariable=Shop).
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of a firm’s assets, which is a standard assumption in the literature on geographical
factors in empirical finance research (e.g. Coval and Moskowitz, 2001; Loughran and
Schultz, 2004; Malloy, 2005; IvkoviÄ‡ and Weisbenner, 2005). In fact, given that bor-
rowers are solely assigned based on their headquarter location, the estimates likely
underestimate the true effect. This is because if creditors additionally take into account
a firm’s other potential bankruptcy venues, I will only capture a partial treatment ef-
fect. In other words, if headquarter location was irrelevant for a creditor’s assessment
of borrower recovery values, local judicial efficiency should have no effect on loan
terms; as I will show below, this is strongly rejected in the data.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 BAPCPA and Ex-Ante Loan Terms: Baseline Estimates
Was the drop in caseload per judge following BAPCPA priced into the contract terms
of forward-looking creditors? Column (1) of table 4.4 starts to investigate this question
by running equation 4.2 with interest rate spreads as the dependent variable. The
estimated coefficient is around −125 and highly statistically significant. The implied
effect is large: a one standard deviation increase in the exposure to BAPCPA (around
0.13) reduced spreads by approximately 16 basis points (bps).22 In column (2) I allow
for the inclusion of county characteristics interacted with the Post−BAPCPA dummy.
The purpose is to control for local differences in employment structure and a few other
significant covariates identified in section 4.4.3. Matching counties on these control
variables increases the estimate to around −146: a one standard deviation increase
now implies a drop of more than 19 bps.
A challenge of these regressions, however, is that unobservable differences across
bankruptcy districts not captured by the control variables may bias the coefficients
upwards. I thus turn to column (3), where I replace the continuous Exposure measure
with a dummy that tags districts in the top quartile of the non-business caseload share
as “treated” (and the bottom quartile as “control”). As shown in section 4.4.3, there
are no observable differences in borrower, loan, or county characteristics in these dis-
tricts. The estimate of around−31 in column (3) is again highly statistically significant
despite the decrease in sample size. Since both independent variables of interest are
dummies, this can be interpreted as a direct elasticity of spreads (in bps) to BAPCPA:
borrowers in highly exposed bankruptcy courts saw a decrease in spreads of around
31 bps compared to less exposed districts, even within the same state. In column (4), I
22The calculation is −124.895× 0.132 ≈ 16.5.
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again “match” this estimation on the set of county-level control variables, which yields
a point estimate of −24. The implied basis point reductions are large compared to the
median spread of 175 bps: even the smallest estimate in column (4) implies a reduction
in the cost of credit of around 14%.
In columns (5) through (8) I repeat the same exercise using the natural logarithm
of loan maturities as the dependent variable. Again, all specifications are highly pre-
cisely estimated and imply a substantial impact of judicial efficiency. In the baseline
regression (5), the coefficient of 0.504 implies that a one standard deviation increase in
exposure extends long maturities by approximately 0.504× 0.132 ≈ 6.7%.23 Including
county interactions raises this to an effect of around 16% in column (6). These mag-
nitudes are close to the within-state comparison of districts with high vs. low exposure
in columns (7) and (8), which imply an increase of around 10% or 13%, depending on
whether I include county-level controls (interacted with the Post-BAPCPA dummy).
Since the median loan maturity in the sample is 5 years, or 60 months (≈ exp(4.094)),
these estimates imply that the decrease in court backlog increased loan maturities by
between 4 and 10 months.
Figure 4.4 plots the dynamic impact of the BAPCPA-induced drop in caseload in
the estimation sample over time. A first important observation is that there are parallel
trends before the reform and the caseload drop: there is no distinguishable correlation
between the non-business caseload share and loan terms prior to the reform. The
second observation is that the passing and implementation of BAPCPA itself in March
and October 2005 had virtually zero effect on spreads and maturities.24 Instead, the
sizeable changes in loan terms perfectly coincided with the drop in caseload in January
2006 shown in figure 4.1. This suggests that improvements in judicial efficiency, not
changes to the legal framework, were behind the improvement in borrower’s credit
terms.
In table 4.13 in the online appendix, I find further support that the actual caseload
drop is indeed the driver of these results. In particular, I run a “horse race” of my
post-BAPCPA dummy (defined as 1 starting in January 2006) against dummies for the
major legislative steps of the reform, namely its passing of the Senate, House, and
the application of most provisions. The estimated coefficients on the legislative steps
are small and statistically insignificant (except for a single estimate with the “wrong”
sign); the dummy I use to tag the drop in caseload starting in January 2006 retains its
23I use the Taylor approximation here to translate log-points into percentage changes for conveni-
ence. Given that the numbers here are relatively small, this is going to be a relatively accurate descrip-
tion of the actual percentage changes.
24BAPCPA passed the Senate on March 10, 2005 and the House on April 14.
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Figure 4.4: THE IMPACT OF BAPCPA ON LOAN TERMS
PANEL A: INTEREST RATE SPREADS (IN BPS)
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PANEL B: LOG(LOAN MATURITY)
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These figures show the dynamic effect of BAPCPA on interest rate spreads for secured loans. They plot
the estimated coefficients β of the regression Yj = β
2007q4∑
t=2004q1
Dt × Exposured + γXijt + αt + αi + εj ,
where Yj refers to the interest rate spread in Panel A and the natural logarithm of loan maturities in
Panel B. “BAPCPA passed” refers to the passing of BAPCPA in the Senate on March 10, 2005.
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statistical power and in fact increases in size.
Overall, the results presented here are consistent with the interpretation that a de-
crease in the backlog of bankruptcy judges has a sizeable effect on financial contracts.
In the next section, I use plausibly exogenous exposure on the borrower-level to the
caseload drop to narrow down the channel behind these findings.
4.5.2 Exploring Borrower-Level Exposure
The results above suggest that the caseload drop following BAPCPA had a large ef-
fect on the interest rate spreads and maturities of loan contracts. If the channel I am
capturing is indeed a change to the efficiency of bankruptcy courts, we would expect
some borrowers to be more affected by the caseload drop than others. In this section,
I use firm-level variation to narrow down the channel behind my main results. Con-
veniently, this also allows me to address the challenge that unobserved district factors
may bias my estimates by including district× year fixed effects.
To begin, I exploit that around a third of the borrowers in my sample had taken out
loans prior to BAPCPA that matured after the drop in the court caseload in its after-
math. It seems unlikely that firms factored in a potential increase in judicial efficiency
when they took out loans prior to BAPCPA, in many cases years before it was clear
whether it would pass Congress. In fact, BAPCPA had a long legislative history. The
bill was first drafted in 1997 and passed Congress in 2000, only for President Clinton to
veto it. After this setback, BAPCPA was shelved numerous times over disagreements
over proposed amendments by both Democrats and Republicans. Only after the Re-
publican party increased their majority in the Senate and House in the 2004 elections
was the bill re-introduced in the Senate in February 2005. As such, firms that took out
loans with a fixed maturity prior to BAPCPA had an exogenously determined demand
for credit at some point in the post-reform period (also see Almeida et al., 2012); this
exposed them to shifts in credit supply as a result of the caseload drop that is unrelated
to borrower fundamentals.
I exploit this exogenous refinancing need by constructing a dummy for borrow-
ers who issued a loan prior to 2005 with a scheduled maturity date in 2006 or 2007.
I exclude credit lines because the end-date of revolving loans, which are frequently
rolled over, is less informative about refinancing needs. Around 30% of firms in the
estimation sample had pre-2005 loans maturing after the caseload drop starting in
2006. This dummy variable is then interacted with the Post − BAPCPA × Exposure
variable, which creates variation on the borrower-time level; this allows me to absorb
unobserved local variation across bankruptcy courts using a full set of district× year
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dummies.25 Note that the fixed effects in this specification absorb the main treatment
effect as well as the Refinancing need dummy itself.
Table 4.5 plots the results. To aid comparisons, I reproduce the baseline result in
column (1). In column (2), I introduce the triple interaction with the refinancing need
dummy. The coefficients of −177.846 for spreads and 1.454 for maturities are highly
statistically significant. Because I compare borrowers in the same district in the same
year that differ in their pre-determined need to roll over debt, they are unlikely to
reflect differences in firm demand. The implied magnitudes are considerably larger to
the baseline coefficients in column (1), and even larger than those including county-
level controls in table 4.4. Taken at face value, this suggests that the entire effect of
BAPCPA is due to changes in credit supply. To illustrate, a one standard deviation
increase in Exposure decreased spreads of borrowers with a loan maturing in 2006 or
2007 by around 23 bps. The same change in the non-business share in total caseload
increases loan maturities by around 19%.
Borrowers show substantial heterogeneity prior to BAPCPA not only in their re-
financing needs but also in other characteristics that one would expect to matter for
creditors concerned with potential losses from a borrower’s default. If the reform in-
deed impacted credit contracts through its impact on expected recovery values, one
would expect two aspects to matter in particular: (1) a borrower’s probability of de-
fault and (2) a borrower’s expected liquidation values in bankruptcy. In the data, I
measure the probability of default using numerical credit ratings or market leverage.
I proxy for liquidation values using firm size (as proxied by the log of total assets).26
Since these firm variables might themselves have changed with BAPCPA or in reaction
to the improved financing terms, I use their pre-reform values.27
Table 4.5 show the results of including these interactions in the main regression.
As above, the borrower-level variation allows me to include a full vector of district-
year dummies, which absorbs local factors unrelated to the Exposure measure. Note
that the pre-reform characteristics themselves are absorbed by the firm fixed effect αi.
25The estimates plotted here are almost equivalent when the regressions are run with the less strin-
gent standard set of borrower and year fixed effects. They are also qualitatively and quantitatively
similar when using the “High congestion” dummy. I omit the results for brevity but they are available
upon request.
26In unreported results, I find that proxies for liquidation values such as the asset redeployability
score of Kim and Kung (2017) or the ratio of research and development expenditures to total assets
yield qualitatively similar findings.
27I define pre-reform values as the average of 2004 and 2005, i.e. when Post−BAPCPA is equal to
0. Note that I continue to include the full vector of lagged borrower control variables, which however
makes no differences to the results.
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Table 4.5: BAPCPA AND LOAN CONTRACT TERMS: BORROWER HETEROGENEITY
This table presents estimated coefficients of the relation between corporate loan terms and
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). The
dependent variables is the interest rate spread or natural logarithm of the loan matur-
ity. BAPCPA is 0 for the years 2004 and 2005; and 1 for the years 2006 and 2007. All
firm-level variables are the simple average of the years where BAPCPA is 0, i.e. 2004
and 2005. Refinancing need is a dummy for borrowers that issued a loan that is not a
credit line before 2005 that matures in 2006 or 2007. See text for description of other
variables. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered by district and year.
Interaction with pre-reform...
Refinancing Credit Market Log(Total
Baseline Need Rating Leverage Assets)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Interest Rate Spread
Post-BAPCPA × Exposure -124.896*** – – – –
(26.716)
Post-BAPCPA × Exposure × Var. -177.846*** -40.541*** -730.623*** 54.428***
(71.606) (6.558) (120.088) (16.118)
Post-BAPCPA × Var. 100.339* 18.332*** 428.791*** -42.972***
(55.864) (4.207) (99.287) (11.567)
Observations 3,445 3,142 1,756 2,743 3,057
Adj. R2 0.778 0.839 0.854 0.845 0.833
Panel B: Log(Loan Maturity)
Post-BAPCPA × Exposure 0.504*** – – – –
(0.167)
Post-BAPCPA × Exposure × Var. 1.454*** 0.138*** 2.244* -0.200**
(0.436) (0.034) (1.263) (0.094)
Post-BAPCPA × Var. -1.025*** -0.106*** -1.605* 0.172***
(0.328) (0.027) (0.930) (0.061)
Observations 3,445 3,142 1,756 2,743 2,987
Adj. R2 0.544 0.650 0.635 0.633 0.640
Loan controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes – – – –
District × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Column (3) starts by considering whether firms with a higher probability of default (as
measured by numerical credit ratings) were more affected by the BAPCPA-induced
caseload drop. A higher number on the rating signifies higher risk. The estimate of
the triple-interaction term is −40.541 for spreads and highly statistically significant.
Since AAA ratings are assigned a 1 in the rating variable and BB+ a 11, this captures
the difference in spreads between prime- and junk-rated borrowers. The coefficient
thus implies that BAPCPA had a differential effect of 40.451 × 0.13 × 10 ≈ 53 bps on
junk-rated borrowers for a one standard deviation increase inExposure. This is a large
effect. For loan maturities, the difference is around 0.18 log-points. I find similar effects
in column (4) when using market leverage as a measure of bankruptcy probability.
A standard deviation increase in both market leverage (0.236) and the non-business
share (0.132) is associated with a differential effect of about 23 bps in spreads and 7
log-points in maturities.
In column (5), I consider whether the effect of BAPCPA varied by firm size, which
I use as a proxy of liquidation values. This estimation also serves as a sanity check
for the importance of forum shopping: if my findings were spuriously driven by
the largest firms with potential leeway over their filing location, the effect should in-
crease in firm size. The data suggests the opposite. For interest rates, the estimate
of 54.428 (highly statistically significant) implies that a standard deviation increase in
pre-reform size (1.621) paired with a one standard deviation increase in Exposure is
associated with a 12 bps lower reaction for larger firms. For maturities, the corres-
ponding value if −0.200× 1.621× 0.132 ≈ 4.2 log-points.
Overall, the results in this section are consistent with the interpretation that bank-
ruptcy court backlog matters particularly for borrowers that are closest to bankruptcy
or have lower expected recovery values. They also suggest that the entire effect of
BAPCPA is driven by credit supply, rather than differences in credit demand; this is
the implication of finding larger than baseline effects for borrowers with exogenous re-
financing needs. It is also consistent with the fact that the share of non-business cases
is largely uncorrelated with firm fundamentals prior to the reform, including borrower
risk. I conclude that creditors price in local judicial efficiency contemporaneously with
observed improvements.
4.5.3 Ruling Out Alternative Explanations
The sharp discontinuity in credit terms after the implementation of BAPCPA could
have a number of alternative interpretations. First, as highlighted above, BAPCPA
coincided with the housing boom of the 2000s. I already showed above that the expos-
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ure measure based on the non-business share of total bankruptcy caseload is largely
uncorrelated with district fundamentals and my results persist even when compar-
ing borrowers with different ex-ante exposure within the same district in the same year.
Could unobserved exposure to the housing boom still play a role? To investigate such
concerns, I follow Mian and Sufi (2014a) and construct measures of the nontradable
and construction sector and drop these from the estimation, since these are the in-
dustries that are most directly affected by swings in house prices and local demand.
Column (2) of table 4.6 shows that this has no bearing on my main results.
Second, BAPCPA included a few provisions that indeed had an impact on corpor-
ate bankruptcies. In section 4.4.1, I already showed that these had virtually no effect on
the number of corporate bankruptcy filings; it is also unclear why these legal changes
should vary with a court’s ex-ante share of non-business caseload. Levin and Ranney-
Marinelli (2005) conduct a detailed legal analysis of BAPCPA and conclude that, if
anything, the reform changes to business cases would reduce recovery values for firms,
which works against finding a decrease in spreads. While both points make it unlikely
that the minor legal changes had a substantial direct impact on corporate credit terms,
a large empirical literature has shown that bankruptcy laws matter greatly for firm fin-
ancing (see e.g. Acharya et al., 2011; Vig, 2013; Aretz et al., 2016; Rodano et al., 2016).
A related paper by Sautner and Vladimirov (2017) finds that riskier firms used more
trade credit (and had higher sales) in 2006 compared to 2003-2005. They attribute this
to the changes in corporate bankruptcy law that were part of BAPCPA.28
In the case of BAPCPA, the amendments for corporate bankruptcies were largely
targeted at specific groups, particularly retailers.29 In column (3) of table 4.6, I thus ex-
clude borrowers with SIC codes starting with 50 and re-run the baseline regressions.
This makes no difference to the estimates. Another line of argument is that BAPCPA
changed the treatment of derivatives (Edwards and Morrison, 2005).30 However, the
sample only includes non-financial corporations, so it is unlikely that this change had
a substantive impact on my estimates. A last potentially biasing feature of BAPCPA
28Note that the main variation for the analysis in Sautner and Vladimirov (2017) comes from a cross-
country panel study of differences in debt enforcement.
29Before BAPCPA, debtors-in-possession had to assume or reject unexpired leases of nonresidential
real property within 60 days after the initial filing, a period that could be extended by the court. After
BAPCPA, bankruptcy courts were only allowed to grant a single extension. Since retailers often have
large numbers of leased properties, they were particularly affected by this provision. BAPCPA also hit
businesses with large inventories by giving these “administrative expense priority status”, which again
impacted retailers. See Levin and Ranney-Marinelli (2005) for further discussion.
30See, e.g., a post on the ”Synthetic Assets” blog for a thorough discussion of the effects of BAPCPA
on the classification of different financial instruments.
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is that it likely decreased interest rates on car loans by eliminating so-called cram-
down provisions (Chakrabarti and Pattison, 2016).31 If this led to an increase in local
demand, it could boost firm liquidation values by raising house prices, and thus com-
press corporate spreads. Chakrabarti and Pattison measure the exposure to BAPCPA
using the share of non-business bankruptcies that are filed under Chapter 13. Changes
to cramdown provisions are an unlikely explanation for my findings; the exposure
variable in Chakrabarti and Pattison (2016) has a relatively low correlation of 19%
with the share of non-business cases in total caseload I use. Including their interaction
in column (4) makes little difference to the point estimate. Also recall from section
4.4.3 that BAPCPA exposure is, if anything, negatively correlated with the change in
house prices from 2001 through 2006.
31Before BAPCPA, borrowers with underwater car loans could have their debts reduced to the mar-
ket value of the car through a “cramdown” in Chapter 13 bankruptcy. This was quite common because
cars depreciate quickly. BAPCPA eliminated these for the first 910 days of car loans.
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A third concern might be that the relatively large borrowers in my sample should
not be subject to changes in local judicial efficiency due to “forum shopping”. While I
already outlined in section 4.2 why forum shopping, if anything, works against finding
any results in my setting, I can run a number of validity checks to rule this out. In
columns (5) through (7), I exclude firms that are most likely to be forum shoppers:
very large firms (those in the top 10% of total assets); firms headquartered in five
states most subject to forum shopping (CA, NJ, PA, IL, FL); and firms in industries
where more than 75% of public bankruptcy cases are marked as “forum shoppers”.32
The results in table 4.6 again suggest that these exclusions make no meaningful change
to the point estimates. Forum shopping is unlikely to be behind my results.
Fourth, the 2004-2007 period was characterized by an increase in the use of securit-
ization (see e.g. Benmelech et al., 2012; Keys et al., 2010). If securitization is correlated
with the Exposure measure, this might be behind the decrease in spreads and increase
in maturities. Data reported by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets As-
sociation (SIFMA) suggests that the volume of outstanding Collateralized Loan Ob-
ligations (CLOs), CDOs backed by corporate loans, increased from $123.4 to $189.7
between 2005 and 2006, at 54% the highest growth rate since the mid-1990s. To control
for the impact of securitization, I exclude loan facilities that are possibly owned by
CLOs, building on Benmelech et al. (2012). In particular, I drop all term loan B and C
facilities, which are specifically structured for institutional investors such as CLOs, as
well as loans of borrowers with no credit rating at issuance. Since CLOs are primar-
ily active in the leveraged loan segment (i.e. unrated or junk-grade borrowers), this
likely excludes the vast majority of securitized loans. I report the estimation results
of this reduced sample in column (8). Despite the substantial drop in sample size, the
coefficients are still significant at the 1% level; securitization does not drive my results.
As a fifth point, one might speculate that omitted geographical drivers affecting
firm risk are behind the results presented here. Such changes are likely to work against
me: table 4.3 suggests that house prices growth is, if anything, negatively correlated
with higher exposure to BAPCPA (although insignificant for the high congestion dummy).
Further, I already showed in section 4.5.2 that ex-ante more exposed borrowers saw a
larger change in loan terms even within the same district in the same year. In an alternat-
ive story, firms in these areas could have experienced a sudden change in fundament-
als that made them less likely to default, and thus improving loan terms. I test this
hypothesis in a district-year-quarter panel by regressing the number of business (or
Chapter 11) bankruptcies (scaled over total employees) in a district on the interaction
32The latter two measures are constructed using the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database
at http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/.
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Post − BAPCPAt × Exposured, as above.33 The results are reported in table 4.12 in
the online appendix to conserve space. The estimated coefficients on the interaction
in columns (1) and (3) are far from regular levels of statistical significance and have
different signs: following BAPCPA, there was no change in business bankruptcies in
districts more exposed to the reform. As a next test, I consider whether the Exposure
measures picks up districts with higher ex-post realized risk, again proxied by the num-
ber of bankruptcies. I implement this by replacing the Post−BAPCPAt variable with
Crisist in columns (2) and (4), which is 0 for the sample period 2004-2007 and 1 for the
crisis period 2008-2011. The results, again, suggest a zero correlation between the non-
business share in total caseload and business bankruptcies during the Great Financial
Crisis, which makes it unlikely that lower ex-post risk drives my results.
4.5.4 Further Robustness Checks
In the online appendix, I report a battery of additional robustness checks of the main
results presented in table 4.14. Column (1) shows the baseline estimates for conveni-
ence. The first number of exercises is aimed at establishing that the exact time window
chosen here does not drive my findings. Columns (2) through (4) thus show specific-
ations where I allow the Post − BAPCPAt dummy to vary differently by excluding
2007 from the “treatment” status or extending the pre and post period. The results still
hold, suggesting that the effect of BAPCPA on loan terms was neither driven by pre-
trends in earlier years nor reverted back over the course of the financial crisis. What is
particularly worth highlighting here is that the point estimates are hardly affected by
dropping 2007 from the regression in column (2). This is reassuring because it suggests
that the effect is neither driven by (1) the onset of financial market stress in summer
2007 nor (2) the changes BAPCPA made to the exclusivity period of firm bankruptcies,
which in practice applied from mid-April 2007 (see section 4.2).
The regressions on the loan-level I run throughout the paper have the advantage
that they allow for the inclusion of other loan characteristics as controls, which im-
proves the precision of the estimates. There may, however, be a concern that these
control variables might themselves be endogenous. In column (5), I thus drop all
covariates from the regression and only retain borrower and year fixed effects. The
coefficients now imply somewhat smaller magnitudes, as one may expect, but remain
33I acknowledge that filing for bankruptcy is a sufficiently rare form of default on debt instruments.
What matters for the identification strategy in this paper, however, is that the cross-sectional Exposure
measure does not predict differential local business conditions going forward, which is what I test here.
Also note that the results are not affected by the scaling variable; I repeated these estimations using the
log of bankruptcy cases, which makes no material difference.
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highly statistically significant at the 1% level.
Next, I address that some firms in the sample take out multiple loans only before
or after BAPCPA. While this still allows for the inclusion of borrower fixed effects,
it does not capture a true within-firm effect of the reform. Dropping these firms in
column (6) yields almost perfectly equivalent point estimates that are highly statistic-
ally significant. In a similar spirit, one may be concerned that the loan-level analysis
here suppresses standard errors due to the repeated number of observations per firm
before and after “treatment”; this is an important point highlighted in Bertrand et al.
(2004). To mediate such concerns, I collapse all loan observations into the pre- and
post-period, which allows me to take the first difference of average borrower loan
terms.34 The result is a single data point for each borrower. Column (7) presents the
result of regressing the borrower-level change in contract terms on the Exposure vari-
able. Reassuringly, both in terms of precision and magnitude, the result is closely
aligned with the baseline result in column (1).
Another issue in analyzing loan outcomes is that borrowers and lenders are not
randomly allocated to each other over the credit cycle (Schwert, 2017). I thus restrict
the sample to borrowers issuing at least one loan to the same bank before and after
BAPCPA between 2004 and 2007. Then, I re-run the main specification with bank ×
borrower fixed effects. Effectively, this means tracking loan term changes within the
same borrower-bank pair over time. Even though this leads to a substantial drop in
sample size, the results in column (8) suggest that the results still hold.
In section 4.4.1, I show that the districts of Delaware and Southern New York rep-
resent outliers in the first-stage relationship between the non-business caseload share
and the subsequent drop in the caseload per judge. As a robustness exercise, I thus
“winsorize” these to take the caseload share of Alaska, as in Iverson (2016). The coeffi-
cients in column (9) are now considerably larger than before, suggesting that the non-
linearity introduced by the two districts does not have an impact on my results.
As a last exercise, I conduct a placebo test. In section 4.5, I already showed that
there are no detectable differential trends along Exposure variable prior to BAPCPA.
The results in table 4.14 further suggest that the effects I uncover are of similar mag-
nitude when using 2000-2005 or 2006-2012 as the pre or post period, respectively. Here,
I conduct a counterfactual experiment by pretending the BAPCPA-induced caseload
drop happened two years earlier. In this set-up, Post − BAPCPAt is 0 in 2002-2003
and 1 in 2004-2005; Exposured analogously is now measured in 2001. The coefficient
estimate in column (10) is quantitatively small and undistinguishable from 0.
34In particular, I create the loan size-weighted spreads and maturities before and after BAPCPA for
each firm and take the difference between these two values.
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Talbe 4.15 in the online appendix includes a range of additional validity exercises
and shows that my estimates are not driven by the 20 districts for which BAPCPA
added additional judges; time-varying shocks on the state-, industry-, or bank-level;
or the pre-reform year in which I define the Exposure variable. In table 4.16, I further
present 8 sets of alternative standard errors for the baseline results, all of which still
imply that my estimates are highly statistically significant.
4.6 The Social Costs of Court Backlog
How large are the welfare losses associated with inefficient legal enforcement in the
court system? The law and economics literature has long grappled to find plausible
answers to this question because court backlog is endogenous to local factors. Most
obviously, poorly designed laws beget poor enforcement: uncertainty about the law
and its implementation are likely a major contributor to judicial backlog.
In this section, I use the estimated effects of quasi-random exposure to BAPCPA on
interest rate spreads and maturities to conduct a back of the envelope calculation. At
the heart of this exercise lies the idea that, under a set of several simplifying assump-
tions, a reduction in interest rates (a price term) can be translated into aggregate cost
savings (a quantity). This is because, in my setting, the estimated savings of lower
spreads and longer maturities reduce the annual interest burden of non-financial cor-
porations. Together with estimates on the costs of creating new judgeships in the
United States, I can conduct a cost-benefit analysis for reducing the workload of courts.
As such, I attempt to provide an empirical assessment of whether the costs of an over-
burdened bankruptcy system are indeed “enormous” – the charge raised by the U.S.
district judge in the opening quote.
From the onset, it should be noted that this exercise should be regarded as illus-
trative: the estimates are based on a reduced-form linear model that uses the caseload
per judge as sole measure of judicial efficiency. While I find large macroeconomic sav-
ings due to the drop in court backlog following BAPCPA, extrapolating from these
in-sample estimates requires additional simplifying assumptions. My approach is
also entirely silent about whether one can extrapolate estimates based on bankruptcy
courts I study here to other settings, e.g. the costs of congestion in family courts.
4.6.1 Estimating the Elasticity of Loan Terms to Judicial Caseload
To estimate the macroeconomic costs of court backlog, I need point estimates for how
much interest rates would fall (and maturities increase) for a given exogenous drop in
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caseload. I use the within-firm estimates of ≈ −90.144 bps for spreads and ≈ +29.5%
for maturities, reported in column (7) in table 4.14. These are around a third lower
than the baseline estimates, and thus conservative.
These values imply that a one standard deviation increase in Exposure (0.132) de-
creases spreads by 11.9 bps and increases maturities by 3.9%. In the estimation sample,
table 4.2 shows that a one standard deviation increase in exposure to BAPCPA is asso-
ciated with a drop of around 91 hours in annual caseload per judge (0.083×1092.878 ≈
91), around two full work-weeks. Assuming a linear relationship, we can interpret
these estimates as an elasticity of 11.8 basis points for spreads, and 3.9% for maturit-
ies, to a drop in caseload per judge of around 91 hours. This does, however, require
the additional assumption that the changes in spreads and maturities are permanent
and react linearly to changes in the caseload.
The point estimates I use here are likely conservative for another reason, because
the median borrower in my sample is much larger than the typical corporation in the
United States. Because smaller firms were considerably more affected by the BAPCPA-
induced drop in caseload (see table 4.5), this means I will underestimate the effect on
the population of US firms.
4.6.2 Estimating Changes to the Interest Burden of US Corporations
To translate these numbers into an aggregate cost, I draw on the approach of Drehmann
et al. (2015) to calculate the US-wide interest payments of non-financial corporations.
They calculate the macroeconomic debt service burden as follows, where I omit sub-
scripts for brevity:
Interest Burden =
Interest Rate
(1− (1 + Interest Rate)−Maturity) ×Debt, (4.3)
where Debt refers to the total stock of non-financial corporate debt; Interest Rate to
the average interest rate on the existing stock of debt; and Maturity to its average
remaining maturity. For the baseline estimates, I ignore the effect of an exogenous
drop in caseload on maturities. This is highly conservative, because incorporating the
increase in maturities substantially increases the macroeconomic savings associated
with more efficient bankruptcy courts. In the online appendix, I provide back-of-the-
envelope calculations with a change in maturities that suggest the findings presented
here are an extreme lower bound of the social costs of overburdened judicial systems.
Because I am interested in how much the cost of debt service change with judicial
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efficiency, and ignore the change to maturities, this yields the following equation:
∆Interest Burden = ∆Interest Rate×Debt. (4.4)
Note that Interest Rate consists of an interest rate spread and an underlying reference
rate. Because I am only interested in the change to spreads, I directly translate it into
changes in interest rates. Keeping reference rates constant, a decrease in spreads and
increase in maturities can be directly translated into a reduction in aggregate corporate
debt servicing costs.
Because the BAPCPA setting allows me to calculate the elasticity of a change in
spreads to a change in caseload, I could directly calculate its aggregate effects by re-
placing ∆Interest Ratet in equation 4.4 with the estimated elasticity:
∆Interest Burden =
−90.144 / 10, 000
1092.878
× Caseload Drop×Debt, (4.5)
where −90.144 / 10, 000 is the estimated coefficient for the change in spreads (in basis
points) and 1092.878 the estimated coefficient for the caseload drop. Caseload Drop
specifies the size of the drop in the weighted caseload per judge one is interested in.
However, the aggregate effect may depend crucially on how firms differ in their ex-
posure to such changes and how much debt they have. For example, firms that would
be highly exposed to an increase in judicial efficiency may be large and highly levered,
or small and hold no debt at all. I thus allow for firm-level variation in the caseload
drop and outstanding debt, which yields:
∆Interest Burdeni =
∑
i
(−90.144 / 10, 000
1092.878
× Caseload Dropi ×Debti
)
. (4.6)
I will refer to equation 4.6 as “direct estimation”, compared to the formula-based es-
timation in equation 4.3. The advantage of calculating effects directly is that I can use
firm-level variation in outstanding debt and exposure without having to assume ho-
mogeneity in a firm’s debt structure (bonds versus loans) or average financing terms.
A disadvantage is that I cannot easily gauge the effect of a change in maturities, be-
cause calculating the outstanding maturity of a firm’s outstanding debt is difficult (see
also Drehmann et al., 2015). Another disadvantage is that the large, publicly listed
borrowers in my estimation sample are not representative; this introduces a strong
downward bias, because smaller firms are more likely to file for bankruptcy, and thus
more affected by changes to the efficiency of bankruptcy courts (see the results section
4.5.2). The firms in my sample also hold only a fraction of total non-financial corporate
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debt in the US, and may pay different spreads on bonds and loans.
I address these challenges two-fold. First, I will scale up the outcomes of equation
4.6 using the share of debt of firms in my sample as a fraction of total debt to arrive at
more representative values. Note that to maximize the external validity of my calcu-
lation, I use data on all firms in the matched Dealscan-Compustat data set for which I
can identify their bankruptcy district.35 Second, I compare the firm-level estimates to
changing the inputs of the aggregate debt service ratio in equation 4.3, which I refer
to as “formula-based”. This has the advantage that it allows for different interest rates
and maturities for loans and bonds (which are assumed to be equal across firms), and
also makes calculating changes to maturities manageable. According to data from the
US Financial Accounts, non-financial corporates had a total of $5,070.1 billion in debt
at the end of 2004 (around 58% in bonds), and $7,680 by the end of 2016 (around 66%
in bonds).
4.6.3 BAPCPA and the Interest Burden of Corporate Borrowers
Equipped with point estimates for the effect of a drop in caseload on the spreads of
corporate borrowers, and the methodology outlined above, we can make a back-of-
the-envelope calculation for the macroeconomic savings of BAPCPA. To quantify the
effect, I use the total drop in the caseload per judge between 2006-2007 and 2004-2005,
equal to around 493 hours (see section 4.2). Because firms were more exposed to the
caseload drop than others, I weight the firm estimates by the district’s exposure, i.e.
the non-business share in the weighted caseload of the bankruptcy district. This yields
the following equation:
∆Interest Burden =
∑
i
(−90.144 / 10, 000
1092.878
× 493× Exposurei ×Debti
)
, (4.7)
where Debti is the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities from Com-
pustat, averaged over 2004 and 2005. As outlined above, I assume that the district
differences in Exposure map linearly into improvements in caseload (1092.878 from
table 4.2) and spreads (−90.144 from column (7) in table 4.14). The assumption is thus
that lower caseload allows firms to roll over pre-existing debt at better financing con-
ditions – which is consistent with my findings on borrowers with exogenous financing
needs in section 4.5.2.
35Note that the results presented here yield highly similar results if I instead use only the firms in
the estimation sample.
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Table 4.7: THE SOCIAL COSTS OF CONGESTED BANKRUPTCY COURTS
This table presents the inputs required to calculate the social costs of excessive bank-
ruptcy court caseload. The Implied elasticity is calculated as the ratio of Exposure on
spreads, divided by Exposure on the caseload drop. The Estimated drop in spreads is cal-
culated as the Drop in caseload per judge (average) times the implied elasticity. The Judge
multiplier is the ratio of savings in interest burden to required judgeships. Net gains
are the difference between the savings in interest butden and required judgeships.
Direct Estimation Formula-Based
In-sample Total Total
debt corporate debt corporate debt
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Point Estimates
Exposure on spreads -90
Exposure on caseload drop 1,092.878
Implied elasticity (bps/caseload hour) -0.082
Panel B: Estimated Effect of BAPCPA
Total debt (2004, in $ billion) 2,686 5,070.1 5,070.1
Drop in caseload per judge (average) 493 493 493
Estimated drop in spreads -40.599 -40.599 -40.599
Savings in interest burden (in $ billion) 8.109 15.308 9.536
Panel C: Estimated Effect of Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017
Total debt (latest, in $ billion) 5,303 7,680 7,680
Drop in caseload per judge (average) 154 154 154
Savings in interest burden (in $ billion) 0.476 0.689 0.414
Required judgeships (in $ billion) 0.004 0.004 0.004
Judge multiplier 119 172 104
Net gains 0.472 0.685 0.41
Panel D: Estimated Effect of New Judges for Highly Congested Courts
Total debt (latest, in $ billion) 5,303 7,680 7,680
Drop in caseload per judge (average) 310 310 310
Savings in interest burden (in $ billion) 0.681 0.986 0.592
Required judgeships (in $ billion) 0.008 0.008 0.008
Judge multiplier 85 123 74
Net gains 0.677 0.982 0.588
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I start with the in-sample calculation for the publicly listed firms in the matched
Dealscan-Compustat sample in column (1) of table 4.7. The borrowers in the sample
had a total of $2,686 billion in outstanding debt prior to BAPCPA in 2004. This means
they account for a substantial fraction of 53% of the total outstanding debt of non-
financial corporates of around $5,070 in that year. Equation 4.6 implies that the drop in
caseload per judge following BAPCPA saved the sample firms $8.109 billion in interest
payments per year - a substantial magnitude, even if one abstracts from changes to
maturities.
Next, I turn to the aggregate debt service burden of all non-financial corporations
in column (2). Because the borrowers in my sample make up a significant part of total
borrowing, I their geographical distribution is likely a solid approximation for the
geographical distribution of total debt. With that assumption in mind, I can calculate
the macroeconomic savings due to BAPCPA by scaling up the in-sample estimate of
$8.109 billion by the factor of total to in-sample debt ($5,070
$2,686
billion). This implies total
interest burden savings of $15.308 billion as a result of the caseload drop following
BAPCPA.
How do these firm-level estimates compare to those from changing the inputs in
the formula in equation 4.3? Answering this question requires a number of additional
inputs, are assumed to be equal across firms: the fraction of total debt accounted for by
bonds and loans, as well as the average maturity and interest rates of the outstanding
debt in each category. I describe how to calculate these in more detail in the online
appendix and compare them to data reported by the BIS. Accounting for the drop in
spreads due to BAPCPA in the aggregate implies total savings of $9.536 billion. This is
slightly lower than the estimate of $15.307 billion when taking heterogeneity in firm-
level exposure into account. It does, however, suggest that changes to the aggregate
interest burden yield similar results to those based on firm-level data.
How does these savings in interest burden compare to the costs of BAPCPA? The
United States Government Accountability Office estimated implementation costs of
around $72.4 million – but these were almost exclusively related to the legal changes
for consumer cases, and in fact do not incorporate the 28 new temporary judgeships
BAPCPA created (USGAO, 2008). As I will discuss in more detail below, bankruptcy
judgeships cost approximately $1 million a year, adding $28 million in annual ex-
penses. These numbers pale in comparison with the estimated savings from the exo-
genous drop in caseload for my sample firms alone, which clocked in at around $8.1
billion.
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4.6.4 The Costs and Benefits of Resolving Excessive Court Caseload
BAPCPA was a watershed event in the history of bankruptcy in the United States. This
makes it attractive to isolate the causal effect of judicial efficiency, but less attractive
as an indication of what constitutes congestion in US bankruptcy courts. After all, the
caseload drop following BAPCPA was a reflection of a substantial legal change, and
specifying the excessive or undesirable component of the caseload per judge is clearly
challenging. In this section, I propose two simple approaches and calculate the costs
of making courts less busy.
First, I will use the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017 as a template for a min-
imum desirable reduction in caseload. The Act passed the Senate on September 5,
2017 and added four new permanent judgeships for the districts Delaware (2), Flor-
ida Middle (1), and Michigan East (1), following the recommendations of the Judi-
cial Conference.36 Data from the Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics for Q1/2018 and
Q1/2017 allow me to calculate how the new judgeship affected the annual change in
the weighted caseload per judge. For Delaware, the judge workload changed from
around 626 to 476 hours (a drop of 150); for Florida Middle from 906 to 766 (a drop of
140); and for Michigan East from 948 to 777 (a drop of 171). The average drop was 154
hours per judge per year.
Second, I will estimate the effect of reducing the caseload per judge of districts
above the 90th percentile in Q1/2017 by hiring an additional judge in each of these
districts.37 This would reduce the annual workload per judge in these courts by an
average of 310 hours, ranging from a minimum of 102 caseload hours in the northern
district of Illinois to a maximum of 731 hours in the northern district of Mississippi.
Note that these courts do not overlap with the districts receiving new judgeships as
part of the 2017 bill: the average weighted caseload per judge of Delaware, Florida
Middle, and Michigan East in Q1/2018 was 827 hours per year, which lies between
the 75th and 90th percentile of the caseload distribution.
In both scenarios, the majority of courts would be unaffected by hiring additional
judges. I thus begin by using the firm-level calculation as in equation 4.6 to calcu-
late the savings in interest rate burden, and then scale up these values using the frac-
36See https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1107/text
for the full text of the bill and http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2017/04/07/
judiciary-seeks-bankruptcy-judgeships-warns-crisis for the recommendations of
the Judicial Conference. The Act also made permanent many previously temporary judgeships that
were extended on a regular basis. Since these judges were already in place, this does not have an
immediate effect on the court workload.
37In Q1/2017, these were the districts AL,M; GA,N; IL,N; LA,W; MO,E; MS,N; TN,W; and TX,E.
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tion of total debt in Compustat in my sample to total non-financial corporate debt in
Q4/2016.38 The in-sample firms accounted for approximately 69% of total debt in 2016
($5,303
$7,680
billion ≈ 0.69).
For the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017, this procedure yields estimated sav-
ings in the interest burden of approximately $689 million for the entire stock of non-
financial corporate debt ($476 million in-sample). If one were to hire an additional
judge in each of districts with a caseload above the 90th percentile, the savings would
amount to $986 million ($681 million in-sample). How do these numbers compare to
those one would arrive at using the aggregate formula 4.3, ignoring the firm hetero-
geneity? My estimates suggest a somewhat lower drop of $414 million for the Bank-
ruptcy Judgeship Act and $592 million in the high-congestion scenario. Again, these
differences arise because the aggregate debt service formula relies on assumptions
about the maturity of outstanding debt on one hand, but also allows for different fin-
ancing terms for loans and bonds. Taking the simple average of the four estimates on
the total non-financial corporate debt suggest that the costs of overburdened courts
are indeed “enormous”: at least $670 million per year.
How much would it cost to resolve excessive court inefficiency? For the Bank-
ruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017, the Congressional Budget Office estimates annual salar-
ies and benefits for bankruptcy judges of about $232,000.39 The Congressional Budget
Office also provides an estimate for judicial administrative costs for personnel, se-
curity, and court operations of about $700,000 per judge per year. Hiring an addi-
tional judge would thus cost approximately $932,000; I will round this estimate up to
$1,000,000 for simplicity. Four judges in the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act scenario thus
would cost $4,000,000, and the 8 new judgeships required by the 90th percentile scen-
ario $8,000,000. Clearly, these costs are miniscule compared to the estimated benefits:
from a fiscal policy perspective, they imply a “judge multiplier” of above 100 in almost
all estimations. The average multiplier for the four total debt estimates is 118.
Taken together, I conclude that the social costs of court backlog are large, and that
addressing these costs could be a potentially profitable avenue for government ex-
penditures. Again, these findings rely on a number of simplifying assumptions. Des-
pite this caveat, the range of values I present is likely an extreme lower bound for
38More precisely, I use the sum of debt in current liabilities and total long-term debt of firms in the
Dealscan-Compustat sample, and average these values over 2015 through 2017 (as available).
39Bankruptcy judges are entitled to compensation equal to 92% of that of a district judge, which
puts their listed annual salary at approximately $191,000. See https://www.law.cornell.edu/
uscode/text/28/153 for the background covering bankruptcy judge compensation and http:
//www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-compensation for the time series of ju-
dicial pay. District judges in the United States were entitled to $208,100 in compensation in 2018.
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multiple reasons. First, they are solely based on the effect of judicial caseload on pub-
licly listed firms with low bankruptcy risk. Second, they are based on some of the
smallest point estimates I find. Third, they ignore knock-on effects of financing terms
on foregone firm investments and employment, as well as the effect of judicial effi-
ciency on the interest burden of households. Fourth, I do not consider costs arising
from an inefficient resolution of bankruptcy cases due to congested courts (see e.g.
Iverson, 2016). Fifth, up to this point, I have not considered the effect of caseload on
loan maturities. All of these factors bias my estimates downwards.
4.6.5 Incorporating the Effect on Loan Maturities
Up until this point, I have ignored the effect of an exogenous drop in caseload on loan
maturities. This is to be conservative: Drehmann et al. (2015) show that even small
changes to the average maturity of outstanding debt can drastically shift the interest
burden, because repayment is spread out over a longer time period. The details of this
exercise are reported in the online appendix in table 4.17.
Allowing for court caseload to affect debt maturities increases my estimates of its
social costs. For the BAPCPA evaluation, the formula-based calculation implies total
savings in the corporate interest burden of $47.274 billion when incorporating matur-
ities compared to $15.307 billion when considering the change in spreads only. For the
Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017, the effect is $2.111 billion, up from $685 million.
And for the 90th percentile scenario, incorporating maturities increases the formula-
based estimate from $982 million to $3.014 billion. I take these values as suggesting,
again, that my assessment of the costs of court congestion above are likely to be highly
conservative, and that resolving excessive caseload may yield even larger dividends.
4.6.6 The Return to Judges in 71 Bankruptcy Districts
The calculation above suggests that we can uncover the benefits associated with hir-
ing additional judgeships in each bankruptcy district. In other words, I can answer the
question which districts – according to my estimates – would yield the highest social
returns if they were given an additional judgeship. To arrive at the estimated sav-
ings per district, I use equation 4.6, plug in how much the caseload per judge would
drop with one additional judgeship (assuming a constant caseload), sum the firm-
level estimates by district, and scale up the district-level estimate using the share of
total outstanding corporate debt to that in the sample.
Compared to a calculation of macroeconomic costs, this requires much fewer as-
sumptions, because we can directly infer the returns to judges using the geographical
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distribution of corporate debt. Note, however, that the estimation still ignores house-
hold debt, which in many areas might be a considerably more important factor. I will
also restrict the exercise to the case of one additional judgeship to maximize the like-
lihood that the linear reduced-form model I estimated for the BAPCPA caseload drop
yields a valid approximation. I also drop districts with less than three headquartered
firms.
Table 4.18 in the online appendix plots the results for each of the 71 remaining
bankruptcy districts in the sample. I also plot information on the key inputs, namely
the caseload per judge and its projected drop for hiring an additional judge (as of
Q1/2017); the number of firms and their total debt per district; and the average and
total savings in interest burden. To reduce the influence of individual firms, I also
present the total and average savings after winsorizing the firm-level estimates at the
1% level; however, 23 out of the 25 top districts remain unchanged.
Figure 4.5: 25 BANKRUPTCY DISTRICTS WITH THE HIGHEST RETURN TO JUDGES
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This figure plots the estimated savings in corporate interest burden from creating one additional judge-
ship by district, as described in the text. The southern district of New York (NY,S) is marked red,
because it represents an outlier in the relationship of the non-business caseload share and the drop in
caseload per judge following BAPCPA (see figure 4.3).
Figure 4.5 plots the 25 districts with the highest total savings in corporate interest
burden for hiring one additional judge (based on the winsorized values). The southern
district of Texas has the highest savings, followed by the southern district of New York,
146
and the northern districts of Illinois, Texas, and Georgia. However, the inclusion of the
southern district of New York should be taken with a grain of salt, given that it is an
outlier in the relationship between the non-business caseload share and caseload drop
following BAPCPA.
Is the order of districts I find mechanically driven by the estimated drop in caseload
per judge? In figure 4.8 in the online appendix, I show that this is not the case. Instead,
the district-level savings are highly correlated with the distribution of outstanding
debt (−0.74) and the number of firms in a district (−0.39, unreported).
Because the savings are measured in $ million per year, and the costs of an addi-
tional judgeship are approximately $1 million per year, we can directly interpret these
values as returns to hiring a bankruptcy judge. Clearly, many factors go into the de-
cision where new judges should be hired. The Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017 is
a prime example, which only partially reflected the corporate returns to judgeships:
it added a new judgeship to the eastern district of Michigan (ranked #1 in the basic
and #9 in the winsorized return measure), but also Delaware and the middle district
of Florida (ranked #23 and #53 in the winsorized measure). Nevertheless, assessing
the potential benefits from reducing the workload of bankruptcy judges using my ap-
proach could serve as a transparent quantitative input for policy makers.
4.7 Conclusion
A large literature has identified legal frameworks as important predictors of financial
contracting. Yet, there is little evidence on how much the implementation of laws into
practice matters quantitatively. I draw on the US bankruptcy system to shed some
light on this important issue.
Exploiting exposure to the Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
as an exogenous shock to court caseload, I show that judicial efficiency has quant-
itatively large effects on the ex-ante terms of corporate credit. The implied effects
are large: estimations imply that BAPCPA decreased interest rate spreads by 40 basis
points and increased maturities by 10%, equivalent about half a year.
By exploiting pre-determined borrower characteristics, I can further disentangle
how much of this effect is driven by credit supply, rather than unobserved demand
across bankruptcy districts. I find that the entire impact of the BAPCPA-related drop
in court backlog is due to changes in credit supply. This is also consistent with the
time series pattern: loan terms remained unchanged during the passing and effective
implementation of BAPCPA in April and October 2005, but improved drastically once
the caseload of bankruptcy judges saw a dramatic drop in early 2006.
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The relatively mild identifying assumptions that are required to interpret the BAP-
CPA shock as a causal effect of court caseload on ex-ante contracting enable me to
calculate the social costs of inadequate court staffing. Given that interest rate spreads
are a price term, I can back out the social costs of inefficient enforcement (as meas-
ured by court backlog) under a set of simplifying assumptions. This exercise implies
that the halving of caseload per judge in the wake of BAPCPA saved US non-financial
corporates between $9.5 and $15.3 billion in interest payments, even in the most con-
servative calculation.
I also use two approaches to quantify the costs of “excessive” court backlog today
and the benefits of resolving it. The results suggest that busy bankruptcy courts have
macroeconomic costs of at least $670 million per year, and hiring additional judges
to ease these costs would have implied fiscal multipliers of above 100. My approach
also uncovers the districts with the highest social returns to judges for the corporate
interest burden, which can serve as a transparent quantitative input for policy makers.
An important open question coming out of these findings is the extent to which
they apply to judicial efficiency in other settings. While the corporate loan market
provides me with a relatively clean set-up, financial contracts may be particularly
exposed to the reliability of court outcomes; this is also reflected in findings that li-
quidation values and default risk explain the bulk of variation in credit spreads (e.g.
Benmelech et al., 2005; Gilchrist and ZakrajÅ¡ek, 2012). Future work should provide
more evidence from other areas of legal enforcement.
148
Appendix
Table 4.8: BANKRUPTCY CASE WEIGHTS
This table shows the average number of hours spent on bankruptcy cases
of a particular type, building on the findings of Bermant et al. (1991).
Type of case Case weight in hours
Chapter 7 Business 0.397
Chapter 7 Consumer 0.101
Chapter 11 7.559
Chapter 12 4.040
Chapter 13 0.381
Other cases 0.194
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Online Appendix
A Cross-Sectional Correlations
Figure 4.6: CASELOAD PER JUDGE AND LOAN TERMS – CROSS-SECTIONAL COR-
RELATIONS
ALL-IN-DRAWN INTEREST RATE SPREADS
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(c) Dealscan-Compustat Sample
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Notes: These figures show binned scatter plots, where the interest rate spread and loan maturity are
grouped into 20 quantiles and plotted against the caseload per judge in each bankruptcy district. Panels
(A) and (C) use the entire matched Dealscan-Compustat sample from 1987 to 2012. Panels (B) and (D)
use the estimation sample.
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Table 4.9: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Variable Description
Borrower characteristics (Compustat)
Book leverage [Long-term debt (dltt) + debt in current liabilities (dlc)] / Total assets (at).
Log(Total assets) Natural logarithm of total assets (at).
ROA Operating income before depreciation (oibdp) / Total assets (at).
Negative debt-to-cash flow [Long-term debt (dltt) + debt in current liabilities (dlc)] / [Operating in-
come before depreciation (oibdp) + Depreciation and amortization (dp).
Equal to 1 for negative values.
High debt-to-cash flow [Long-term debt (dltt) + debt in current liabilities (dlc)] / [Operating in-
come before depreciation (oibdp) + Depreciation and amortization (dp).
Equal to 1 for the top quartile.
Sales growth Growth in sales/turnover (net) [(sale - sale (t - 1)) / sale (t - 1)].
Rating dummy Equal to 1 if a firm has any rating from Standard & Poors, Fitch, Moody’s,
or Duffs & Phelps.
Tangibility [Property, plant and equipment (ppent) / Total assets (at).
Pre-reform borrower characteristics (Compustat/Dealscan, average for 2004 and 2005)
Refinancing need Dummy variable equal to 1 for borrowers with a loan in Dealscan with
an issuance date prior to 2005 and a maturity date in 2006 or 2007.
Firm rating Numerical credit rating, ranging from AAA to D.
Log(Total assets) Natural logarithm of total assets (at).
Market leverage [Long-term debt (dltt) + debt in current liabilities (dlc)] / [Market value
of capital (csho × prcc_c + dlc + dltt)].
Loan characteristics (Dealscan)
Interest rate spread Interest rate spread, usually over LIBOR, in basis points.
Log(Maturity) Natural logarithm of loan maturity in months.
Log(Loan size) Natural logarithm of facility amount in million USD.
Collateral dummy Equal to 1 if loan is backed by collateral.
Relationship dummy Equal to 1 if a firm received a bank from the same lead bank before.
Term loan dummy Equal to 1 if loan is a term loan.
Bankruptcy district characteristics (US Courts)
Exposure The share of non-business cases in the total weighted caseload.
High congestion dummy Equal to 1 for districts in the top quartile of a state’s Exposure; 0 for the
bottom quartile. Missing for states with a single district.
County characteristics (BEA/US Census)
Manufacturing emp. share Share of employees working in manufacturing in 2003 (BEA).
Finance emp. share Share of employees working in finance in 2003 (BEA).
Income per capita Income per capita in 2003 (BEA).
Population density Population scaled over county area (Census).
Republican vote (2000) Republican share in total votes (Census).
High school graduates/Pop. Share of population with a high school degree or higher (Census).
Asians/Pop. Share of population classified as Asian (Census).
Hispanics/Pop. Share of population classified as Hispanic (Census).
African-Americans/Pop. Share of population classified as African American (Census).
Owner-occ. housing share Share of housing occupied by owners (Census)
∆ Real estate emp. (’01-’06) Percentage change in the number of employees in real estate (BEA).
∆ Construction emp. (’01-’06) Percentage change of construction employees (BEA).
House price growth (’02-’06) Percentage change in the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s All-
Transactions house price index between 2002 and 2006. I fill in house
prices in the following order: five-digit ZIP code, three-digit ZIP code,
county, state.
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B BAPCPA and Court Efficiency – Evidence from Chapter 7 Costs
Table 4.11: EFFECT OF BAPCPA ON CHAPTER 7 CASE OUTCOMES
This table shows the estimated coefficients of case-level regressions on the effect of BAPCPA on
chapter 7 case outcomes reported to the US Trustee Program. The regression specification is
Yc = αs + αt + βPost−BAPCPAt × Exposures + γXc + εc,
where c, s, and t index bankruptcy cases, states, and year-months, respectively . Postt is a
dummy equal to 1 for the years 2006 and 2007, and 0 for 2004 and 2005. Exposures is the
share of the weighted non-business bankruptcy caseload in the total district caseload in 2003. Be-
cause the UST office regions and bankruptcy districts cannot be clearly assigned to each other,
the sample is restricted to the 27 states with a single bankruptcy district. The case-level control
variables Xc are the log number of days a case took and the logarithm of the total amount of
gross receipts. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered by state and year-month.
Court Costs/ Net Receipts/
Log(Total Fees) Log(Court Costs) Total Fees Fees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post-BAPCPA × Exposure -0.204*** -1.389*** -0.060*** 0.699***
(0.069) (0.274) (0.010) (0.192)
Log(Days) 0.300*** 0.785*** 0.016*** -0.764***
(0.006) (0.024) (0.001) (0.018)
Log(Gross Receipts) 0.879*** 0.090*** -0.007*** 0.403***
(0.003) (0.008) (0.000) (0.009)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 86,951 86,951 86,879 86,879
Adj. R2 0.896 0.085 0.087 0.211
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Figure 4.7: THE IMPACT OF BAPCPA ON CONSUMER CHAPTER 7 OUTCOMES
PANEL A: LOG(TOTAL BANKRUPTCY FEES)
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PANEL B: COURT COSTS / TOTAL BANKRUPTCY FEES
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These figures show the dynamic effect of BAPCPA on chapter 7 outcomes in cases supervised by the
US Trustee Program. They plot the estimated coefficients β of the regression Yc = β
2007q4∑
t=2004q1
Dt ×
Exposures + γXc + αt + αs + εc, where Yc refers to the natural logarithm of total bankruptcy fees
in panel A and the ratio of court costs to total bankruptcy fees in Panel B. The sample are the 27 states
with a single bankruptcy district. Xc includes the log number of court days and log value of gross pro-
ceeds of each case as control variables. I also include state (s) and year-month (t) fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered by state and year-month.
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C Does Exposure to BAPCPA Capture Lower Ex-Post Borrower
Risk?
Table 4.12: FIRM BANKRUPTCIES AROUND BAPCPA AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
This table presents the estimated coefficients of panel regressions on the district-year level. The de-
pendent variable is the change in the number of bankruptcy cases/employees in a district, where bank-
ruptcies refer to all firm cases in column (1) and (2) and chapter 11 cases in column (3) and (4). All
regressions include district and year fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered
by district and year.
∆ Firm Cases/Employees ∆ Ch. 11 Cases/Employees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post-BAPCPA × Exposure 0.064 -0.042
(0.147) (0.055)
Crisis × Exposure -0.033 -0.050
(0.047) (0.034)
Observations 1,280 2,560 1,280 2,560
Adj. R2 0.136 0.111 0.078 0.045
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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D Additional Robustness Checks
Table 4.13: BAPCPA AND LOAN CONTRACT TERMS: LEGISLATIVE STEPS
This table presents estimated coefficients of the relation between corporate loan terms and
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). The
dependent variables is the interest rate spread or natural logarithm of the loan matur-
ity. Post − BAPCPA is 0 for the years 2004 and 2005; and 1 for the years 2006 and
2007. Senate Intro. is 1 for the period after February 1, 2005, and 0 otherwise. Sen-
ate Pass is 1 for the period after March 10, 2005, and 0 otherwise. Applied is 1 for
the period after October 17, 2005, and 0 otherwise. See text for description of other
variables. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered by district and year.
Interest rate spread Log(Maturity)
(1) (2)
Post-BAPCPA × Exposure -117.098*** 0.693***
(31.399) (0.197)
Senate Intro. × Exposure -3.717 -0.286*
(21.912) (0.164)
Senate Pass × Exposure -4.737 0.163
(15.327) (0.099)
Applied × Exposure -0.237 -0.126
(11.861) (0.084)
Observations 3,445 3,445
Adj. R2 0.778 0.546
Loan facility controls Yes Yes
Borrower controls Yes Yes
Borrower FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
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Table 4.16: BAPCPA AND LOAN CONTRACT TERMS: ALTERNATIVE STANDARD
ERRORS
This table presents estimated coefficients of the relation between corporate loan terms and the Bank-
ruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). The dependent variables
are loan maturity or interest rate spread of a loan facility (both in natural logarithm). BAPCPA is 0 for
the years 2004 and 2005; and 1 for the years 2006 and 2007. Exposure is a bankruptcy district’s share of
non-business bankruptcy cases in 2003. See text for description of control variables. Standard errors re-
ported in parentheses are clustered as indicated, with clustering by district and year being the baseline.
Interest Rate Spread Log(Loan Maturity)
(1) (2)
Post-BAPCPA × Exposure -146.425 1.208
S.E. Cluster
Robust (59.812)** (0.324)***
District × Year (59.292)** (0.252)***
District (73.788)** (0.381)***
State × Year (58.709)*** (0.258)***
State (60.774)** (0.328)***
Borrower × Year (64.186)** (0.325)***
Borrower (69.565)** (0.359)***
Bank × Year (61.662)** (0.444)***
Bank (71.285)** (0.471)**
Loan controls Yes Yes
Borrower controls Yes Yes
Post-BAPCPA × County controls Yes Yes
Borrower FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
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E Social Cost Estimation – Additional Details
This section provides additional details on the inputs required to conduct a back-of-
the-envelope calculation for the macroeconomic costs of excessive bankruptcy court
caseload. The approach taken by Drehmann et al. (2015) requires estimates of the
outstanding debt, average interest rates, and average maturity of non-financial cor-
porations.
As outlined above, I use data from the US Financial Accounts to measure total
outstanding debt. At the end of 2004, US non-financial corporates had $5,070.1 billion
in debt, out of which $2,123.8 were loans and $2,946.3 bonds. At the end of 2016, total
debt was $7,680, out of which $2,598.8 were loans and $5,081.2 bonds.
For the interest rates on the outstanding stock of loans, data from the Federal Re-
serve’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending (Table E.2) suggests that the weighted-
average effective loan rate on commercial and industrial loans was 3.39 percent in
2004, and 2.53 percent in 2016. For bonds, I construct the weighted-average coupon
for bonds that were outstanding in 2016 from the Mergent Fixed Income Securities
Database (FISD); this yields a bond interest rate of 5.39 percent for 2004 and 3.39 per-
cent for 2016.
Calculating the interst burden also requires an estimate of the maturity of outstand-
ing (rather than newly issued) loans and bonds. This is difficult in practice, because
average remaining maturities may differ widely from contractual maturities due to
refinancing arrangements such as rollovers. For loans, I thus use the generic 13 years
average remaining maturity as in Drehmann et al. (2015) and the average corporate
bond maturity reported in the World Bank Global Financial Database (10.8 years for
2004 and 12 years for 2016). Note that constructing a measure of the maturity of out-
standing bonds from Mergent FISD data yields almost equivalent maturities.
With these ingredients, one can calculate the total non-financial interest burden as
InterestRate
(1−(1+InterestRate)−Maturity) ×Debt. This yields a total interet rate burden of $571.6 billion
for 2004 and $759.6 billion for 2016.
How do these values compare to what is reported by the BIS? For Q4/2016, for
example, they report a debt service ratio for the US non-financial corporate sector of
40.1% (relative to corporate income). To arrive at the interest rate burden, we thus
need a measure of corporate income. According to data from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis, the sum of after-tax profits of non-financial corporate businesses and net
interest and miscellaneous payments – which is what the BIS measure is based on –
totaled $1,258.9 in the same quarter. Put together, this suggests a corporate interest
rate burden of $504.8 billion, slightly lower than my estimate. The total profits of all
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non-financial businesses (including those not incorporated), minus taxes on corporate
income, were $2,582.4 billion – implying an interest burden of about $1,035.5 billion.40
As such, my baseline estimate of $759.6 billion seems reasonable.
In the formula-based estimation, I change the inputs in the interest burden calcula-
tion to reflect permanent changes in financing terms due to a drop in the bankruptcy
caseload per judge. Because the average maturities and interest rates differ for bonds
and loans, the results are also weighted by the share of these in aggregate. More form-
ally, I use a firm-level version of equation 4.3 in the main text:
Interest Burdeni =
Interest Rateb
(1− (1 + Interest Rateb)−Maturityb) ×Debti ×
Bonds
TotalDebt
+
Interest Ratel
(1− (1 + Interest Ratel)−Maturityl) ×Debti ×
Loans
TotalDebt
,
(4.8)
where the subscripts b and l refer to bonds and loans, respectively. Equation 4.8 is
calculated separately with the original inputs specified above and the new inputs as-
suming a change in caseload on spreads (and maturities). The difference between the
original and new inputs, then, is the change in interest burden.
For the BAPCPA estimation, for example, I replace the loan interest rate (Interest Ratel)
of 3.39 percent pre-BAPCPA with 0.0339− (0.00406×Exposurei), where 0.00406 is the
estimated effect of the caseload drop of 493 hours per judge around BAPCPA relative
to the estimated coefficient of Exposure on the caseload drop of 1, 092.878. Exposurei
is a firm’s non-business caseload share. For the “excessive caseload” estimation, I use
a district’s actual drop in the caseload per judge instead of Exposurei.
As outlined above, incorporating maturities has a substantial effect on the debt bur-
den of US corporates. This is intuitive, because even relatively small changes in the
average time to maturity of the stock of debt reduce the annual payments. Drehmann
et al. (2015), for example, show that changing the assumption of an average 13-year
maturity on the debt of non-financial corporate debt in their sample to 10 years in-
creases the ratio of debt service to corporate income by around 20%.
40This number is calculated as the difference of “Nonfinancial business; income before taxes”
($2,904.7 billion) and “Nonfinancial corporate business; taxes on corporate income” ($322.3 billion),
both from the Federal Reserve’s Financial Accounts.
160
Table 4.17: THE SOCIAL COSTS OF CONGESTED COURTS – INCORPORATING MA-
TURITIES
No Change to Maturities Change to Maturities
(Direct Estimation) (Formula-Based)
In-sample Total Total
debt corporate debt corporate debt
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Point Estimates
Exposure on maturity – – 0.285
Panel B: Aggregate Debt Service Burden (2004)
Total debt 2,686 5,070.1 5,070.1
Loans
Outstanding 2,123.8 2,123.8
Weighted-average rate (in %) 3.39 3.39
Maturity of outstanding debt (in years) 13 13
Bonds
Outstanding 2,946.3 2,946.3
Weighted-average rate (in %) 5.39 5.39
Maturity of outstanding debt (in years) 10.8 10.8
Corporate interest burden (in $ billion) 571.646 571.646
Panel C: Estimated Effect of BAPCPA
Drop in caseload per judge (average) 493 493 493
Estimated drop in spreads -40.599 -40.599 -40.599
Estimated increase in maturities – – 0.129
Savings in interest burden (in $ billion) 8.109 15.307 47.274
Panel D: Aggregate Debt Service Burden (2016)
Total debt 5,303 7,680 7,680
Loans
Outstanding 2,598.8 2,598.8
Weighted-average rate (in %) 2.53 2.53
Maturity of outstanding debt (in years) 13 13
Bonds
Outstanding 5,081.2 5,081.2
Weighted-average rate (in %) 3.39 3.39
Maturity of outstanding debt (in years) 12 12
Corporate interest burden (in $ billion) 759.65 759.65
Panel E: Estimated Effect of Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017
Drop in caseload per judge (average) 154 154 154
Savings in interest burden (in $ billion) 0.476 0.689 2.115
Required judgeships (in $ billion) 0.004 0.004 0.004
Judge multiplier 119 172 529
Net gains 0.472 0.685 2.111
Panel F: Estimated Effect of New Judges for Highly Congested Courts
Drop in caseload per judge (average) 310 310 310
Savings in interest burden (in $ billion) 0.681 0.986 3.018
Required judgeships (in $ billion) 0.008 0.008 0.008
Judge multiplier 85 123 377
Net gains 0.677 1.176 3.014
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Figure 4.8: THE RETURN ON JUDGES – CORRELATIONS WITH CASELOAD DROP
AND FIRM LOCATION
PANEL A: RETURNS TO JUDGES AND HYPOTHETICAL DROP IN CASELOAD PER JUDGE
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PANEL B: RETURNS TO JUDGES AND FIRM DEBT PER DISTRICT
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These figures plot the correlation of the estimated total savings in corporate interest burden (firm values
winsorized at 1% of the distribution) with the hypothetical drop in caseload per judge (Panel A) and
the total outstanding debt of firms in the matched Dealscan-Compustat sample by district (Panel B).
Districts where less than three firms in the sample are headquartered are omitted.
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Chapter 5
Implications for Policy and Future
Research
Up to this point, I have documented new stylized facts on credit markets around the
world and attempted to provide a few answers about what might explain them. My
results on electoral cycles and bankruptcy courts also raise the question how legal
frameworks should be designed to regulate credit markets.
These new findings, however, raise many more questions that will take more than a
single PhD thesis to answer. In this chapter, I discuss the implications of my thesis for
future research and for policy makers. I begin by showing some preliminary results
on the predictive ability of sectoral credit on banking crises, discuss implications for
international credit cycles and factors shaping financial development, and propose a
test on how to identify the effect of financial development on productivity through
credit allocation. I then consider the policy implications of my work.
5.1 Implications for Future Research
A Credit Booms under the Microscope
In chapter 2, I document how the lending of banking systems around the globe has
developed over the past 70 years. In this section, I use these data to provide some pre-
liminary evidence on what drives recurring “credit booms gone bust” in the period
after 1940, which have been subject of much attention in the wake of the Great Finan-
cial Crisis 2007-09. In particular, the granular data allow me to assess whether such
lending booms are broad-based phenomena that differ substantial on a case-by-case
basis, or rather a recurring theme concentrated in a few sectors. This has import-
ant policy implications: targeted instruments, such as macroprudential tools aimed at
the housing market, are based on the assumption that rapid credit growth in specific
sectors of the economy are particularly detrimental for medium-term macroeconomic
performance. However, an often-voiced criticism is that such policy instruments may
not get into “all the cracks” and further be subject to Goodhart’s law; once in use, say
the critics, the indicators used to activate them will lose their reliability.
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I argue that if credit booms gone wrong are “sui generis” events, there should be
little or no heterogeneity across sectors in their ability to predict banking crises.1 This
is another way of saying that such crises may be preceded by an unsustainable growth
of debt in any sector of the economy. To gain intuition, I briefly review the relevant
classes of theories on financial crises below, and then turn to an empirical test.
Theories of credit booms and financial crises: a brief review
Theories of the nature of financial crises following credit booms can be broadly grouped
into two categories: Those based on aggregate frictions or overoptimism and those
with a clear role for misallocation during the boom.2 I briefly review different classes
of theories to, which I will later Not all elements of these groups are mutually exclus-
ive, but they do make distinct predictions about why crises are costly, and whether
and how policy makers should try to prevent them.
Theories of general booms. The first group is made up of behavioral theories and
theories on financial frictions. An important idea that has gained considerable atten-
tion is that crises are fundamentally the result of periods of excessive overoptimism or
“sentiment”, which leads to flawed decision making during a boom that is ultimately
not justified by fundamentals. At the high point of overconfidence, which usually
only becomes apparent ex-post, a key event triggers the reversal of expectations, lead-
ing to a contraction in economic activity. This idea is rooted in Austrian theories, such
as Von Mises (1912) and Hayek (1929), and is probably most prominently featured in
Kindleberger (1978) and Minsky (1986); important recent formulations include Green-
wood et al. (2016) and Bordalo et al. (2017). It also meshes well with narrative accounts
of many crisis episodes where investors were convinced that “this time is different”
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009b).
Importantly, flawed belief formation in these theories is very general: It is not ne-
cessarily limited to specific sectors in the economy, such as finance, but may also hold
for households (as in Case et al., 2012), or managers more generally (e.g. Greenwood
and Hanson, 2015; Gennaioli et al., 2015). Mian and Sufi (2014a) stress how both bor-
rowers and creditors play a role in boom phases. Because broad-based sentiment is
the fundamental driver in this class of theories, many put emphasis on the unique
1I use the term “prediction” to refer to the in-sample predicted values by an independent variable
of interest. This contrasts with the term “forecast”, which refers to the out-of-sample predicted values.
2I focus here on explanations with financial frictions or agents without perfectly rational expect-
ations. A large body of research shows that such frictions matter, and that return predictability with
proxies of “sentiment” or “mispricing” is pervasive. See, among others, Shiller (2000) and López-Salido
et al. (2017) for helpful pointers to the relevant literature.
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nature of “bubble” episodes. For example, Kindleberger (1978) revisits crisis episodes
arising from overinvestment in asset classes as diverse as Tulips, railroads, or govern-
ment lending. Many authors have highlighted the role of utility and technology stocks
in the stock market booms of the late 1920s and 1990s, respectively (see e.g. Barberis
et al., 2016). Rajan and Ramcharan (2015) study the boom-bust pattern in agricultural
land during the Great Depression.
The unifying feature of behavioral and frictional theories is that (leveraged) bubbles
can arise in very different sectors and asset classes, independent of what sets them in
motion. As such, a departure from rational expectations is not a necessary component:
Models with perfectly rational agents can generate large externalities if individuals do
not fully internalize the impact of their decisions on the macroeconomy. Such ex-post
overborrowing can be induced by mechanisms such as nominal ridigities or the zero
lower bound (e.g. Korinek and Simsek, 2016; Farhi and Werning, 2016; Eggertsson and
Krugman, 2012).
Theories of misallocation. The second category of theories has a particular role
for misallocation of resources during the boom phase preceding crises. There is now
substantial evidence that capital misallocation played a critical role in the the financial
crisis in the Eurozone countries (see e.g. Gopinath et al., 2017; Martin and Philippon,
2017).3 However, the probably most striking empirical evidence in this area comes
from the strong predictive ability of household credit, as compared to corporate credit,
for particularly costly economic contractions (Büyükkarabacak and Valev, 2010; Jordà
et al., 2014, 2015; Mian et al., 2017b).
More generally, Gorton and Ordoñez (2016) show that credit booms that are asso-
ciated with a decline in productivity growth are more likely to end badly. They ration-
alize this finding in a model where a decrease in collateral screening can trigger credit
booms, which eventually burst when the productivity slowdown leads to a wake-up
call for producing information about borrowers. Similarly, Borio et al. (2016) show
that credit booms are associated with labor reallocation towards low-productivity sec-
tors (see also Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2015). Mian et al. (2017a) show that the 1980s
banking deregulation in the US led to a boom-bust pattern in the nontradable sector,
which is usually much less productive than tradables; a similar pattern holds for the
Great Recession (Mian and Sufi, 2014a,b). In Schneider and Tornell (2004), the nontra-
dable sector is endogenously borrowing constrained, which gives rise to a boom-bust
pattern. These findings are also in line with the model of “investment hangover” in
Rognlie et al. (2014), where durable capital is overbuilt during boom times, which
3See Schivardi et al. (2017) for an assessment suggesting a more modest role for capital misallocation
in Italy.
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diverts resources away from other sectors.
Credit booms may also feature excessive risk-taking. Greenwood and Hanson
(2013) show that the share of risky firms in total debt issuance increases during credit
booms and that this increase in risk is not priced by investors: Higher lending to risky
firms is associated with lower, not higher bond returns. To the extent that the pre-
dictable reversal of this mispricing leads to economic downturns, as shown by López-
Salido et al. (2017), it could be interpreted as evidence for credit misallocation during
the boom.4
Empirical predictions. There is one fundamentally distinct prediction these two
classes of models make about the nature of credit booms. In the first group, there is no
reason to expect that the costs of such episodes such vary across sectors: crises are the
outcome of overconfidence or frictions, which are not limited to particular areas of the
economy. To the contrary, an important contribution has been to show the diversity of
“bubbly” assets. In the data, we should thus expect that credit booms generally should
predict crises; we would not expect systematic heterogeneity across sectors over the
broad sweep of modern banking history. In the second group, however, such hetero-
geneity is expected to the extent that sectors might differ in their propensity of being
subject to booms and subsequent crises. The reasons for such differences are manifold:
government subsidies or regulations, organizational incentives for lenders, differences
in industry cyclicality or the costs of screening borrowers are just some candidates that
may generate lending booms that differ in their outcomes. For the purpose of sorting
through existing theories, the source of the heterogeneity is irrelevant. What matters
is whether specific credit booms are more likely to end in crises than others.
Empirical results
In this section, I present some initial evidence on the empirical validity of the theor-
ies reviewed above based on a simple prediction framework for financial crises. I test
whether financial crises over the period 1940 through 2014 are more likely to be asso-
ciated with credit booms in particular sectors of the economy. To do so, I use a simple
log-odds prediction framework of the type:
log
P [Bit = 1|∆Ci,t−h]
P [Bit = 0|∆Cit] = α + β∆Cit + εit, (5.1)
where i and t denote countries and year, respectively. Bit is a dummy indicating
whether a country experienced a financial crisis in a given year (as defined below). Cit
4This is also related to the finding that subprime mortgages were insufficiently screened by lenders
during the housing boom (see e.g. Keys et al., 2010).
170
is a vector of five lags of changes in credit to GDP (following Schularick and Taylor,
2012), where I vary the type of credit by sector to explore heterogeneity in their pre-
dictive ability.5 Since my sample includes many countries, some of which never exper-
ienced a crisis, I present here the results without country fixed effects. In untabulated
results, I find that the findings are not affected by the inclusion of a full set of country
and/or year dummies.
To compare the ability of different types of credit growth to correctly classify fu-
ture periods into crisis and non-crisis times, I use the by now often-used Area Under
the Curve (AUC) statistic (see e.g. Schularick and Taylor, 2012; Jordà and Taylor, 2011;
Jordà et al., 2013b,a, 2015). The AUC captures the intuition that what matters for pre-
diction is the ratio of true positives to false positives; it measures whether given a
signal given by Cit is informative over and above what a coin toss would suggest. For
interpretation, an AUC with a value of 1 denotes perfect classification ability and 0.5
is perfectly uninformative. The origin of AUC use is the area of biostatistics, where
researchers have long used it to gauge, for example, the likelihood of rare illnesses
conditional on certain predictors. In the case of financial crises, it can provide a useful
benchmark to test how informative different credit measures are.
I already introduced the credit data set used for the analysis above. In addition, we
need data on financial crises. Identifying such crises across countries and time is a non-
trivial task, which has led to some disagreement between existing sources (Bordo and
Meissner, 2016). To keep the classification tractable, I follow a simple approach. First,
I identify systemic banking crises based on the data of Laeven and Valencia (2013),
which is arguably the most frequently used and reliable source that is available for a
broad cross-section of countries from 1960. I assign the crisis dummy a value for 1 in
the first year of a systematic banking crisis that was not preceded by a crisis in the pre-
vious five years. Second, I add the crisis dates from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b), Jordà
et al. (2016), and Bordo et al. (2001). Again, I require that countries did not experience
a crisis in the previous five years. In unreported regressions, I experimented with a
great deal of alternative crises classifications; it turns out, the exact definitions do not
make a difference to the results presented here.
Table 5.1 presents the regression results from estimating equation 5.1. For clarity, I
only report the sum of the five lags of credit growth. P-values are based on a joint two-
sided F-test under the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients is zero. Recall
that the coefficient sizes per se are not meaningful, because equation 5.1 is estimated
as a logit regression; the AUC, however, is comparable across models. As in the work
5I use five lags to allow for heterogeneity in the predictive horizon of different credit types for crises.
The results, however, are qualitatively unchanged when I use three lags instead.
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Table 5.1: CREDIT BOOMS AND CRISES: BROAD SECTORAL HETEROGENEITY
Dependent Variable: Banking Crisis Dummy
Total Household Corporate NFC Non-Bank Finance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆Ci,t−h 0.114*** 0.356*** 0.132*** 0.220*** 0.190
(Sum of 5 Lags) (0.270) (0.868) (0.043) (0.071) (0.122)
PseudoR2 0.051 0.063 0.049 0.046 0.021
Observations 4,040 3,093 3,091 2,118 2,287
AUC 0.665 0.678 0.700 0.648 0.613
Note: Table 5.1 shows the results from predictive regressions as in equation 5.1. Standard errors are
based on a two-sided F-test that the sum of five lags of ∆Ci,t−h is significantly different from zero.
***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. See text for details.
of Schularick and Taylor (2012), Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012), and others, credit
growth is a powerful predictor of banking crises. In column (1), I start by estimating
the baseline model with the growth of total credit to the private sector as predictor,
which enters highly significantly. This finding is reassuring, given that I am estimating
the regression using what, to my knowledge, is the largest available macroeconomic
lending dataset.
Next, I allow for heterogeneity across broad institutional sectors. In particular,
I start by dividing total credit into household and firm lending in columns (2) and
(3), respectively. This yields two findings. First, both household and corporate credit
growth predicts banking crises. This confirms earlier findings by Büyükkarabacak and
Valev (2010) in a much larger sample and also chimes well with the historical analysis
of Jordà et al. (2014) on mortgage vs. non-mortgage debt.6 Importantly, both corporate
and household credit are more informative indicators (as indicated by the AUC val-
ues) than total credit: The values here are 0.700 and 0.678, respectively, compared to
the baseline for total credit of 0.665. This suggests that there is merit to using disag-
gregated measures for predicting crises, but also that it is difficult to rule out particular
corporate lending booms as harmful for financial stability.
I explore this issue further by dissecting total corporate credit into its non-financial
and (non-bank) financial components in columns (4) and (5). This is an attempt to ex-
tend previous findings, where corporate credit usually includes both types; the down-
6As a reference point, the total observation count here is almost ten times that of Büyükkarabacak
and Valev (2010) and double the historical data used in Jordà et al. (2015); yet, the basic finding holds.
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side is that the observation count decreases, which is driven by the availability of
lending to the non-bank financial sector. Perhaps surprisingly, I find that growth in
the non-financial corporate credit segment retains a significant classification ability
with an AUC of 0.648, while non-bank finance does not seem to matter. The sum of
the coefficients on the latter are statistically indistinguishable from zero and the AUC
only 0.613.
Table 5.3: CREDIT BOOMS AND CRISES: DETAILED SECTORAL HETEROGENEITY
Dependent Variable: Banking Crisis Dummy
Corporate credit Household credit
Total Agriculture Industry CRE Wholesale/Retail Mortgage Consumer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆Ci,t−h 0.114*** -0.160 0.298 0.447*** 0.684*** 0.344*** 55.268**
(Sum of 5 Lags) (0.270) (0.259) (0.246) (0.121) (0.179) (0.129) (26.509)
PseudoR2 0.051 0.009 0.010 0.047 0.034 0.049 0.042
Observations 4,040 3,027 2,909 2,842 2,878 2,064 1,927
AUC 0.665 0.512 0.556 0.650 0.661 0.653 0.715
Note: Table 5.3 shows the results from predictive regressions as in equation 5.1. Standard errors are
based on a two-sided F-test that the sum of five lags of ∆Ci,t−h is significantly different from zero.
***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. See text for details.
To understand the source of this heterogeneity, I next differentiate between more
narrowly defined corporate sectors in table 5.3: agriculture, industry (referring to man-
ufacturing and mining), construction and real estate, and wholesale/retail trade (in-
cluding hotels and restaurants). As outlined above, there is a large literature to motiv-
ate each of these sectors as potential candidates for breeding instability in the financial
system. For reference, I include the regression using total credit growth as predictor in
column (1). The results in columns (2) through (5) show that there are substantial dif-
ferences across credit booms. Consistent with previous evidence on mortgage lending
in 17 advanced economies in Jordà et al. (2014, 2015), I find that corporate credit growth
in construction and real estate is a powerful indicator for future banking crises. The
same holds true for the wholesale/retail trade sector, which is closely tied to house-
hold consumption and overlaps strongly with the definition of non-tradable indus-
tries as defined in Mian and Sufi (2014a). This evidence is also consistent with the
boom-bust pattern in the non-tradable sector often accompanying credit booms, as
documented in Mian et al. (2017a) and Mendoza and Terrones (2012). Importantly,
the ability of lending to agriculture and industry to predict financial crises is basically
zero: the estimated coefficients for these sectors are statistically insignificant and the
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AUC values close to 0.5.
I also investigate differences in the types of lending to households in columns (6)
and (7). Both mortgage and consumer credit (defined as the residual of total house-
hold lending and mortgages) predict banking crises. While the somewhat lower ob-
servation count for the disaggregated data marginally reduces the AUC for mortgages
(0.653) compared to total household credit (0.678), it is considerably larger for non-
mortgage credit (0.715). I believe to be the first to document that heterogeneity in
household lending matters for systemic crises.
The results presented here suggest that there is considerable underlying heterogen-
eity in which types of credit growth precedes financial crises. These differences are in-
consistent with at least simple versions of models where general euphoria or sentiment
drive booms (and subsequent busts), which would not suggest differences across sec-
tors. I find a role for firm and household lending, where booms in the former hurt
when they are concentrated in construction, real estate, and non-tradables. Growth
in both mortgage and non-mortgage credit to households regularly precedes crises.
These findings are consistent with misallocation during booms, where credit is sys-
tematically allocated towards a few concentrated sectors. However, it remains funda-
mentally unclear which factors are behind the occurrence of such concentrated booms
in the first place and why these sectors are particularly affected. I consider my work
as a laying the groundwork to address these questions in future research.
B International Credit Cycles
A related but distinct question to the cyclical properties of different sectors in the
loan market is why some studies find considerable co-movement of financial vari-
ables across countries. In influential work, Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2015) and
Rey (2015) show that global factors predict a considerable component of the cross-
country variation in credit aggregates, house prices, among other variables. For policy
makers, the influence of foreign central banks’ interest rates on domestic conditions is
a crucial concern, because it implies a lack of power over the national economy. As
such, Rey (2015) suggests that one of the central tenets of international economics, the
Mundell-Fleming trilemma, may not hold in modern economies.
The idea of a “global financial cycle”, however, has recently been called into ques-
tion by an analysis of actual capital flows in Cerutti et al. (2017c). The authors show
that global factors only explain a small fraction of international capital flows, the most
plausible candidate for cross-country transmission. However, it is possible that global
factors matter for domestic credit – and I hope the sectoral database I have constructed
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will be useful in assessing this empirically.
In particular, a pressing question is what types of credit co-move across countries,
and to which extent this may be driven by global industry-level shocks or country-
specific trends. The long-run nature of my data also allows for an agnostic approach
in studying breaks in such co-movements across countries. As such, one can let the
data dictate a classification of different periods of international credit cycles, which
can then be re-aligned with the historical narrative and policy variables such as capital
account openness.
C Credit Markets in the Long-Run
While the main contribution of the new database I have constructed is setoral data, it
also includes new long-run time series on total credit to the private sector for many
countries. I relied extensively on historical secondary sources that have not been
tapped into before to study banking – such as statistical publications of the League
of Nations and United Nations. In other cases, I was able to use collections of histor-
ical statistics compiled by other researchers or archival publications of national central
banks. The result is a dataset on total credit that spans back to 1910 for many dozens
of countries, many of which are still classified as “developing” today.
These data are interesting for two reasons. First, they add to the seminal work of
Schularick and Taylor (2012) by providing researchers studying credit dynamics with
long-run data for a broader cross-section of countries. Second, they allow for a much
richer analysis of what shapes the size of financial sectors around the world. What is
particularly interesting here is the long-standing debate whether “deep parameters”
(such as the legal origin of a country’s judicial system imposed by colonial powers) or
time-varying factors (such as political decisions) play a more important role (La Porta
et al., 1997, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Equipped with cross-country variation in
credit market size for more than 100 years, it would be possible to much more credibly
investigate these questions.
D Financial Development and Credit Allocation
The Great Financial Crisis of 2008-2009 was a stark reminder that the financial sec-
tor can be a source of substantial macroeconomic turmoil. It also marks an important
caesura in economic thought: while bubbles and overlending were known to play
a role in financial crises (e.g. Minsky, 1977; Kindleberger, 1978), the overwhelming
consensus was that the growth of the financial sector would beget growth of the mac-
roeconomy, and thus benefit society (Zingales, 2015).
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Research after the global financial crisis has yielded a new, much more nuanced
consensus. Many studies have examined the costs imposed by overleveraged house-
holds and firms drawing on detailed micro data. On the macro level, the predictive
ability of credit growth for financial crises is now well-documented, which I have dis-
cussed in detail above. An influential line of empirical research goes a step further than
highlighting these risks, arguing that “too much finance” may indeed be detrimental
for economic growth beyond a certain threshold (Arcand et al., 2015; Cecchetti et al.,
2011; Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012). In essence, these authors argue that the posit-
ive cross-country correlation of financial development with economic growth found
in earlier – but notably, not more recent studies – masks a non-linear relationship. Out
of the many potential channels why this might be the case, an excessive allocation
of highly-skilled workers into finance has received particular attention (Cecchetti and
Kharroubi, 2015); however, some recent evidence suggests that this channel may not
have aggregate effects (D’Acunto and Frésard, 2018).
Despite these qualifications to the idea that finance benefits growth, the most meth-
odologically convincing studies appear to have withstood the test of time: the seminal
contributions by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Wurgler (2000). In brief, Rajan and
Zingales argue that more developed financial systems allocate capital more to indus-
tries that are financially constrained for technological reasons, which they dub “de-
pendence on external financing”. In the data, they show that – after conditioning on
country and industry fixed effects – sectors with a higher dependence on external fin-
ancing show a higher growth in value added in countries with larger financial sectors
(relative to GDP). Wurgler’s approach is similar in spirit: he shows that industries in
countries with more developed financial sectors show a higher sensitivity of invest-
ment to value added, which he takes as finance increasing the efficiency of resource
allocation. It seems fair to say that, despite the post-crisis soul searching in the eco-
nomics profession, the conclusions from these two studies are regarded as nearly too
obvious to mention by many financial economists.
Of course, every study is a product of its time, and the use of within-country vari-
ation to identify causal effects rests on econometric assumptions that are considered
much less plausible today than they were in the late 1990s. For example, we know that
measures of financial development – such as the ratio of private credit to GDP – are
highly correlated with a sheer endless number of observable country characteristics,
such as GDP per capita, productivity growth, education attainment, the rule of law,
or even cultural factors. As such, a country’s credit-to-GDP ratio can hardly be in-
terpreted as being “as good as random” across countries, the benchmark for credibly
exogenous variation in observational data. Similarly, there is no reason to believe that
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an industry’s technologically-determined demand for external financing should not
change over time; be fixed across countries (assuming equal production functions); or
be distributed “as good as randomly” across sectors. It is also not clear why an in-
dustry’s sensitivity of investment to value added solely measures of “efficiency”. This
opens the door to alternative explanations, for example that industries with a higher
sensitivity to aggregate productivity shocks grow faster in more developed countries
– and that the causal impact of financial development is zero.
The main difficulty in assessing the conclusions of the work by Rajan and Zingales,
and Wurgler, is that they are using macroeconomic outcomes (value added and invest-
ment) to indirectly infer a role for the financial sector. While credit and “real” economic
outcomes often move hand-in-hand, the over-leveraging of construction and real es-
tate companies in the run-up to the 2008 Eurozone crisis is only one particularly strik-
ing reminder that this may not always be the case.
In ongoing work, I propose a simple, direct test for whether a larger financial sector
benefits the allocation of credit to efficient but financially constrained sectors using the
sectoral credit database I have assembled. In contrast to Rajan and Zingales (1998) and
Wurgler (2000), I can directly investigate whether a higher ratio of credit-to-GDP, for
example, is associated with a reallocation of credit towards industries that are highly
dependent on external financing. Apart from the data on the amount of sectoral credit,
I have also collected a considerable amount of data on sectoral interest rate spreads.
By combining data on prices and quantities, I could infer whether credit supply factors
(as stressed by Rajan & Zingales) or demand are the driving force.
To be clear, the idea of this test is not to interpret the estimates as causal effects, al-
though the staggered implementation of banking reforms throughout the world start-
ing in the 1970s may provide some opportunity to construct an identification strategy.
Rather, I want to assess whether the correlations found with value added data indeed
coincide with changes in credit markets or reflect other factors. Of course, a lack of
a correlation does not imply that larger financial sectors cannot have a causal effect,
because we do not have a credible counterfactual without exogenous variation. Nev-
ertheless, a zero or even negative correlation would make it much less plausible that it
is indeed financial development that causes a more efficient resource allocation, which
is the preferred interpretation of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Wurgler (2000).
5.2 Implications for Policy
Since the Great Financial Crisis of 2008-2009, policy makers have grappled with the
question of how to re-design financial regulation in the wake of massive bank failures,
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skyrocketing stocks of non-performing loans, and deep macroeconomic downturns.
One of the major policy innovations has been to establish frameworks for the real-
time identification of systemic risk – usually associated with strong increases in the
growth of asset prices, credit, and a compression of risk premia. If these could be
identified with reasonable accuracy, the story goes, the most costly financial crises
may be prevented – or at least their damage contained – by “leaning against the wind”
using macroprudential and/or monetary policy.
At the heart of the dilemma that policy makers face is, of course, that such policies
are likely costly ex-ante in states of favorable economic prospects. In particular, they
have to be squared and constantly justified in light of the large body of evidence sug-
gesting that access to finance is, in fact, an important determinant of growth on the
firm and macroeconomic level (Fraser et al., 2015, e.g.). This is especially true for
emerging economies: if a country’s firms and households face severe constraints in
accessing credit (Ayyagari et al., 2017), a potential worsening of such constraints with
the stated goal of preventing potentially costly crises is a hard sell politically.
I believe that the work presented in this thesis has implications for financial regula-
tion that might be helpful in addressing these challenges. A first insight is as important
as it is trivial, once one has seen the data: most countries around the globe have not
experienced sustained growth in firm lending relative to GDP over the past three dec-
ades. It is disconcerting that this is particularly true for emerging economies, which
do not only have much less developed financial sectors, but are usually also far from
estimated thresholds for potential effects of finance and growth (Arcand et al., 2015).
What is even more disconcerting is that the stalling of corporate credit growth has not
been offset by bond markets, cross-border lending, or trade credit. If one takes mod-
els seriously that consider heterogeneity in credit allocation (Matsuyama, 2007, 2013),
this suggests that many countries may be caught in “bubbly growth traps” (Tripathy,
2017), where credit growth does not contribute to growth but still increases the risk of
costly bubbles.
What does this mean from a policy perspective? It is obviously tempting to con-
clude that the results of the finance-growth literature do not imply that financial de-
regulation benefits growth, and that credit policy (such as that used by France in the
post-WWII period (Monnet, 2014)) should be used to steer the allocation of financing
towards high-productivity sectors. Some support for such conclusions even comes
from the deregulation episodes in the United States – often cited as the best evidence
for the positive impact of lifting regulatory restrictions – which may have discouraged
innovators that depend on relationship lending (Hombert and Matray, 2017). In my
data, I also find that financial deregulation is associated with higher share of house-
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hold credit, which has been associated with more crises, but not higher growth (Jordà
et al., 2014; Beck et al., 2012).
Nevertheless, I would argue that such conclusions would be ill-advised given the
current state of research. The main reason is that the institutional requirements for
implementing an efficient system of credit controls are likely steep: even in the case
of France, there is evidence that the lifting of these controls in the 1980s led to a more
efficient allocation of credit (Bertrand et al., 2007). Indeed, the widespread abuse of
the powers that come with directing credit has been one of the primary motivations
for international organizations and academics to call for their liberalization in the first
place. It remains for future research to determine efficient policies to influence the
allocation of credit without brute force. The German system of local savings banks
and cooperative banks, for example, might be an interesting case study, because it is
often seen as an important backbone of the country’s industry despite being de-facto
subject to geographical and sectoral lending restrictions.
A related question is whether countries should use their macroprudential policy
arsenal to limit the flow of credit to particular crisis-prone sectors. At first glance,
the preliminary results I presented in the previous section are clearly supportive: in
the modern history of banking crises since 1940, only lending to a few sectors was
systematically associated with future crises. If one is willing to accept these initial
findings at face value, policy tools that prevent excess growth of credit to construction
and non-tradable sectors may help to prevent the worst financial meltdowns.
But again, great powers confided to regulators may come with great temptations.
Because access to credit is a salient aspect of the daily lives of most individuals, it
may not be entirely surprising that I find a lower likelihood of tightening for targeted
prudential policy in the run-up to elections. However, the policy implications of this
finding are potentially enormous, particularly because this electoral cycle does not
seem to depend on the degree of central bank independence or the quality of other in-
stitutions. Indeed, the existence of an electoral cycle makes it difficult to judge whether
the already hard-to-gauge welfare effects of sectoral lending restrictions are positive.
I believe that some help in this dilemma may come from my work on judicial effi-
ciency in chapter 4 and other studies in the law and finance literature. Fundamentally,
credit institutions have to be able to make a profit if they are to provide loans at reas-
onable terms. This requires creditors to compensate for the fact that some fraction of
borrowers will default by recovering some of the value of their debt claims. Recovery
values, in turn, are to a large extent a function of bankruptcy regimes and the efficiency
of the court system.
It does not seem to be widely appreciated that recovery values may be a direct
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link between legal frameworks and their enforcement on the allocation of credit and
financial stability. This is because a firm’s ability to pledge collateral (and thus its ex-
pected recovery values) are negatively correlated with firm productivity (Buera et al.,
2011). During credit booms that end in crises, in turn, credit appears to be primar-
ily allocated to sectors with low productivity (Gorton and Ordoñez, 2016; Borio et al.,
2016). This also meshes with my findings that financial crises tend to be preceded by
booms in lending to the non-tradable sector, which tends to be less productive than
manufacturing.
Taken together, this suggests that structuring legal frameworks to make it more
profitable for creditors to lend to borrowers with higher productivity may be a hitherto
underappreciated way to address financial stability issues. Campello and Larrain
(2016), for example, show that allowing firms to pledge more specific types of collat-
eral leads to substantial reallocation effects. Because specific assets have lower liquid-
ation values (see e.g. Benmelech, 2009) and are thus more productive, such reforms
might be a way to sidestep political economy limitations.
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